

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.
Report of the Madras Standing Congress
Committee for 1889.

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ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

Madras Standing Congress Committee

FOR

1889.

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The Madras Standing Congress Committee begs to submit its report for the year 1889.

On Wednesday, the 13th March, the first general meeting of the resident delegates to the Indian National Congress Meetings was held in the Hall of the Mahajana Sabha Office, under the presidency of M. R. Ry. P. Somasundaram Chettiar, and an Executive Committee consisting of one President, two Vice-Presidents, 32 members and 2 Secretaries was appointed for the transaction of the business of the Standing Congress Committee for the current year.

During the year there were held four general meetings, at which the proceedings of the previous meetings of the Committee were confirmed. Twelve meetings of the Executive Committee were held, at which several important subjects relating to the furtherance of the objects of the Congress in the Presidency were taken into consideration and fully discussed. The one marked feature of the work done during the year was the appointment of separate Sub-Committees to consider and report on several of the questions referred to them by the General Secretary, Mr. A. O. Hume. By such a system the Committee was able to do a large amount of work.

The first business of importance which engaged the attention of the Committee was the further division of this Presidency into several electorates. Such a division the Committee thought to be essential for a regular and speedy despatch of all business connected with the Congress. The Committee has accordingly divided this Presidency into 36 electorates, and in each of these, it must be noted, there have sprung up Sub-Committees, embracing almost all the important towns of the District. Much has been done by these District Committees and Sub-Committees during the period under notice to popularize the aims and objects of the Congress by means of public lectures, mass meetings, and distribution of pamphlets.

The next business that engaged the attention of the Committee was the drafting of a scheme for the reform and expansion of the Legislative Councils in India. Hitherto at the several Congress Meetings resolutions were simply passed advocating the necessity of such a reform. But no definite scheme had been drawn up and placed before the Congress. The Madras Committee went one step further this year in laying before the public a scheme of its own. The Committee is glad to note that this step has elicited more public discussion on the subject. At a meeting of the Committee, a Sub-Committee was appointed to draw up a report on the letter of Mr. A. O. Hume, the General Secretary, a copy of which will be found elsewhere. (vide Appendix A.) Taking this letter as its basis the Sub-Committee held several sittings, and ultimately drew up an elaborate scheme (vide Appendix B) which was approved and adopted by the Committee as well as by the general body of delegates. A large number of copies of this report was printed and widely circulated. The Committee feels glad that in his Draft Bill Mr. Charles Bradlaugh has incorporated most of the provisions of that report, though the Honorable Member does not, it would seem, approve of the electorate proposed by the Madras Committee. The Committee dissents strongly and unanimously from the proposal to make the Municipalities, Local Fund Boards, &c., the electorate for the Legislative Councils for reasons given in the elaborate and fairly exhaustive report of the Sub-Committee printed elsewhere. (vide Appendix D). The Committee feels

of the report of the Sub-Committee appended to this volume will convince the general public of the utility and comparative excellence of the scheme of the Madras Standing Congress Committee.

In November last, the Committee issued a general circular to all the District Committees asking these to hold public meetings and to elect Delegates for the fifth Congress. In connection with this subject the Committee begs to state that it has not laid down any hard and fast rules with regard to the number which each electorate ought to elect, there being some difference of opinion in regard to this point. In response to this circular there were public meetings held for electing Delegates in all the electorates as well as in certain important towns and public Associations. In the city of Madras there were held four public meetings as usual in each of the four electorates for the purposes of election. These Meetings were largely attended and were presided over by Mr. P. Somasundaram Chettiar, Rajah T. Rama Row, Moulvie Mahomed Mahomed Nizamudeen Khan Bahadur and Sir Savalai Ramasawmy Mudaliar, Kt., C.I.E. All these four are leading citizens in this city. Mr. P. Somasundram Chettiar is the leader of the progress party, almost by prescription the President of every movement aiming at the general welfare and amelioration of all classes. Rajah T. Rama Row is an ex-member of the local Legislative Council, a distinction he enjoyed for six years upon whom the Government conferred the title of Rajah in the year of the Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen Empress. Moulvie Mahomed Nizamudeen Khan Bahadur is one of the leading Mahomedan noblemen in this city and the son-in-law of the late Prince of Arcot. He is also the much respected and esteemed Secretary of the Anjumani-Muffidi-Islam of Madras. Lastly Sir Savalai Ramasawmy Mudaliar, Kt., C.I.E., is one of our most affluent and charitable citizen known throughout India for the numerous public institutions and individuals who have benefitted by his donations. He is also an ex-Sheriff of Madras. The Committee feels glad to be able to state that a large number of people attended and evinced a great interest in the proceedings of these Meetings.

Another distinguishing feature in the growth of the Congress movement in this Presidency is the increasing number of European gentlemen that manifest an interest in it; and it is particularly gratifying to the Committee that its labours and the labours of others co-operating with it in the cause of political advancement are gradually commending themselves to so influential a community. It is satisfactory to note that at several public meetings held for the purpose of electing delegates during the year, European gentlemen engaged in Christian Missionary labour have not only presided but also manifested their warm sympathy both by words and deeds. The intellectual emancipation of the Indian people owes a great debt to this latter agency; and in the great work of political emancipation the Committee perceives plain proofs that a sensible proportion of the eventual results will be contributed from the same quarter.

In conclusion, the Standing Congress Committee of Madras has to record in the course of the year for the whole Presidency patriotic work which both in quantity and quality is hopeful. So far as the urban parts are concerned the Committee may say that the organization is complete. In the rural parts it has put forth important branches. It has not covered the whole Presidency yet; but the Committee hopes to see considerable progress made during the next year in this important direction. There has been sober and steady progress, which, as time rolls on, will gather fresh impetus from the ever increasing conviction among all classes of the community that the best interest of England and of India are united in the political development of this vast and splendid continent.

(Signed) P. SOMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR,

AWMY NAIDU.

President.

AGHAVACHARIAR.

Secretaries.

APPENDIX A.

To

THE SECRETARY OF THE MADRAS

STANDING CONGRESS COMMITTEE.

SIR,

It may be necessary to put on record in more exact detail than has hitherto been done, some indication of the manner in which a great many of the leading members of the Congress party are, with the information *now* at their command, disposed to think that a representative element might be introduced into the administration.

Of course, nothing that may be said by any one outside the four corners of the Resolutions passed by the Congress is more than an individual opinion. But in my case, before giving that individual opinion, even confidentially, I desire to make sure that it is generally in accord with the views held by the leading members of our party.

I have listened to the speeches and have read the writings of many of these. I have discussed the question with most of them, at one time or another and I have recently been in correspondence with several of them on this subject, and I find that in one or two particulars the scheme that we put forward in 1886 does not fully represent the present feeling on the subject.

Since 1886 the country has been organized; in many provinces the organization is nearly perfect; in all except one very small circle, it is being carried out. Things that in 1886 seemed impossible now appear to present little real difficulty. But, despite the great progress made in the last four years, I believe that we are all as firmly convinced as ever that the country is not fit yet for representative *Government*, as it at present obtains in Great Britain, and that all we require is that a substantial proportion of the *advisers* of the Government should be elected representatives of the inhabitants.

I desire now to summarize what I believe to be, at the present time, the general view, and to ascertain whether, broadly speaking, it commends itself to your committee.

Except in matters of detail that view is, substantially, identical that enunciated by the Congress in 1886, but these details are of some importance.

1. *The Council (both local and of the Governor-General) to be enlarged, so as to comprise not less than 24 or more than 48 members.
2. In the cases of all the Councils one-fourth of the members to be *ex-officio*, one-fourth to be nominated by Government, one half to be elected.
3. The elected members of all the Councils to be elected by electoral colleges, one in each presidency or province, who will elect both the members for the Council (if any) of their own province, and the members who are to represent their province on the Council of the Governor-General. It will rest with the Governor-General in Council to decide what proportion of the elected members of his Council shall be furnished by each presidency or province.
4. The electoral college of each presidency and province is to consist of members, three-fourths to be elected by all the electoral divisions of such province, and one-fourth to be nominated† by the Government of such province.
5. The electoral divisions to be of two classes—
 - 1st.—Territorial, each comprising as may be found locally most convenient.—
 - (a) one or more wards of a city, or

* This scheme refers only to British India proper, and excludes Burmah and all the Native and Feudatory States, though it is obvious that, hereafter at any rate, these likewise should be in some way represented on the Governor-General's Council.

† This is of great importance at first starting, because this will enable the Government to make sure that all interests and all sections of the community are *fairly* and *adequately* represented in the college.

- (b) a whole city or town, or
- (c) a town and portion of a district, or
- (d) a whole district, or
- (e) (*in very backward portions of the country*) two or more districts.

The territorial divisions between them to embrace the entire area of the province.

2nd.—Sectional (to ensure the representation of minorities) to consist of sections of the community, of sufficient importance to deserve representation, but yet numerically too weak to be able to secure certainly adequate representation in the ordinary territorial divisions. Examples of these* are the Parsee community in Bombay; the Christian community of Nuggur and other places; the European merchants and tradesmen of our large cities; the European planters of Assam, Darjeeling, Behar, the Nilgiris, &c.; the Mahomedan communities of Calcutta and some other places where the Mahomedans are in the minority; the Anglo-Indian and Eurasian communities at several centres, &c.

6. The total number of members of the electoral college to be elected for any presidency or province to be at the rate of five per million for the entire population of the province. That total number to be divided over the whole number of divisions, territorial and sectional, with reference, not merely to the population, but also to the intelligence, stake in the country, &c., of the constituents of each division.

7. In both classes of divisions the franchise to be enjoyed by all males of 21 years of age and upwards, who are able to read and write and who (a)† have not within the previous ten years been in jail under conviction (not subsequently reversed) for a non-bailable offence, and who (b) either pay, yearly, revenue or rent of not less than Rs. ‡ to Government or to some superior holder, on account of land or premises, or pay yearly direct taxes (imperial, provincial or local) in the aggregate of not less than Rs § or are graduates of some University. ||

No person to vote in more than one division, and all elections, whether in the divisions or electoral colleges, to be by ballot.

As you are aware this scheme could now be immediately carried out almost everywhere. Our organization is now fast becoming such that, if the local officials, instead of opposing us (as they do in many places) were only to countenance and support our work, the registration of voters and every further steps in the programme would be perfectly easy. The point I desire to ascertain is whether this skeleton scheme does, on the whole, fairly represent the general opinion of the present day, as to how an elective element might most easily, constitutionally and wisely be introduced into the Government. Of course there are a vast number of minor details that would have to be fixed in a tentative fashion (subject to revision from time to time) for each province, by a strong committee convened *ad hoc* by the Government thereof.

It will, of course, be observed that this scheme only amplifies and gives greater precision to clauses 1—3 of our scheme propounded in Resolution IV of 1886. Clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7 are not affected by it.

These would now stand as clauses 8, 9, 10 and 11, and (I reprint them for facility of reference), run as follow:—

- (8)—No elected or nominated Member of any Council, to receive any salary or remuneration in virtue of such membership, but any such Member, already in receipt of any Government salary or allowance, to continue to draw the same unchanged during membership, and all Members to be entitled to be

* It is the general opinion now that mere associations as *such* should not be constituted electoral divisions. Where such associations represent a special section of the community *there*, that section of the community and not merely the association should be constituted a division.

† Excluding Native and Feudatory States and Burmah, the population of the countries to which our scheme would apply may be taken in round numbers at 200 millions; of these rather less than 50 millions are males above 21 years of age. Of these again 9 years ago 6½ millions could read and write, having ceased to be under instruction, while 2½ millions nearly were under instruction. At the present time fully 10 millions of males, of 21 years of age and upwards, must be able to read and write. In both Italy and Portugal, at the present time, capacity to read and write is a necessary qualification for exercising the Franchise.

‡ The exact figures in each case will have to be fixed with reference to the circumstances of the province.

§ The exact figures in each will have to be fixed with reference to the circumstances of the province.

|| It seems to be generally considered that graduates of any University should possess the Franchise independent of property qualifications.

reimbursed any expenses incurred in travelling in connection with their membership.

- (9)—All persons, resident in India, to be eligible for seats in Council, whether as electees or nominees, without distinction of race, creed, caste or colour.
- (10)—All legislative measures, and all financial questions, including all budgets, whether these involve new or enhanced taxation or not, to be necessarily submitted to and dealt with by these Councils. In the case of all other branches of the administration, any Member to be at liberty, after due notice, to put any question he sees fit to the *ex-officio* Members (or such one of these as may be specially charged with the supervision of the particular branch concerned) and to be entitled (except as hereinafter provided) to receive a reply to his question together with copies of any papers requisite for the thorough comprehension of the subject, and on this reply the Council to be at liberty to consider and discuss the question and record thereon such resolution as may appear fitting to the majority. Provided that, if the subject in regard to which the inquiry is made involves matters of Foreign policy, Military dispositions or strategy, or is otherwise of such a nature that, in the opinion of the Executive, the public interests would be materially imperilled by the communication of the information asked for, it shall be competent for them to instruct the *ex-officio* Members, or one of them, to reply accordingly, and decline to furnish the information asked for.
- (11).—The Executive Government shall possess the power of overruling the decision arrived at by the majority of the Council, in every case in which, in its opinion, the public interests would suffer by the acceptance of such decision; but whenever this power is exercised, a full exposition of the grounds on which this has been considered necessary shall be published within one month, and in the case of local Governments they shall report the circumstances and explain their action to Government of India, and in the case of this latter, it shall report and explain to the Secretary of State; and in any such case on a representation made through the Government of India and the Secretary of State by the overruled majority, it shall be competent to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons (recommended in the 3rd resolution of the 1st Congress which all subsequent Congresses have affirmed) to consider the matter, and call for any and all papers or information, and hear any persons on behalf of such majority or otherwise, and thereafter, if needful, report thereon to the full House.

Now the questions are, will this scheme, as now set forth in these various clauses I—II, satisfy fairly the present aspirations of the country, and does it possess the requisite capacity for a gradual expansion, as time goes on, into true constitutional Government?

I think that both questions must be answered in the affirmative. It is true that by asking for the election of only one-half of the members, and by them allowing the Government to nominate one-fourth of the electoral colleges that are to elect these elected members of Council, we are making only a small advance; but I believe that it is generally agreed that this is all that it is desirable to make at present. On the other hand nothing can be easier, as time goes on, and the Government becomes satisfied as to the safety and wisdom of further progress, than to expand this scheme. First, the Government may nominate one-eighth instead of one-fourth of the electoral colleges. Then it may cease to nominate at all to these. Then it may increase the number of elected members in the Council to two-thirds (even so it would command a majority in 99 cases out of 100); then to three-fourths; then it may enlarge the chambers and have all the members elected, and introduce a regular constitutional system, except in regard to some special branches of the administration and classes of question; and then, finally, our children or grand-children may inherit a perfectly constitutional system, as in Canada at the present day, the electoral colleges disappearing and the constituencies electing direct to the chambers.

On the whole does your committee endorse this scheme?

A very early reply is earnestly requested.

Yours obediently,

A. O. HUME.

CALCUTTA :
6, PARK STREET,
26th February, 1859. }

APPENDIX B.

The Congress Committee Office,

100, MOUNT ROAD,

MADRAS, 14th May, 1889.

SIR,

1. We,* the Sub-Committee, to whom the consideration of Mr. Hume's letter of the 26th February was entrusted, having met and carefully debated its contents, report as follows :—
- | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| * Mr. P. Somasundram Chettiar. | Mr. G. Subramania Iyer. | |
| „ Eardley Norton. | „ P. R. Sundram Iyer. | |
| „ W. S. Gantz. | „ N. Subramaniam. | |
| „ John Adam. | „ M. Viraraghava Chari. | |
| „ S. Ramasawmy Mudaliyar. | „ M. Ramasawmy Naidoo. | |
| „ P. Aunda Charlu. | | |

2. In view of the wide and constant misrepresentation to which the aims of the Congress have been subjected, we deem it advisable to repeat that we do not ask for a representative Government. Our demands are, and always have been, limited to a partially representative Legislative Council, which shall be distinct from the Executive. That these representative Council will in time create and consolidate unity of sentiment and a common national ambition we believe, as we believe that they will arouse a wider and deeper sense of self-respect and responsibility which, under the training of a new political life, will call into being forces which are now dormant and, by many, unsuspected. The Legislative Councils if wisely and generously constituted, will unquestionably mark the era of a new and important departure in the history of India. Even if they be conceded in a spirit of grudging unwisdom, with harassing restrictions and unnecessary impediments, reform will be only hampered and delayed, not killed. But while we hope that the reconstitution of the Legislative Councils will lead in due course of time, and by the irresistible logic of events, to the fulfilment of ambitions which are at present outside the range of practical politics, we reiterate that we neither desire nor intend for the present to secure any larger or more decisive share in the administration of the country than is embraced in the proposal to enlarge and remodel the existing Legislative Councils by a restricted application of the principle of popular election.

3. Confining ourselves exclusively to Madras, we are agreed with Mr. Hume, upon the general outlines of the contemplated reform as under :—

- (a) that the Legislative Council of the Governor-General, and the Legislative Council of the Governor of Madras shall be enlarged ;
- (b) that the minimum number of seats thereon shall be 24, and the maximum 48 ;
- (c) that one-fourth of the members of the said Councils shall sit *ex-officio* ; one-fourth as nominees of their respective Governments ; and one-half as elected members ;
- (d) that the elected members of the Legislative Council of Madras, and the elected members who shall represent the Presidency of Madras in the Legislative Council of the Governor-General shall be elected by an Electoral College, sitting, and wholly composed of residents, in the Presidency of Madras ;
- (e) that the Governor-General in Council shall decide what proportion of the elected members of his Legislative Council shall be furnished by each Presidency or Province of India.

4. But we disapprove—

- (a) of the dual electorate, territorial and sectional, which is the proposed machinery for bringing into existence the Electoral College ; and
- (b) of the proposal to hand over a one-fourth nomination of the Electoral College to the patronage of the Government.

5. First as to the dual electorate.

The objections which present themselves with regard to this scheme seem to be—

- (a) that it is too complicated ;

- (b) that it would be expensive ;
- (c) that it would create confusion and delay ;
- (d) that it would be politically undesirable as giving a large number of electors a plurality of votes.

The country is ignorant of any system of political election. Any system, therefore, to be successful, must be simple and inexpensive. A machinery that was complicated would inevitably break down. A machinery that was costly would be unsuited to the great bulk of the people. Either disadvantage would at once be eagerly seized upon by the hostile critics of the movement. It would be impossible to put the sectional divisions into motion until the territorial election was concluded ; for, as the sectional representation is suggested only to secure the rights of minorities and to rectify any inequality of representation among the smaller communities, it would obviously have to await the result of the territorial elections before the necessity for its own action, if any, could arise. It would be impossible to predict, when the polling booths were first open, among what communities there would be a deficient, and among what an excessive, representation. If, therefore, the sectional were to be made to wait upon the territorial elections, the whole period of the election would be prolonged, with the inevitable and undesirable prolongation of an unwholesome political agitation. Such a result would have a disastrous effect upon the candidates and their constituents, would seriously hamper private business and the public convenience entail a grave expenditure of money, and possibly call into existence a very perceptible bitterness of feeling and of speech. Pending the results of this inconveniently extended campaign, the meeting of the Electoral College itself would have to be deferred with consequent disadvantage to affairs of great public moment. Lastly, it would be expedient with the introduction of a totally new scheme to introduce the "one man one vote" system, towards which there is so strong an inclination to-day in England. Under the dual electorate, the same man would, in a great many instances, vote twice ; first, under this general qualifications at the territorial election, secondly, under his special qualifications at the sectional election.

6. To obviate all this, we would suggest that the elections for the College be only territorial and that there be only one general election for the first formation, and subsequent elections, of the Electoral College.

7. With a view to protect the interests of minorities we would suggest the following scheme :—

- (a) that 4-5ths of the College be elected territorially;
- (b) that the remaining 1-5th be elected by co-option by the elected 4-5ths: *provided* always that this co-option be so exercised as to ensure upon the total strength of the College a minimum representation of (say) 1-10th Mahomedan, 1-20th European and 1-20th Eurasian.

By way of explanation, we append this illustration :

If the total strength of the College be (say).....	500
then there shall be elected territorially 4-5th	=400
who shall elect by co-option 1-5th	=100=500

Supposing that among the 400 already elected, there are only 30 Mahomedans, 20 Europeans, and 7 Eurasians, then by co-option there shall be elected at least 20 Mahomedans, at least 5 Europeans, and at least 18 Eurasians. This limitation on co-option would only exist when the fixed *minimum* number of Europeans, Mahomedans and Eurasians has not been, respectively, elected territorially.

8. The most prominent recommendations of this system are its simplicity, and the celerity and cheapness with which it can be worked. It amply guards the rights of minorities, whose exact proportion upon the Electoral College would be fixed by the legislature, thus leaving little, if any, room in the College for the play of selfish considerations. The 400 members elected from among those candidates who offered themselves at the territorial election, once returned, would forthwith proceed to the election by ballot of the remaining 100, from among as many candidates as chose to offer themselves for election by co-option. By fixing the minimum of the sectional representatives, the representation of minorities is secured at the lowest computation consistent with justice. But we anticipate with confidence that the public spirit and intelligence of the general electorate will return among the territorial representatives many candidates whose aggregate shall far exceed the minimum of the sectional representatives. We feel no doubt whatever but that in many electoral divisions

Europeans, Eurasians, and Mahomedans will be returned by Hindu electors. And we look with equal confidence to the good sense, the patriotism, and the independence of the territorial members of the College for the due and impartial discharge of the trust reposed in them, that their choice under the system of co-option shall be guided by large and generous considerations of the public good. Some discretion is accorded to all bodies of men in every walk of life; and if the College cannot be credited with sufficient strength and purity to elect upon the whole the best of the candidates, it would be wise to admit at once that those for whom we propose to legislate are wholly unworthy any political consideration at all. If the country is fit to be entrusted with any instalment of the elective principle, it is equally fit to be entrusted (under safeguards) with the administration of its own elective machinery. If there be any inequality in the College of representation of minorities, in excess of the minimum, the inequality would, in the first place, speedily be remedied by advancing political education, and even if it were not so remedied, the inequality would not affect the minority representation in Council because our scheme insists upon a representation of minorities there.

9. We accept Mr. Hume's proposed qualifications for those who are to enjoy the franchise which, for the purpose of making this report so far as possible self-contained, we insert here—

“The franchise to be enjoyed by all males of 21 years of age and upwards who are able to read and write and who have not, within the previous ten years, been in jail under conviction (not subsequently reversed) for a non-bailable offence, and who either pay yearly revenue or rent of not less than Rs. 50 to Government, or to some superior holder, on account of land or premises, or for yearly direct taxes, (imperial, provincial, or local) in the aggregate of not less than Rs. 20 or all graduates of some University.”

The capacity to read and write should, we think, be satisfied by the capacity to read and write any of the vernaculars, and the possession of a degree in any University in the world should entitle its holder to a vote. But the males who are to enjoy the franchise should be limited to British subjects, born or naturalized.

10. We think that the total number of members of the Electoral College should be at the rate of 20 per million for the entire population of the Madras Presidency. It seems to us very desirable that the Electoral College should be as large as possible so as fully to include and to represent the great varieties of caste and creed, of wants, of interests and of opinion throughout the country. The importance of this becomes apparent when it is recollected that we propose to invest the College with the unfettered privilege of electing to the Legislative Council, as *bonâ fide* representatives of the people, one-half the aggregate of that Council. The due discharge of that responsibility postulates an extensive electorate, not merely large enough in its own representation to be a faithful mirror of the people's wants, but large enough as well to contain in itself the corrective to the possible existence in its ranks of private pique, of personal dislike, of amenability to influence, and of those other shortcomings so invariably associated with every political assemblance.

11. All elections shall be conducted by ballot.

12. One of the two alternatives to an Electoral College would be a representation in the Legislative Council directly elected by the various electoral divisions. The country, in our opinion, is not yet capable of effectively discharging such a responsibility. The practical difficulties in the way of securing a representation of minorities—a representation which cannot and ought not to be overlooked in the conditions which obtain in India—would appear to be insuperable under any other system than that proposed.

13. Although at one time an alternative system was suggested on behalf of Madras, whereby the members of Council might be elected by Municipal corporations, Local and District Boards, Chambers of Commerce and Universities, we consider that our present scheme is preferable. The members of these various bodies sit there as electees for a certain specific purpose. The members who will sit in Council will sit for other and distinct purposes. It would be inexpedient to give bodies elected for one specific object the right to elect on behalf of the people, whom they do not represent for this purpose, members to sit for another and a different object in another and a different assembly. Exclusion of these two sets of electorates leaves us with no other electorate than a College.

14. We have dealt so far with the electorate for the College, its constitution and its functions. We turn next to the College itself.

15. That body should, in our opinion, be thus worked; it should elect by ballot one-half of the members on the Legislative Council: *provided* that of such half it shall elect a minimum of members belonging to the European, Eurasian, and Mahomedan communities.

Illustration : assuming that the total number of the Legislative Council is 48, the College shall elect 24, provided that of these 24, not less than (say) 6 shall be Hindus, not less than 3 shall be Mahomedans, not less than 2 shall be Europeans, and not less than 2 shall be Eurasians.

16. By defining in the Act the *minima* which the College shall furnish to Council, all need Government interference in the constitution of the Council to rectify any sectional deficiencies which may be apprehended thereon is avoided. We are strongly and unanimously opposed to any scheme of Government nomination on the Electoral College. To sanction that would, in effect, be to reduce our present claim for a one-half representation in Council. The Government are already amply secure by holding the other half of the council in their hands with the additional power of the veto. Under the system we have sketched of a College so formed as faithfully to portray the interests of minorities, of a College bound by the Act which gives it birth to send a representation of minorities to Council, it would be impossible that minorities could be overlooked. That danger averted, there is no reason why Government should interfere in the constitution of the Electoral College. Our endeavour has always been to counteract, to modify, to lessen the immense authority which the Government wield unchecked by any criticism for persons clothed with representative responsibility, and with the deference due to exponents of the public voice. Our aim has been, and is, to ensure popular representation. We abandon both by any concession which exposes the electorate or the representatives of the people to the reproach and to the danger of government manipulation. There can be, and there is, no more important question than that which determines the character of our electorate. Upon the constitution of that electorate will depend the complexion and the character of the successful candidates to the College. And upon the character of those elected to the College will depend the character of our members in Council. We insist, as a fundamental principle from which we cannot depart, that whatever be the number of seats ultimately accorded to us, the men who fill those seats shall be elected wholly by the people as distinguished from the Government. Any infraction of that principle would paralyze our infant institution as its start, detract from the dignity and independence of popular election, and afford the Government not merely an undue preponderance in Council, but occasion for constant interference which would have the most demoralising effect alike upon constituencies and their candidates. The Government under any scheme hold the balance of power. In addition to one-half the Council and the veto, a certain proportion of the elected members would probably follow the Government upon many questions. We cannot easily conceive an occasion when the elected members would vote *en bloc* one way and the Government members *en bloc* the other. For even among these last we should expect to find some dissentients who would on occasions sacrifice party considerations to the public weal, and convenience to conscience. But if the necessity should ever arise for a division on strict party lines, if such a state of things should occur as that the Government and their nominees were united in pressing some scheme which the representatives of the people ought to be equally united in opposing as being unjust, we are agreed that we should like to feel sure that the members for the people would stand by the people.

17. In defining the functions of the Electoral College we have, it will be seen, fixed a *minimum* representation of the numerically weaker communities which the Electoral College will have no option but to return. As in the case of the members who will form the College, this limit is inserted with a view to protect the rights of minorities. But in thus safeguarding these rights, a scheme necessitated as well by justice as by our objection to the interference of Government, we add our firm belief that from the first, and for all time, the rights of minorities will be respected to a far larger extent than we have thought it necessary to make provision for. We feel assure that the College will justify our faith by returning to Council many more European, Mahomedan, and Eurasian members than stipulated for by the limits of the proposed constitution. We are confident that the College will act in a spirit of fairness, if not of generosity, and that its nominees will be the best men irrespective of creed or colour. But we would prefer to accept the risk of a bare minimum alone being returned to the risk attendant upon Government influence. The one is a known and limited danger and admits of being provided against. The other is an unknown and limitless quantity against which it would be difficult to ensure protection.

18. We suggest the following with regard to the Electoral College :—

- (a) that any British subject, born or naturalised, resident in the Presidency of Madras, of 21 years of age and upwards, be eligible thereon for election and service, without distinction of race, creed, colour, or caste, provided that he shall not, within the previous ten years, have been in jail under conviction not subsequently reversed of a non-bailable offence ;
- (b) that any member of the Electoral College be eligible for election therefrom into the Legislative Council of the Governor-General, or the Legislative Council

of the Governor of Madras ; and any member so elected shall not vacate his seat upon the College ;

- (c) that the Electoral College be elected territorially every three years and hold its sessions in the City of Madras ;
- (d) that each territorial member thereon shall sit for some specified division, or specified portion of some division ;
- (e) that vacancies caused thereon, within the period of the session of the Electoral College, whether by death, by resignation, or by whatever other cause, be as speedily as possible filled up by a territorial election in that particular division, or portion of division, of the Presidency for which the member causing such vacancy was originally elected ;
- (f) that every member newly elected to fill any such vacancy as above enumerated shall fill it only for such unexpired portion of time as may remain to the whole Electoral College before its dissolution as a body ;
- (g) that a vacancy caused for any of the above reasons amongst the co-opted members shall be filled up by co-option, and such member so elected shall sit for the period defined in the immediately preceding paragraph ;
- (h) that no member of the Electoral College receive any salary, or remuneration, in virtue of, or in connection with, such membership but every member shall be entitled to receive his travelling expense in connection therewith from the Government.

19. The last point for consideration is the Provincial Legislative Council. We have endeavoured, by defining the territorial electorate and the Electoral College, by laying down the functions of each, and by making each, subject to restrictions which ensure the rights of minorities, as independent as circumstances would allow, to provide what guarantees we could for the ultimate election of the best men into Council. The main point is to secure a strong Electoral College, numerically, morally, and intellectually. This we think our scheme will secure. The Electoral College will compose the pick of every denomination. We anticipate that many of those returned to Council will be selected from among the members of the College. And if this be so, it will but justify our belief that the College will be an assemblage of the best educated, the most responsible, and the most respected members of the various communities in the Presidency. Thus it is that the greatest pains and thought have been bestowed upon the constitution and the duties of the Electoral College. If its members be the ablest and most representative men in the Presidency of Madras, they will be animated in their choice of members of Council by a high and strict sense of duty to themselves and their electorate, and by the desire to secure the public good by an able and impartial selection. Some influences not wholly desirable a portion of them may be subject to. There is probably no human association to which such a criticism would not apply. But in the main the Electoral College will rise superior to sectarian prejudice or local feeling. It will know that its labours are being watched, on the one hand, by a public full of sympathetic anxiety that the first great national experiment in political life should be crowned with a sure and lasting success ; on the other, by a small and powerful ring of critics who will subject every movement to commentaries which shall be always pitiless and sometimes unfair. The College will feel that all England will be a deeply interested spectator of this first and cautious approach upon the pathway of political progress. Statesmen of all countries will focus their attention upon this new development of national ambition springing into life not merely with the assent but under the guidance and tuition of the English people. Stirred by reflections such as these, the College will find a keen incentive to the discharge of its high and solemn functions in an honourable desire to earn the applause of its friends and to avoid the censure of its foes. Realising that not merely any further progress but the very continuance of its own existence will depend absolutely upon the merit and capacity of the men who shall sit as the people's representatives in Council, self-interest will aid higher and nobler considerations in insisting upon a due discharge of duty.

20. It merely remains to suggest the following heads :—

- (a) that any British subject, born or naturalised in the Presidency of Madras of 21 years of age and upwards, be eligible for election and service upon the Legislative Council of the Governor-General or of the Governor of Madras, without distinction of race, creed, colour, or caste ;
- (b) that such elections be carried out by the Electoral College ;
- (c) that the College elect by ballot ;

- (d) that members of either Council elected and nominated shall sit therein for a period of three years, at the end of which period there shall be a general election of elected members of either Council by the Electoral College ;
- (e) that no member of any Council, local or supreme, elected or nominated, shall receive any salary, remuneration, in virtue of such membership, but that all members shall be entitled to be reimbursed any expenses incurred in travelling in connection with their membership ;
- (f) that every member, elected or nominated to any Council, local or supreme, shall vacate his seat.
 - (1) on conviction, not reversed, of any offence which is non-bailable, or
 - (2) on absence from the Presidency for a continuous period of one year and such vacancy shall be filled up, in the case of an elected member by election in the College.

21. Of the members who shall sit in the Supreme Council little need be said. They will be selected by the Electoral College, and will be under no further restrictions or disabilities in the matter of qualification than will be the members of the Local Council. The great difficulty will be to find European and Eurasian candidates rich and independent enough to bear the expense of a lengthy sojourn in Calcutta. It is not unlikely that under these circumstances the choice, so far as the Europeans are concerned, will fall upon Covenanted Civilians or upon some European who has settled from pecuniary considerations in the country. There will always be Hindus and Mahomedans with means and leisure enough to sustain the position of a member in the Viceroy's Council with becoming dignity.

22. The most important function which the reformed Legislative Councils will possess is, to our mind, its right of interpellation, and its right to call for papers. Without these powers Council would be of little real use. The sense of responsibility, and the publicity of its utterances will effectually guard against any misuse of these rights. We would add one further matter, that all members should be absolutely privileged for all statements made in Council. Subject to this, we approve and accept the following definition and limitation of the proposed Council :

- (a)—All legislative measures, and all financial questions, including all budgets, whether these involve new or enhanced taxation or not, to be necessaryes submitted to, and dealt with, by the Councils. In the case of all other branches of the administration, any Member to be at liberty, after due notice, to put any question he sees fit to the *ex-officio* Members (or such one of these as may be especially charged with the supervision of the particular branch concerned) and to be entitled (except as hereinafter provided) to receive a reply to his question, together with copies of any papers requisite for the thorough comprehension of the subject, and on this reply, the Council to be at liberty to consider and discuss the question and record thereon such resolution as may appear fitting to the majority. Provided that, if the subject, in regard to which the inquiry is made, involve matters of Foreign policy, Military dispositions or strategy, or is otherwise of such a nature that, in the opinion of the Executive, the public interests would be materially imperilled by the communication of the information asked for, it shall be competent to such Executive to instruct the *ex-officio* Members, or one of them, to reply accordingly, and decline to furnish the information asked for.
- b)—The Executive Government shall possess the power of overruling the decisions arrived at by the majority of the Council, in every case in which in its opinion, the public interests would suffer by the acceptance of such decision ; but whenever this power is exercised a full exposition of the grounds on which this has been considered necessary shall be published within one month, and in the case of local Governments they shall report the circumstances and explain their action to the Government of India and in the case of this latter, it shall report and explain to the Secretary of State ; and in any such case on a representation made through the Government of India and the Secretary of State by the overruled majority, it shall be competent to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons (recommended in the third resolution of the 1st Congress which all subsequent Congress have affirmed) to consider the matter, and call for any, and all papers or information, and hear any persons on behalf of such majority or otherwise, and thereafter, if needful, report thereon to the full House.

23. We raise no objection to any political advance we may secure being, in the first instance, small. On the contrary reform to be lasting must, we are aware, be gradual and progressive. But except in the sense that the smallest introduction of the representative principle must necessarily be large in a country where hitherto the executive have intentionally abstained from taking the people into their confidence and endowing them with any fraction of political authority, we cannot admit that our proposed advance is large. We do not seek to place the executive in a minority; we are not actuated by any desire to hamper the Government. We merely insist upon this: that if the principle of representation is to be accepted and conceded, the measure of representation meted out to us must be a genuine representation pure and undefiled, the exclusive property of the people to whom it is to be presented. In that view, we reject the interpolation of Government nomination. If the Government will not give us a one-half share, we will accept, but not be contented with, a smaller representation. But whatever that representation, it must be ours, all ours, and only ours. The expansion of reform to which we all look so hopefully forward must be expected and awaited in the gradual decrease in the number of Government nominees in the Council and the College, and in the corresponding gradual increase of the "people's" members in the local and Supreme Chambers. As we acquire knowledge of and familiarity with procedure, and justify our demand to a real share in the administration of this country by the prudence of our demeanour and the intelligence of our debate, so the Government should cautiously withdraw their preponderating influence in the Councils and admit us into confidence and power. We cannot help thinking that much of the present bitterness of opposition is due to mistrust, a sentiment founded upon ignorance of the country. The hostility of Government and their servants is due in some measure to a spirit of jealousy; but in a larger to a suspicion, absolutely unfounded, that the main object of our entrance into public life is to impede the action of the executive. The first two years of a remodelled legislature will dissipate these doubts and with the recognition of the honesty of our ambitions will eventually come the concession of a larger franchise. Intimacy with the people and their representatives will teach the Government to lean upon and not to shun them. Trust will come with knowledge, and respect with both, so that, possibly more speedily than we dare at present to anticipate, the executive themselves may accelerate the realisation of that dream which paints the picture of authority, trusting and trusted, toiling hand-in-hand with a people, invigorated by the transmission of a new political status, to attain the splendid ideal of a Constitutional Government.

24. In conclusion, this report does not pretend to be exhaustive of all points connected with the proposed expansion of the Councils, though it claims to be exhaustive of Mr. Hume's letter. It purports to do no more than indicate the main points for consideration in connection with any contemplated system of reform. An enormous number of details will have yet to be carefully thought out and discussed. A very large number of other details will have to await the test of time and experience. No one can enact a completed and flawless scheme. Imperfections there always must be, which can only be amended by the slow but steady process of practice. But we shall be satisfied if we have made clear the principles upon which, in our opinion, any measure affecting the political status of the peoples of India should be grounded. Those principles are shortly three. *First*, that the electorate should be as large as possible; *secondly*, that the elections should be in their essence popular, *thirdly*, that they must be free from any Government interference, direct or indirect. We hope that the Standing Committees of the other Presidencies and Provinces will agree with us on this declaration of principle, so that we may approach the Government, when the time arrives for treaty, with that advantage which flows from unanimity.

P. SOMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR,

Chairman.

W. S. GANTZ,

EARDLEY NORTON,

JOHN ADAM,

P. ANUNDA CHARLU,

S. RAMASAWMY MUDALIAR,

G. SUBRAMANIA IYER,


M. VIRARAGHAVA CHARI,

M. RAMASAWMY NAIDU.

} *Secretaries.*

APPENDIX C.

Memorandum to accompany Draft of a Bill for reforming the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils of India.



(By Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, M.P.)

1. I have, for some time, felt that further steps should be taken towards the realisation of the Congress programme respecting the reform of the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils. This important matter should no longer be subject to mere notice of motion, or of the moving of a resolution, but the proposals for reform should be embodied in a Bill, upon which the judgment of Parliament should be sought. I have, therefore, prepared the accompanying Draft, and forward it to the General Secretary of the Congress, to the various Congress Standing Committees, and to all the organs of public opinion in India, with the object of eliciting the opinion of Indians and Anglo-Indians upon the various proposals contained therein. Before the last Parliamentary Session came to a close I gave formal notice of my intention to introduce next Session such a measure as that now drafted.

It is, of course, not to be expected that this Draft covers all the circumstances of the case, or that the language employed is exactly that which will be determined upon when the final views of the Congress are received in this country, and a Bill for presentation to Parliament is prepared. I trust, however, that it will be useful in guiding discussion, and in calling forth comments which are certain to be of great use to the friends of the measure.

It may be explained that it was at one time intended to make of this measure what is known in Parliamentary language as an Omnibus Bill and to include sections providing for the amendment of the law relating to the examinations held in England for admission into the various civil departments of the public service. The object of such sections would have been to ensure that, henceforth, in accordance with the views of the India Office Committee of 1860, examinations should "be held simultaneously, one in England and one in India, both being as far as practicable identical in their nature, those who compete in both countries being finally classified in one list according to merit," and that the successful candidates in India should be sent to England for further study, and subjected there to such further examinations as may seem needful. Further, that all other first appointments (excluding peonships, and the like) should be filled by competitive examinations held in India, under conditions calculated to secure such intellectual, moral, and physical qualifications as may be decided by Government to be necessary. (*Resolution IV., Congress Session, Bombay, 1885*). It has, however, been thought that it would be better that this should be done by a separate Bill; and it is hoped the Congress, during its Session in Bombay, will come to a further unanimous opinion upon this most important subject so that any such measure may have the advantage of the Congress support to commend it to the favourable consideration of Parliament and the people of England.

2. I now proceed to a description of the Draft enclosed.
3. The preamble sets out in some detail the objects of the Bill.
4. Sections 1 and 2 deal simply with the Acts and parts of Acts to be amended. Seven clauses of chap. 67 of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth years

of Queen Victoria, relating to the appointment of certain members of the Governor-General's Council are left intact. Such Council, it is proposed, shall be known as the Governor-General's Executive Council, and its members will be *ex-officio* members of the Supreme Legislative Council.

5. Section 3 establishes the Supreme Legislative Council on the plan, so far as membership is concerned, proposed by the Congress in their Resolution of 1888 and re-affirmed in subsequent years.

6. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide for the Supreme Council being elected for a period of three years only; for the regular Session of this Council being held in Calcutta and commencing at a definite period in each year: provision is also made for the summoning of the Council by the Governor-General when occasions of importance and great urgency have arisen: the mode of election and the qualifications of membership are also set forth.

7. Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, arrange for various details, the nature of which will be gathered from the explanatory heading to each section. They do not, being consequential clauses, call for comment at this moment.

8. Section 14 consists of a statement of business to be transacted, and of the power of veto to be given to the Governor-General, with the option of a final appeal to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons, as provided for in the Congress Resolutions already referred to,

In sub-section (a), line 3, *et. seq.*, however, certain words are used which, it is suggested, better carry out the intentions of the Congress. It is recommended that they be accepted. [For the words in the Congress Resolutions: "new or enhanced taxation," are inserted these words: "the imposition of new taxes, the abolition, reduction, or increase of existing taxes, or the more equitable adjustment of present taxation." Other slight alterations have been made.]

9. Sections 15 and 16 call for no special mention. One is taken from the Act proposed to be amended, and the other is based on the Congress proposals.

At this point the Draft deals with the constitution of Provincial Councils.

10. Section 17 provides for the establishment of a Legislative Council for Madras. Except in the needful wording of the Section, the Congress proposals have been strictly followed. I shall be glad if the Congress will state the number of members in its opinion desirable for each Council, and would further suggest that the principle adopted be a numerical one, say, one elected member for each million of population.

11. Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 make like provision for the establishment of Councils in Bombay, Bengal, the North-West Provinces and Oudh, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces.

12. Section 23, and Sub-Sections *a* and *b* are precisely the same as those contained in Section 20, Sub-Sections *a* and *b*. From this Section it will be seen that precisely the same powers are arranged for the Supreme and the Provincial Councils. Being guided by the expressed views of the Congress as they were before me, I did not feel at present justified in making any difference between the two classes of Council, but would respectfully ask the Congress to consider whether it is not possible, and if possible, advisable, to enhance the dignity and enlarge the powers of the Supreme Council in comparison with the Provincial Councils, without, in any way, lessening the importance of the latter,

13. Section 24 requires, probably, some lengthened explanation. Clause 2 of Resolution IV of the Calcutta Congress, 1886, runs thus:—

“(2.) The right to elect Members to the Provincial Councils to be conferred only on those classes and members of the community, *primâ facie*, capable of exercising it wisely and independently. In Bengal and Bombay the Councillors may be elected by the Members of Municipalities, District Boards, Chambers of Commerce and the Universities, or an electorate may be constituted of all persons possessing such qualifications, educational and pecuniary, as may be deemed necessary. In Madras, the Councillors may be elected either by District Boards, Municipalities, Chambers of Commerce, and the University, or by Electoral Colleges composed of Members partly elected by these bodies and partly nominated by Government. In the North-West Provinces and Oudh, and in the Punjab, Councillors may be elected by an Electoral College composed of Members elected by Municipal and District Boards, and nominated, to an extent not exceeding one-sixth of the total number, by Government, it being understood that the same elective system now in force where Municipal Boards are concerned will be applied to District Boards, and the right of electing Members to these latter extended to the cultivating class. But whatever system be adopted (and the details must be worked out separately for each province) care must be taken that all sections of the community, and all great interests, are adequately represented.”

With this Clause before them the Madras Congress Committee fully considered the whole question, and issued a valuable Memorandum, which has been officially placed in my hands; in this Memorandum it is suggested that the electing body should be an Electoral College for such Presidency and Province. For convenience I may quote the main proposals made by the Madras Committee as follows:—

“One College should be established in each of the Presidencies, Provinces, or Commissionerships of India, and should be constituted in the following manner:—

“(a) Any British subject, born or naturalized, resident in Presidency or Province of _____, of 21 years of age and upwards, shall be eligible thereon for election and service, without distinction of race, creed, colour, or caste, provided that he shall not, within the previous ten years, have been in jail under conviction, not subsequently reversed, of a non-bailable offence; that he shall be able to read and write in the English language, or in one of the vernaculars of India; and who either pays yearly revenue or rent of not less than Rs. 50 to the Government, or to some superior holder, on account of land or premises, or for yearly direct taxes (imperial, provincial, or local), in the aggregate of not less Rs. 20, or shall be a graduate of some University.

“(b) That any member of the Electoral College be eligible for election therefrom into the Legislative Council of the Governor-General, or the Legislative Council of the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor of the Presidency or Province in which the College is situated; and any member so elected shall not vacate his seat upon the College.

“(c) That the Electoral College be elected territorially every three years, and hold its sessions in the city which is the seat of Government in each Presidency or Province; and that its membership be at the rate of 20 per million inhabitants of its respective Presidency or Province.

“(d) That all elections shall be conducted by ballot.

“(e) That each territorial members thereon shall sit for some specified division, or the specified portion of some division as provided for in schedule A annexed hereto.

“(f) That vacancies caused thereon, within the period of the Session of the Electoral College, whether by death, by resignation, or by whatever other cause, be as speedily as possible filled up by a territorial election in that particular division, or portion of division, of the Presidency for which the member causing such vacancy was originally elected.

“(g) That every member newly elected to fill any such vacancy as above enumerated shall fill it only for such unexpired portion of time as may remain to the whole Electoral College before its dissolution as a body.

“(h) That a vacancy caused for any of the above reasons amongst the co-opted members shall be filled up by co-option, and such member so elected shall sit for the period defined in the immediately preceding paragraph.

“(i) That no member of the Electoral College receive any salary, or remuneration, in virtue of, or in connection with, such membership; but every member shall be entitled to receive his travelling expenses in connection therewith from the Government.

“With a view to the protection of the interests of minorities the elections to the respective Electoral Colleges should be as follows:—

“(a) That four-fifths of the College be elected territorially.

“(b) That the remaining one-fifth be elected by co-option by the elected four fifths; provided always that this co-option be so exercised as to ensure upon the total strength of the College a minimum representation of (say) one-tenth Mahomedan, one-twentieth European, and one-twentieth Eurasian.

“ [Example :—

“If the total strength of the College be, say	500
then there shall be elected territorially					
four-fifths, or	400
who shall elect by co-option one-fifth, or	100—500

“Supposing that among the 400 already elected there are only 30 Mahomedans, 20 Europeans, and 7 Eurasians, then by co-option there shall be elected at least 20 Mahomedans, at least 5 Europeans, and at least 18 Eurasians. This limitation on co-option would only exist when the fixed minimum number of Europeans, Mahomedans, and Eurasians has not been, respectively, elected territorially.]”

Judging from material placed before me, it has seemed to me that it would be wiser, in drafting this measure, in view of the Clause of the Resolution of 1886, quoted above, to provide for the electing body for Provincial Councils being composed of members of the various public bodies set out in the Section (24) now under consideration. One reason for this is that, in introducing *quasi* representative institutions into India you would, by this course, be proceeding along the line of least resistance and be preserving a continuity of the policy introduced by Lord Mayo and continued by each of his successors in the Governor-Generalship. Public opinion in India, too, so far as I have been able to gather it from the newspapers, seems to me to be more in favour of the public bodies becoming the constituency than of the Electoral Colleges. Should the Congress approve the latter system I shall, of course, draft the Bill accordingly.

Sub-section c of this Section provides that elected members shall be named for some division or part of a division of a Presidency or Province.

13. Section 25 makes provision for the necessary arrangements for the speedy calling together of the Councils after the Bill has received the sanction of the Queen-Empress and on that sanction being announced in India.

14. Certain schedules will be required, but, as they will be based upon the provisions of the Bill, they cannot, at present, be indicated even in skeleton form.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

20, CIRCUS ROAD, LONDON, N.W.,
October 11th, 1889.

DRAFT OF A BILL to make better provision for the Constitution of the Council of the Governor-General of India, and for the Legislative Councils of the several Presidencies and Provinces of India by enlarging their number constituting them on a partially elective basis, and increasing their powers.

Whereas it is expedient that the provisions of former Acts of Parliament respecting the constitution and functions of the Council of the Governor-General of India should in certain respects be amended, and that power should be given to the Governors in Council of the Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay and to the Lieutenants-Governor of Bengal, the North-West Provinces and Oudh, and the Punjab, and to the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, to make laws and regulations for the Government of the said Presidencies, and of the said Provinces, and to transact other business as hereinafter defined; and that provision should be made for constituting the like authority hereafter in other parts of Her Majesty's Indian dominions: be it therefore declared and enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows:

1. This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The Indian Councils Act, 1889." Short Title.
2. Chap. 67 of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth years of Queen Victoria and all other Enactments whatsoever now in force with relation to the Council of the Governor-General of India, or to the Legislative Councils of the Governors of the respective Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay, and of the Lieutenants Governor of Bengal, and the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, shall save so far as the same are altered by or are repugnant to this Act, continue in force, and be applicable to the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Governor-General of India and the Legislative Councils of the respective Presidencies and Provinces under this Act. Acts and parts of Acts affected.
3. For the better exercise of the power of making laws and regulations vested in the Governor-General in Council, and for the better government of the Empire of India, a Council to consist of not less than _____ members shall be, and is hereby, constituted. Such Council shall consist of _____ members, one-fourth of whom shall be officials (including the Governor-General and the members of the Governor-General's Executive Council above-mentioned), one-fourth (officials or non-officials) nominated by the Governor-General, and one-half elected as hereinafter provided, the persons elected to be non-official persons, that is, persons who, at the date of such election, shall not be in the civil or military service of the Crown in India. Composition of the extended Council of the Governor-General.
4. The Legislative Council of the Governor-General shall exist for a period of three years from the date of establishment, at the end of which period, fresh nominations shall be made and new elections shall take place, both the nominated and elected members being eligible for re-appointment and re-election (unless any one of the said members shall be disqualified under clauses 1 and 2, sub-section *h*, section 24, of this enactment), and the *ex-officio* members to re-appointment. The sittings of the Council shall take place only in Calcutta, and shall, ordinarily, be held in regular session beginning in or about the first week in December of any year, and ending in March of the following year. Upon any serious crisis or matter of great urgency arising at a period when the Council is not in ordinary Session at Calcutta, which, in the opinion of the Viceroy and Governor-General, renders such a course necessary or advisable, the Governor-General shall, in as short a time as possible, summon the Council to meet in such central city in the Empire as may be convenient, and such meetings shall be held as may be necessary for the transaction of the business for the performance of which the Council is summoned. The only business to be transacted shall be that set forth in the notice issued by the Governor-General when summoning the Council. Regular Session and Special Meetings.
5. The elected members of the Governor-General's Legislative Council shall be chosen by the elected members of the several Provincial Councils in such numbers for each Presidency or Province as shall be hereafter determined and duly set forth in a schedule attached to this enactment. Such members shall be elected by ballot. Elected Members.
6. All persons resident in India, possessing the qualifications defined in this enactment shall be eligible for membership in Council, whether by election or nomination, without distinction of race, creed, caste, or colour. Eligibility for membership.

Term of
Membership
to be three
years.

7. Every member of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General so nominated or elected shall be summoned to all meetings held for whatever purpose for the term of three years from the date of the first meeting of such Council when constituted, and shall be eligible for re-nomination and re-election.

Vacancy in
Membership.

8. It shall be lawful for any elected member of Council to resign his office to the Governor-General, and on acceptance of such resignation by the Governor-General, such office shall become vacant, and the seat in Council of any non-official member accepting office under the Crown in India shall be vacated on such acceptance.

Filling up
of vacancy in
the case of
nominated
and elected
members.

9. In the event of a vacancy occurring by the Death, Acceptance of Office, or Resignation, accepted in manner aforesaid, of any such nominated member of Council, it shall be lawful for the Governor-General to nominate any person as members of Council in his place, who shall exercise the same functions until the termination of the term for which the additional member so dying, accepting office, or resigning was nominated: provided always that it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General by such nomination to diminish the proportion of non-official members hereinbefore directed to be nominated. Further, in the event of a vacancy occurring by the death, acceptance of office, or resignation, accepted in manner aforesaid, of any elected member of Council, it shall be lawful for the Governor-General to issue his warrant or authority to the Electing Body of the Presidency or Province for which the deceased or retiring member sat to elect any person duly qualified as member of Council in his place, and such person so elected shall exercise the same functions until the end of the term for which the member so dying, accepting office, or resigning, was elected.

No law or
regulation in-
valid by rea-
son of defect
in constitu-
tion of Coun-
cil.

10. No law or regulation made by the Governor-General in Council, in accordance with the Provisions of this Act, shall be deemed invalid, nor shall any decisions come to on matters of finance or any other matters by reason only that the proportion of official or non-official nominated, or elected, members hereby provided was not complete at the date of the introduction of such Law or Regulation to the Council or its enactment, or when any such decision was duly taken in the manner provided for under the rules and regulations of the Council.

The Presi-
dent of the
Council per-
manent or
temporary to
have a cast-
ing vote.

11. In the absence of the Governor-General and of the President, nominated as aforesaid, the senior ordinary member of the Executive Council present shall preside at meetings of the Council for making laws and regulations and for the consideration of public business; and the power of making laws and regulations vested in the Governor-General in Council shall be exercised only at meetings of the said Legislative Council at which such Governor-General or President, or some ordinary member of Council and or more members of the said Council (including under the term members of the Council such nominated and elected members as aforesaid) shall be present; and in every case of difference of opinion at meetings of the said Council where there shall be an equality of voices, the Governor-General or in his absence the President, and in the absence of the Governor-General and President such senior officials member of Council then presiding, shall have two votes or the casting vote.

Governor-
General to
appoint First
Meeting for
making Laws
and Regula-
tions.

12. The Governor-General in Council shall, as soon as conveniently may be, appoint a place and time for the first meeting of the said Legislative Council of the Governor-General for making laws and regulations and the performance of such other duties as are hereinafter mentioned under this Act, and summon thereto as well the Councillors nominated and elected by and under this Act as the members of such Council; and until such first meeting the powers now invested in the said Governor-General of India in Council of making laws and regulations shall and may be exercised in like manner and by the same members as before the passing of the Act.

Rules for
the conduct
of business in
the Legisla-
tive Council.

13. It shall be lawful for the Legislative Council of the Governor-General to make rules for the conduct of business at meetings of the Council under the provisions of this Act, prior to the first of such meetings, but such rules may be subsequently amended at meetings for the purpose of making laws and regulations, subject to the assent of the Governor-General; and such rules shall prescribe the mode of promulgation and authentication of such laws and regulations: Provided always that it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State in Council to disallow any such rule, and to render it of no effect.

Business to
be transacted
at such Meet-
ings.

14. No business shall be transacted at any meeting except as hereinafter provided, namely:

(a.) All legislative measures, and all financial questions, including all budgets, whether these involve imposition of new taxes, the abolition, reduction, or increase of existing taxes, or the more equitable adjustment of present taxation, shall be submitted to and dealt

with by the said Council. In regard to all branches of the administration, and any measures introduced into the Council, any member shall be at liberty, after due notice, to put any question he sees fit to the *ex-officio* members (or such one of these as may be specially charged with the supervision of the particular branch concerned) and shall be entitled (except as hereinafter provided) to receive a reply to his question together with copies of any papers requisite for the thorough comprehension of the subject, and on this reply the Council shall, if it see fit, consider and discuss the question, and shall record thereon such resolution as may appear fitting to the majority. If papers asked for are refused, it shall be open to a member to proceed by motion to a division of the Council, and if a majority be in favour of the production of the papers, they shall be produced. Provided that, if the subject in regard to which the inquiry is made involves matters of foreign policy, military dispositions or strategy, or is otherwise of such a nature that, in the opinion of the Executive, the public interests would be materially imperilled by the communication of the information asked for, it shall be competent for them to instruct the official members, or one of them, to reply accordingly, and decline to furnish the information asked for.

(b.) The Governor-General in Executive Council shall possess the power of over-ruling the decision arrived at by the majority of the Legislative Council, in every case in which, in his opinion, the public interests would suffer by the acceptance of such decision; but, whenever this power is exercised, a full exposition of the grounds on which this has been considered necessary shall be published within one month, and the Governor-General in Council shall report and explain to the Secretary of State; and in any such case on a representation made through the Government of India and the Secretary of State by the overruled majority, it shall be competent for a Standing Committee of the House of Commons, appointed for the consideration of Indian Legislative Council Appeals, such Standing Committee to be appointed at the commencement of each Session, to consider the matter, and to call for any and all papers or information, and hear any persons on behalf of such majority or otherwise, and thereafter report thereon to the full House.

The Governor-General's power of vetoing the decision of the majority

Final appeal to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons.

15. Whenever any such Law or Regulation has been assented to by the Governor-General, he shall transmit to the Secretary of State for India an authentic copy thereof; and it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to signify, through the Secretary of State for India in Council, Her disallowance of such Law, within a period of six months from the date on which the said Law or Regulation has received the assent of the Governor-General; and such disallowance shall make void and annul such Law from and after the day on which the Governor-General shall make known, by Proclamation or by signification to his Council, that he has received the notification of such disallowance by Her Majesty.

Power of the Crown to disallow Laws made at such Meetings.

16. No elected or nominated member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council shall receive any salary or remuneration in virtue of such membership, but any such member, already in receipt of any Government salary or allowance, shall continue to draw the same unchanged during membership, and all members shall be entitled to be re-imbursed any expenses incurred in travelling in connection with their membership.

Remuneration to Members.

17. A Legislative Council for the transaction of business as hereinafter provided shall be, and is hereby, established in the Presidency of Fort St. George, Madras. This Council shall consist of members, thus divided (1) one-fourth of Government officials, including the Governor of Madras, who shall be President of the Council, possessing like powers with those conferred upon the Governor-General as President of the Governor-General's Legislative Council, as set forth in Sections of this enactment: (2) one-fourth of members, who may or may not be in Government employ, nominated by the Governor of Madras; and (3) the remaining two-fourths elected as hereinafter provided.

Legislative Council for Madras.

18. A Legislative Council for the transaction of business as hereinafter provided shall be, and is hereby, established in the Presidency of Bombay. This Council shall consist of members, thus proportioned:— [as in Section 17.]

Bombay.

19. [Same provisions as in Section 17, with the necessary alterations and designations.]

Bengal.

20. [Same provisions as in Section 17, with the necessary alterations and designations.]

North West Provinces and Oudh.

21. [Same provisions as in Section 17, with the necessary alterations and designations.]

Punjab.

22. [Same provisions as in Section 17, with the necessary alterations and designations.]

Central Provinces.

Business to be transacted at such meetings; right of interpellation by members, etc.

23. The business to be transacted by such Councils shall, in regard to the affairs of each Presidency or Province respectively be, in each Council, as follows:

(a) All legislative measures, and all financial questions, including all budgets, whether these involve the imposition of new taxes, the abolition, reduction or increase of existing taxes, or the more equitable adjustment of present taxation, shall be submitted to, and dealt with by, the Councils. In regard to all branches of the administration, and any measure introduced into the Council, any member shall be at liberty, after due notice, to put any question he sees fit to the *ex-officio* members (or such one of these as may be especially charged with the supervision of the particular branch concerned) and shall be entitled (except as hereinafter provided) to receive a reply to his question, together with copies of any papers requisite for the thorough comprehension of the subject, and on this reply, the Council shall, if it see fit, consider and discuss the question and shall record thereon such resolution as any appear fitting to the majority. If papers asked for are refused it shall be open to a member to proceed by motion to a division of the Council, and if a majority be in favour of the production of the papers they shall be produced. Provided that, if the subject, in regard to which the inquiry is made, or motion put, involves matters of foreign policy, military dispositions or strategy, or is otherwise of such a nature that, in the opinion of the Executive, the public interests would be materially imperilled by the communication of the information asked for, it shall be competent to such Executive to instruct the *ex-officio* members, or one of them, to reply accordingly, and decline to furnish the information asked for.

The Executive Government to have the power of vetoing the decision of the majority, final appeal resting with House of Commons.

(b) The Executive Government shall possess the power of over-ruling the decisions arrived at by the majority of the Council, in every case in which, in its opinion, the public interests would suffer by the acceptance of such decision; but whenever this power is exercised, a full exposition of the grounds on which this has been considered necessary, shall be published within one month, and the local government shall report the circumstances and explain its action to the Governor-General in Council, who, if he think fit, shall report and explain to the Secretary of State; and in any such case, on a representation made through the Government of India and the Secretary of State, by the over-ruled majority, it shall be competent to a Committee of the House of Commons, appointed for the consideration of Indian Legislative Council Appeals, to consider the matter, and call for any and all papers and information, and hear any persons on behalf of such majority or otherwise, and thereafter, if needful, report thereon to the House, such Committee being appointed at the beginning of each Session.

24. The members elected and the mode of election of members of the Provincial Legislative Council shall be as follows:—

Election by Municipalities and other Public Bodies.

(a) The member elected, may be either a member of any Local Board or Municipality, or Association or body, or graduate of any Indian University, as hereinafter provided, or he may be a person not elected but who would be eligible for membership of such Board or Municipality, Association or body.

(b) The electors shall be the members of all Local Boards and Municipality duly nominated or elected thereto, and of all members of Chambers of Commerce, Trades Associations, Planters' Associations, and similar organisations, a list of which Chambers, Associations, etc., shall be annually prepared and printed, and shall be supplied on or before day of in each year, by the official (named in Schedule) of the respective organisations, to the Secretary, Legislative Department, of each Presidency or Province, and published in the *Government Gazette* of the respective Presidencies or Provinces of March 1st in each year, such list to remain in force for twelve months from the date of such publication. Lists of graduates of the respective Universities shall be prepared and printed and supplied in like manner by the Registrar of each University.

(c) Each member elected shall be designated the member for some specified division, or a specified portion of such division, as provided for in Schedule annexed thereto; such member shall not, necessarily, be a resident in the division or portion of division which he represents.

(d) Election shall take place by voting papers, by ballot, in such manner as is hereinafter provided for.

(e) A list shall be prepared of all persons nominated for membership under rules to be hereinafter provided, and each elector shall have the power of voting for [whatever the number of elected members of the Council may be] candidates, and the candidates having the largest number of votes shall be declared elected.

[Or, by grouping of Elective bodies, each group electing a single member, the elections shall be of members for specified divisions respectively, the elector in each case having one vote only, namely, a vote for the representative of the division in which the elector votes.]

(f) Members of the Council, official, elected, and nominated shall sit therein for a period of three years, at the end of which period there shall be a general election of elected members of each Council, and the nomination of the proportion of the Council provided for by nomination.

(g) No member of any Council, local or supreme, elected or nominated, shall receive any salary, or remuneration, in virtue of such membership, but all members shall be entitled to be re-imbursed any expenses incurred in travelling in connection with their membership.

(h) Every member, elected or nominated to any Council, local or supreme, shall vacate his seat.

- (1) On conviction, not reversed, of any offence which is non-bailable, or
- (2) on absence from the Presidency for a continuous period of one year and such vacancy shall be filled up, in the case of an elected member by election as hereinbefore provided, and in the case of nominated members by the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor respectively.

25. Immediately upon the passing of this Act the Governor-General in Council shall direct that a Commission or Commissions of competent persons, of whom one-half at least shall be non-official persons, shall be appointed in each Presidency or Province to arrange for the registration of voters, and for all such other purposes as may be necessary for the due carrying out of this enactment, any expenditure incurred in connection therewith being defrayed under the orders of the Governor in Council of the Presidency or of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province respectively; such Commission or Commissions shall report within three months of their appointment, and the Governor-General's Legislative Council and the Presidency and Provincial Legislative Councils, shall be elected within six months of this Act coming into force, which coming into force shall be as soon as the same shall have been published in the *Gazettes* of the Government of India and of the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors of the Presidencies and Provinces, such publication to take place within two months of the approval of the Queen-Empress of India having been signified to this Act.

Procedure
on passing of
Act.

[Schedules to be exhibited as may hereafter be found necessary.]

APPENDIX D.

Report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Madras Standing Committee of the National Congress to consider the Draft Bill prepared by Charles Bradlaugh, Esq., M. P.

Introduction.

We have met and anxiously considered the provisions of Mr. Bradlaugh's Draft Bill. We propose to deal here not with its many details, but rather with the main, broad, distinguishing matters of principle with which it is concerned. And *in limine* we would preface our criticisms with the averment that we entertain nothing but a sense of the most profound gratitude for the earnest and indefatigable advocacy and industry of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh. No word is written in disrespect of his legislative endeavour. We criticise in response to his invitation, and we do so in a complete feeling of confidence because we know that he appreciates the frankness and courage of opinion. And if we differ from Calcutta and Bombay, we do so with regret, neither wishing nor intending to affront or pain by our declaration of dissent.

Our criticisms and suggestions are intended to be confined to the conditions and requirements of our own Presidency. Incidentally we make allusion to our sister Presidencies, but only in self-defence. We have had to show, as best we could, the demerits of their proposals. We would add that we are not prepared to-day, in our present ignorance of their wants and capabilities, to express any opinion as to the expediency of extending the provisions of the Bill to Provinces in which there are not Legislative Councils already in existence.

2. Although the question of the abolition or re-constitution of the present India Council finds no place in that measure, we have discussed the propriety of its absence from Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill because no scheme, in our opinion, which honestly seeks to confer upon India the advantages of a well considered system of political reform could hope to be successful or acceptable which did not aim at, and enforce, a very drastic change in the present constitution of the Council to the Secretary of State for India. And we are agreed that, although as a matter of symmetry Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill should deal with the India Council, it is better to omit any allusion to it for the present. Its want of utility can be hereafter exposed on independent grounds. Much of its competency for harm is practically counteracted by Sec. 14 (b) of the Bill which incorporates the reiterated suggestion of the National Congress that the final appeal in matters of difference should lie, not as now to the Secretary of State, but to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons. The Council, however, will still retain much power. The principle of its composition is wrong, and it is safe to predict that so long as that principle remains unchanged so long will Indian administration be open to criticism.

3. To the principle of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons as the new Court of ultimate appeal we are, with the exception of one dissentient, agreed. Mr. Adam's minute is appended to this report. The exceptions advanced against it are neither numerous nor strong. If on the one hand there be real danger in the probability that retired Indian Officials will find in it a new theatre wherein to urge afresh their contracted and ungenerous views of Indian politics, on the other hand we may believe that the Committee will contain at least an equal number of members not unable to maintain their ground against the possible advocates of a selfish and unwise treatment of the wants of India, and who, reared in the manlier atmosphere of English Parliamentary life, will be able to repel, by the infusion of a wiser and a broader grasp of our necessities and their cure, the criticisms of their opponents. The exception itself is advanced principally by those who, unfamiliar with the reducing qualities of an English Parliamentary career, believe that the pensioned Governor and Collector in the House of Commons carry the same weight and inspire the same awe which they carried and inspired in the District Cutcherry or the Chambers of the local Councils. The Standing Committee can, as we understand the case, initiate nothing *suo motu*. It must report to the full House, a guarantee that we shall have a further check upon the intellectual eccentricities of retired Anglo-Indians.

India Council best omitted.

Standing Committee approved.

Objection to it met.

4. So far we anticipate only unanimity between ourselves and all the other Presidencies and Provinces of India. We are all equally unanimous about the necessity for a partially elected Legislative Council, at any rate for the three Presidencies. But the next logical step entailed in the system of political regeneration will, we fear, excite strong and considerable divergence of opinion. We have touched hitherto, in order of importance and constructive sequence, on the proposed Standing Committee of the House, on the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and on the Chambers for legislative purposes proposed to be established in India. We shall all endorse the intention of the Bill as to the elective element of these assemblies and of the proportion which that elective is to bear to the official and nominated element. It would be impossible to re-affirm too often or too emphatically the statement that any legislation, Imperial or otherwise, which proceeded on lines hostile to our demand for the partial introduction of the elective principle would signally fail to satisfy our wants or to effect any salutary or any lasting reform. A reconstitution of the present Legislative Councils, as would seem to be Lord Cross's view, which involved merely their numerical extension on the basis of official nomination would be but an extended re-affirmation of heresies which the Congress has been striving to kill. To accord the privilege of interpellation under such conditions would, as we shall show, be in reality to accord the semblance without any of the reality of power. The possession of that right by an assembly every member of which owed his seat to the favour of the Government and not to the verdict of his fellow-citizens would only be to ensure an endless series of interrogative testimonials to the sagacity, the toleration, and the liberality of authority. The proposed concession, therefore, of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cross is in reality no concession at all. Under the disguise of words all the old objectionable errors will be repeated and stereotyped. Against any spurious reform upon such principles all India will protest.

Presidential unanimity as to India Council, Standing Committee, & elective principle in Legislative Council:

that principle reaffirmed; its omission stultifies reform.

5. This brings us to the point where almost for the first time there is likely to be a strenuous and pronounced difference of view. Who are to be the Electorate for the elected Members of Council? Is the power and responsibility of selecting the representatives of the people to lie away from the people with Municipalities, Local Boards, Chambers of Commerce and other associations, or with the people themselves in the hands of an Electoral College constituted *ad hoc*? The conflict will be one over a matter of principle, not of detail, and over a matter of principle upon which we think so strongly and so unanimously that we are prepared to press our views to a division at the approaching Congress.

Point of disagreement with Calcutta and Bombay; who is to be the electorate?

6. There must be no haziness above this question. It involves no mere secondary matter of detail over which a compromise might be almost as welcome as possible. It involves the very essence and vitality of the principle of election on the importance of which in the formation of the Legislative Councils we are all agreed. And if it be a question of principle there from which no departure is possible, it can be none the less a question of equally stubborn and equally important principle merely because it recurs in the consideration of a structure, politically, perhaps, less attractive but politically not less essential than the Legislative Council itself. If election is a *sine qua non* in our reconstituted assemblies, their purity, their really popular character, and the security for their continuance surely demand the hostage that the fountains of their origin shall themselves be in the main popular and elected. Local Boards, Chambers of Commerce and Municipalities are neither popular nor, in the main, elected. They fail, therefore, in the initial quality for the introduction of which into the Legislative Councils we have so strenuously contended.

This is a question of principle, not of detail. Rival scheme fails (1) in absence of elective element:

7. They fail, moreover, in other and equally important respects. Local Boards and Municipalities exist for a specific purpose wholly unconnected with, and in many respects alien to, the purposes for which an Electoral College would be summoned into existence. It is not easy to understand the reasoning of the policy which would invest these bodies with a privilege foreign to their birth and intent, and for which neither the training nor the inclination of many of their members would qualify their owners. Most of the members of this Committee sat upon the Committee which accepted the scheme in May last (See *ante* page) for the reconstitution of the Councils and the formation of an electorate. On that occasion the opinion was formulated with respect to this very suggestion of clothing Municipalities and other associations with the power of selecting Legislative candidates that "the members of these various bodies sit there as elected for a specific purpose. The members who will sit in Council will sit for other and distinct purposes. It would be inexpedient to give bodies elected for one specific object the right to elect on behalf of the people, whom they do not represent for this purpose, members to sit for another and a different object in another and a different assembly." Further reflection has fortified us in our former views. To make the bodies suggested the electorate is, in our opinion, to abandon the principle of popular representation. This we are neither prepared to accept nor to recommend.

(2) in it oblivion of origin and purpose of the Municipalities &c:

(3) in comparative intellectual and moral inferiority of its electorate :

8. Another objection, inseparable from the aims and ends of such bodies as Local Boards and Municipalities, is that the class of men as a rule who hold seats there differ very materially in their qualifications from the class of men who would constitute an Electoral College. Local influence ; a capacity praiseworthy but parochial, to deal with small local affairs ; a tendency to gravitate towards the officials :—the possession of these qualities represent not infrequently the main qualifications of members of Local Boards and Municipalities for office. Such would scarcely be in keeping with the position of members of the Electoral College, from whom would be expected, and received, a gift of wider comprehension and of sympathy, a capacity to accept a statesmanlike view of political needs, and to take a just measure of the worth of contending candidates.

(4) in making no provision for representation of minorities :

the danger illustrated :

9. A still graver defect would be that any scheme which contemplated vesting the choice of candidates in Boards and Municipalities would make no provision for the representation of minorities. Such a representation in the present condition of Indian political history is an absolute necessity and one which may endure for many years to come. Till education is more diffused, and till the races of this continent can mix more freely and more frequently with each other and learn by personal contact the unwisdom of mutual distrust, the due representation of minorities must be safe-guarded by the sanction of legislative enactment to a scheme which in terms provides for their practical protection. The Hindus preponderate numerically in the country. They preponderate similarly on the Local Boards and Municipalities. In this Presidency, at any rate, Europeans, Eurasians, Mahomedans, and Native Christians are not adequately represented in such institutions. After all due allowance on their parts for want of interest and energy, their absence is principally to be accounted for by the fact that they are outvoted. What is true of the present state of affairs in Boards and Municipalities will be equally true, there is reason to apprehend, if Boards and Municipalities are to choose the members of Council. Madras is in earnest that all classes and all creeds shall have a fair proportionate representation on the new Councils. She does not desire that any one sect shall have a numerical advantage, and although she believes that Hindus will frequently elect members of other communities, through a spirit of personal liking and a sense of fair play, she also deems it wise to provide by legislation against those contingencies which are always possible so long as men are influenced by the passions, the prejudices and the emotions of their kind. It is not in any spirit of distrust but from motives of prudence that it is proposed to provide for the representation of Municipalities by legislative intervention. A clause in the new statute rendering it imperative upon Municipalities to elect a minimum members of the races in the minority might to a limited extent cure this defect. But it would not secure the presence of those higher political, moral, and intellectual attainments which are and can be the only reliable sureties that men shall conscientiously endeavour to discharge the trust reposed in them to the advantage of their country. Statistics show that the total strength of the 54 Municipalities in this Presidency, when all the conditions of their full enjoyment of power have been fulfilled, will be 463 nominated and 452 elected members, giving an aggregate of 915. Of these only 83 are Mahomedans, and only 188 Europeans. With regard to the latter it is to be remembered that most of these 185 are *ex-officio* members, and that a considerable deduction will have to be made in the view that the same officer is, not rarely, a member of all the Municipalities in his District. In the case, for instance, of educational officers, whose duties necessitate the constant perambulation of the Presidency for purposes of inspection, the same individual finds himself generally repeated as a member of every District Board through whose district he travels. Further, these represent only the official Europeans. The non-officials are practically excluded. In the District Boards matters are even worse. They are 21 in number and their sanctioned total strength is 708. The elected members are only 108. There are only 42 Mahomedans, and only 115 Europeans. Small as is their number for Municipal purposes, the Mahomedans would justly complain that in proportion to their number and weight in the State a scattered allowance of 83 of their religionists was scarcely an honest or adequate allowance for the purpose of securing anything like a fair political representation in the 21 districts of which this Presidency is composed. Unanswerable as their protest would be even if these 83 members of their creed could meet and act with the force of a compact body, it acquires additional strength, were it needed, from the scattered and helpless condition of those members. A similar objection prevails as to Europeans, Eurasians and Native Christians, whose comparative paucity needs the *ægis* of the Madras scheme.

the present plight of Mahomedans and other numerically inferior communities :

District Boards in Bengal seem-ingly no better than in Madras :

So far as to Madras. Speaking less authoritatively, matters seem to be no better in Bengal. There the members of the District Board last year numbered 785. Of these 433 were nominated by Government, and 352 elected by Local Boards. Of the latter, 29.8 per cent. were Zemindars, or representatives of the landed interest ; 26.4 per cent. were Pleaders ; 17.7 per cent. Government servants ; 2.3 per cent. Muktears, or agents ; and only 7 per cent. Traders. The remaining 23.1 per cent. are unspecified. The fact that so

small a proportion as only 7 per cent. is drawn from the trading classes—a large and important factor in political and social India—augurs ill for the proposal to entrust to such a system of election the fair and adequate representation of interests too scattered or too weak to protect themselves.

Of Local Boards in Bengal there were last year 106 with 1201 members of whom 376 were elected. Of these, again, 51 per cent. are described as Zemindars; 24.4 per cent. as Pleaders; 4.2 per cent. as Government servants; 3.8 per cent. as Traders, and 3.3 per cent. as muktears, having 13.3 per cent. unspecified. Here, too, the outlook scarcely justifies the confidence in the proposed electorate.

We regret that of Bombay's civic conditions we can furnish no account, inasmuch as we have not the time to await the arrival of her statistics, and the speedy issue of this report on the eve of the Bombay Congress is imperative.

10. (a) To erect Municipalities and Local Boards into an electorate is, we maintain, to make a present of selection to the Government. These bodies are presumed by the advocates of their ennoblement to be, we take it, independent and above Government bias. If those qualities be wanting their advocates, it may be conceded, would no longer press their views. Independence for the purposes of an electorate may safely be defined as a condition of exemption from outside control. It can be predicated of no body of men that they are independent if some superior power can of its own volition add to, subtract, expunge, or in any way alter the conditions of their existence. Bearing this in mind, let us examine the constitutions respectively of Municipalities and Local Boards, the suggested guardians of our new born political liberty.

(b) In the Presidency of Madras civic administration is divided, in order of importance, into District Municipalities, District Boards, Taluk Boards, and Panchayats. The Municipalities are independent of the others enumerated. The District Boards control the Taluk Boards and the Panchayats whose territorial jurisdiction is known as a Union.

(c) District Municipalities are governed by Act IV of 1884 (Madras.) By section 4 of that Act the Governor in Council may from time to time declare any town to be a Municipality. Whereby his powers of creation and extension are unlimited. Every Municipal Council is to consist of not less than 12 persons (Sec. 8) and the Revenue Officer in charge of the District wherein a Municipality may exist is *ex-officio* a member (Sec. 9.) The Governor in Council may appoint all the other Councillors, or these may be appointed partly by himself and partly by the tax-payers and inhabitants, *subject to such rules and conditions as he may from time to time prescribe.* (Sec. 10.) This proviso is worthy recollection. When Municipal Councillors are partly elected these shall constitute three-fourth of the whole body, *unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs* (Sec. 12.) The limitation is significant. The same authority has the power to declare by notification the maximum number of any Municipal Council, the proportion of elected members, and whether the chairman shall be appointed by the Governor or by election. Provided that it may also "*by notification from time to time cancel or modify such declaration.*" Whence tenure of Municipal privileges would seem to be precarious. To make quite sure, however, of the absolute control of Municipalities, the Government have legislated themselves outside all criticism. Section 19 provides that the Governor in Council "*may at any time remove any Chairman or Municipal Councillor*" amongst other reasons "*if his continuance in office is in the opinion of the Governor in Council dangerous to the public peace or order*"! The history of this provision is as eloquent as it is remarkable. It will be found authoritatively recorded in the judgments of the Full Bench consisting of Justices Kernan, Muthusami Iyer and Hutchins, reported at page, 466 of the seventh volume of the Madras series of the Indian Law Reports, under the title of *Vijaya Ragava v The Secretary of State for India.* Its main features are worth reproduction. The Plaintiff, a Vakil of the District Court of Salem, had been elected by the rate-payers of his town one of its Municipal Commissioners under the provisions of Section 9 of the Towns Improvement Act (Madras Act III of 1871.) A riot broke out in the town, and the Plaintiff incurred the suspicion and displeasure of the Collector who, terrorized by the unwonted excitement of his surroundings, mistook the honest endeavours of the Plaintiff to quell a tumult for seditious incitement to further violence. He accordingly reported the Plaintiff *ex-parte* to the Government, who, *ex-parte* proceeded to remove him from office. Section 9 of the Act quoted ran thus: "** * * * Governor in Council may from time to time * * * remove any of such Commissioners for misconduct or neglect of duty.*" The Section was construed by Government to mean as investing them with the absolute power of being able, unquestioned, to inflict punishment without calling for a defence. Upon that the Government acted, and removed the Plaintiff without hearing him and without vouchsafing to assign, though petitioned by him, any ground for his removal. The Plaintiff sued in the High Court for wrongful removal.

The Government, declining to meet him on the facts, offered no evidence, but merely raised the issue of law that "an absolute discretion was vested in the Governor in Council to remove a Commissioner if he thought that Commissioner had committed any act of misconduct or neglect although in fact he had not" (*Kernan J.*, 7. Mad. 468.) The Government failed. Judgment was pronounced on the 2nd May 1884: on the 7th May 1884, the suit having been filed in 1883, the Government took expressly in section 19 of the new Act of 1884 the power for the possession of which they had contended before the Full Bench under the old Act of 1871. The story of this legislation does not tend to remove or weaken any portion of our unwillingness to invest the Government with the responsibilities which Bombay and Calcutta would thrust upon the Municipalities, the creatures of Government manufacture and control. The ascendancy of authority over Municipalities would appear to be about as complete as is consistent with a decently outward compliance with the Viceregal mandate of Lord Ripon that the people were to be invested with the privileges of Local Self-Government.

(b) District Boards tested. [Madras Act V of 1884:]

Their entire Control by Government:

(d) District Boards are regulated by Madras Act V of 1884. A very few sections will reveal their so-called independence. They are to consist of not less than 24 members of whom the Collector is *ex-officio* President (Sec. 8 and 9 (1).) The Governor in Council may authorize the election of a President from among the Councillors, subject to the triple limitation that he approves such election, that it is in accordance with rules and conditions he shall prescribe, and that *he may withdraw such authority whenever he chooses* (Sec. 9 (2).) All the Revenue officers in charge of the divisions of the District are to be *ex-officio* members (Sec. 10.) The rest of the Board may be wholly appointed by the Governor in Council or may be "partly so appointed and partly appointed by election by the members of the Taluk Boards in the District from among their own members," or where no Taluk Boards exist, "by the Panchayats and by the tax-payers and inhabitants of such part of the district, *subject to such rules and conditions as may from time to time be prescribed by the Governor in Council.*" (Sec. 11) The italics are not in the Act. By section 24 the Government provide for themselves with legislative consistency the right to dismiss a Local Board, (which includes a District and Taluk Board (Sec. 3 (5)) member as summarily and as arbitrarily as a member of the Municipalities. The following rule of Government will further illustrate the injustice of regarding the District Boards as in any way representative of the majority of the population amid whom they live :

"When the Government shall have directed that any number or proportion of the members of the District Board of any district shall be elected by the Taluk Boards situated within such district, the President of such District Board shall, as soon as any vacancy occurs among the non-official members of the District Board, report the occurrence of such vacancy to Government, stating the Taluk to which each member of the existing District Board belongs and the Taluk Board by which, in his opinion, the vacancy should be supplied. The Government will thereupon determine by which Taluk Board a member of the District Board shall be elected to fill the vacancy, and will direct an election to be held. Provided that when once all the Taluk Boards in the District have secured their full complement of elected representatives on the District Board, the President of the District Board shall, without reference to Government, himself direct, on the occurrence of any vacancy as aforesaid, that the Board of the Taluk to which the outgoing member belonged shall elect a new member to fill the vacancy." In other words, Government reserve to themselves, subject to the one contingency of all the Taluk Boards being represented on the District Board—an exception conceded as of necessity and not of grace, unless one Taluk Board was to retain the privilege of being doubly represented—the right to fill up vacancies, not by the light of local wants and wishes but by the light of their own belief as to what those wants and wishes ought to be. Such a system stands self-condemned even in the present condition of Municipal politics. Yet it is suggested that to such a system we should entrust that freer, fuller political franchise which it is at once our ambition and our right to achieve. Though we be alone in India, and we are grateful that this is a hypothesis and not a fact, in raising our protest against any such political self-immolation, we protest and always shall protest against an entire surrender of the whole or a major portion of the electoral machinery to the unfettered and irresponsible control of a Government which is subject to no effective or authoritative criticism, and which desires that it shall not be so subject. The surrender is the more objectionable that we are asked to make it with our eyes open to the folly of our own act; and as the whole object of the reformed Councils is to curb and decrease the unlimited authority of their present rule, an object which concedes the existence of the evil it seeks to cure, we need not offer any apology for our suspicion of the probable results of entrusting the Government with the manipulation of the electorate involved in the proposed extension of the present system. The case of the Salem Commissioner is only one of many illustrations we could adduce of the tendency of Government to retain in their own hands the complete control of all power.

And if District Boards in no sense represent popular feeling, and if it follow that they cannot claim the moral right to legislate by representation parochially for their neighbours, by what right of morals, of ethics, or of policy should they be clothed with that franchise which will give them the right to legislate vicariously for a Presidency and to control the interests of their nominees? Still less can they be so entitled when the Government may at any moment by a stroke of their pen, without consultation and without hindrance, unsettle and vary the very basis upon which their qualifications rest.

(e) The next step in descent is the Taluk Board. The same Act provides for its creation and control. It is to consist of not less than 12 persons (§ 14) and a President who is to be *ex-officio* the Revenue Officer in charge of the division of the district in which a Taluk Board is born (§ 15). The Board, like the District Board, may be authorized by Government to elect its own President, subject to the like conditions and provisos. (§ 15 (2)) The members of the Taluk Board may be either wholly appointed by the Government, or partly so appointed or partly elected by the members of the Panchayats from themselves or by the tax-payers and inhabitants of the taluk subject to the usual surveillance of the same authority (§ 16). The Government (§ 19) can declare the maximum strength of District and Taluk Boards, and the proportion upon each of elected members, and can at their discretion modify or cancel such alteration. The removal of the members of a Taluk Board is symmetrically provided for as being within the unqualified discretion of the Government in Section 24 quoted in connection with District Boards *supra* 10 (d).

(e) Taluk Boards tested

their entire subordination to Government: —

(f) The last rung of the ladder is the Panchayat. This is a collection of village individuals who must not number less than five (§ 119) and one of whom *ex-officio* is the village headman. This is the Village Munsiff or the Village Monigar, appointed and provided by the Government, in legislative disguise. The rest of the Panchayat may be appointed wholly by the Government or partly by them and partly elected by the tax-payers and inhabitants of the Union or a part of it, subject to the power of Government to sweep it all away and substitute what they like, or nothing (§ 121). The Government may declare the maximum strength of the Panchayat and the elected proportion (§ 122): may appoint a chairman or authorise his appointment by election and may withdraw such authority. (§ 123): and may remove a Panchayatdar for any reason they choose to accept or for no reason (§ 126). It is worthy of remark that the Government have reserved to themselves the right to prescribe as regards Municipalities, District and Taluk Boards and Panchayats a "period during which any person so removed shall not be eligible for re-appointment or re-election." A person obnoxious, therefore, politically to a Government or to one member of it might find himself first ousted from Municipal life without cause, and then excluded from all return to it for a period of 40 years, without appeal to the intervention of the law. And this, no matter his ability, his honesty, or his capacity, and the fact that he may be the elected mouthpiece of the great majority of his fellow townsmen. Even a Panchayat is placed under the control of the Taluk Board (§ 129) and its subjection to authority thus made perfect.

(f) Panchayats tested; their similar dependence.

(g) Such is briefly—for there is no pretence that the subject has been exhaustively treated—an outline of the constitution as authoritatively sketched of those assemblies to whose political fitness and stability the other Presidencies would have Madras entrust her destinies. Short of out-spoken substitution of the Government for local self-rule it would not be easy to devise a more complete or effective control over Municipal freedom than the Government have by legislation devised for themselves over each link in the chain of civic administration from the Municipality to the Panchayat. We believe we have established, from the incontestible evidence of public Acts, our position that Municipalities are Government in disguise. On the short and simple ground that to confide the electoral privileges to such bodies would be to substitute the Government for the people and to continue nomination for election, we most emphatically decline if we can help it to be subjected to a despotism from which we have been long struggling and are still struggling to be free.

Résumé.

11. It is admitted on all hands to be a sound maxim that politics and political influences should not be introduced, if possible, into Municipal institutions. Their introduction is deplored as deflecting men's minds by arousing their prejudices to the detriment of the public good. Yet this is what the Calcutta and Bombay critics of the Madras scheme would support, and this is what Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill proposes to make legislative provision for. Without any especial claim to altruistic motives we may be permitted to regret the advocacy of a system which, apart from other defects that seem to us to be fatal, contemplates the importation of a new and disturbing element into Municipal rivalry which can only result in the delay and confusion of public business.

(6) in demoralising the electorate by the introduction of politics:

(7) in ignoring the example of Western communities.

12. Lastly, we are not aware of any civilised country in the world which, possessing a Legislative Council, has handed over its election to Local Boards or Municipalities. The absence of such an electorate in all the many countries which permit the existence of Legislative bodies and in which Municipal institutions are of indigenous growth furnishes a strong argument against the introduction of any such fancy electorate here. We should be wise to follow the practical wisdom of peoples long acclimatised to the two-fold presence of Legislative Councils and the machinery for their creation.

The fallacy of making Chambers of Commerce, Trades' Associations, etc., the electorate:

13. If there is little, in our opinion, to be said of the scheme which would divert Municipalities from the true aim of their existence, there is less to be said in favour of entrusting the elections to Chambers of Commerce and Trades' Associations. Institutions such as these are composed of individuals, not infrequently wealthy, in the former case generally high up in society and on good terms with authority, perfectly competent to look after their own interests whether as members of collective bodies or as units of society. Members of the Chamber and of the Trades' Association command in their private capacity considerable influence over their fellowmen. They generally reside in localities where their combined influences can be brought into play, and there is no reason whatever to anticipate that, except in their corporate capacities, they could not make sure of a fair and adequate representation on any reformed Council.

Whatever may be the condition of things elsewhere, it is unquestionably true of Madras that the European non-official element is so small and society so contracted that the influence of the Government on any particular matter when the exertion of influence becomes necessary is the more readily felt and obeyed. Calcutta and Bombay are more fortunate in being able through the medium of a very large and very powerful non-official element to exhibit an independence and exert a control over authority almost impossible in our Presidency. To the intimacy of social connections must be added the intimacy of commercial relations which, unfortunately for Madras, consciously or otherwise induces the most influential of our merchants to accord to authority, in the protection of their own interests, a support which it does not always intrinsically deserve. The Trades Associations owe to their comparative immunity from social intimacy with Government House a comparatively larger stock of independence. In the varying accessibility of these bodies of men to pressure which would be less dangerous if applied to their members individually lies one reason for our aversion to entrusting them with electoral powers.

We object also to the impolicy of granting a double vote to the Chambers and like institutions implied necessarily in the proposal to permit the constituents of their corporations to vote first in their individual and next in their collective capacity. The constitution, moreover, of Chambers of Commerce, which are really in the nature of clubs, admitting and rejecting members as they choose, forbids anything like a fair representation upon them of the mercantile community. Merchants cannot claim seats within them as of right. They must submit to the test of election. Many important interests consequently find themselves excluded owing to the existence of prejudice, of jealousy, of personal pique and other influences which, however regrettable, make it impossible to regard Chambers of Commerce as qualified and impartial representatives of the commercial world.

or the University.

14. Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill does not make mention of the University as one of the ingredients of the proposed electorate. But Bengal and Bombay have alluded to it. To us the suggestion does not commend itself. Why, it may be asked, should the University elect and not the Bar? Why if the Bar, not Medicine? Why if Medicine, not the Church? And it would be difficult in this Presidency to support the distinction upon any intellectual differentiation. Who is meant by the "University"? Not the large body of educated graduates but the small and esoteric body of the Senate. In addition to such force, if any, as the objection may carry which has already been applied to the enfranchisement of small and select coteries of men, there is another and grave objection to the enfranchisement of the Senate. That body is purely nominated, and owes its nomination to purely official sources. The graduates have no voice in the selection of the Senate. Enrolment in its ranks is by favour of the Director of Public Instruction, always an official appointed by the Government, sometimes as to-day a member of the Covenanted Civil Service. A Governor may occasionally insert a name. But if he does, whatever his motive, his act still retains the full flavour of undiluted officialdom. The University, therefore, resolves itself on dissection into a Governor or one of his nominees in academic hoods. If it be intended—though we do not see why—that the University should be represented in Council, the remedy lies with the Government who from their numerous nominated seats can rectify inequalities, adjust balances, and appease wounded sensitiveness, where these betray themselves, by bestowing a nomination upon any worthy applicant. It was for such purposes that the Congress scheme expressly reserved a large number of nominations to Government. The like reasoning would apply to Chambers of Commerce, Trades' Associations, and other kindred bodies.

15. The planting interest, however, stands upon a very different footing. Not merely do planters hold a very large pecuniary stake in the country, but they have special claims upon legislative consideration as being enormous employers of labour, and as men who do much by their road making to open up and facilitate communication. They are not gregarious, except as amongst themselves. Though they affect certain districts, they are as a rule isolated from the outside world, and are not in constant touch, as are the Chambers of Commerce and the Trades' Associations, with head-quarters. They represent, moreover, a large body of men numerically, and they have long cleared themselves of the reproach, if it were ever justly earned, of being little more than hospitable boors. There will be found a very considerable element of Public School culture to-day among their ranks. These men have no voice in legislation which may seriously affect their pockets. They have no voice in a sense in which that statement is not true of the Chambers and the Trades' Associations. The Planters are therefore in our opinion clearly entitled, not to form an exclusive or a joint electorate, but to a distinct representation of their own. This could be secured in one of three methods; firstly, either by planters coming forward for election as planter candidates, in which event public sympathy would afford them adequate representation; or, secondly, by the present district areas being contracted so as to make planters in certain localities, like the Wynaad, for example, communities capable of sending their own nominee to Council; or, thirdly, by the Government nominating a planter to a seat. In Ceylon, certainly, and we believe, elsewhere the planting interest has long been represented by a system of semi-election upon the Legislative Council.

Planters on a different footing.

16. Section 5 of the Bill provides for the election of the elected members of the Viceregal Council by the elected members of the Provincial Councils. We prefer our own former suggestion that the electorate for the Viceregal Council should be the Electoral College. The wider the electoral basis the wider the true popular choice. Small parties are apt to breed *cliques* and are more amenable to influence and to prejudice. The terrorism of "position"—no mean factor in Indian social life—would be more full of terror to 20 than to 200 voters. Twenty might, possibly, be placed on the private *entrée* list. Two hundred would inconveniently crowd the approach and rob electicism of its charm. In the struggle which is now raging for political reform that scheme most nearly, and therefore most truly, sympathises with the genius of the movement which takes power from the few to vest it in the many. Such a test would seem to prefer our scheme to that provided for by the Bill.

The Electorate for the elected members of the Viceregal Council should be the Electoral College.

17. To the sections of the Bill which deal with the Madras Provincial Council we would add a section similar in its provisions to those contained in election 9 authorising the Governor to assemble the Electoral College for the purpose of filling up a vacancy created among the elected members of that Council.

Governor should assemble Electoral College when ever vacancy arises.

Acceptance of office by an elected member should, we think, create a vacancy, but we think also that the member so vacating should be eligible for re-election.

Acceptance of office to create vacancy: member eligible for re-election.

18. Over the question of what should be the number of the Provincial Council of Madras there has been considerable discussion. In finally fixing 48 as the aggregate of the elected and nominated members of that Council we have been guided by the following considerations. In the first place, it is desirable that the Council should be as large as possible without being unwieldy. A total of 24 does not too abundantly manufacture members for a Presidency in which there are 22 Districts. Secondly, a large number of nominated seats will the more easily enable the Government to rectify any possible inequalities, and to protect the interests of corporations which in their opinion ought to be represented.

Number of Provincial Council: 48 suggested. reason therefor.

19. The suggestion of naming members in Council as sitting for particular districts or in particular interests does not commend itself to us. The territorial representation of the Presidency will, according to our scheme, be fully carried out on the constitution of the Electoral College. Persons who are elected by the College into Council will be elected for their general fitness and capacity, and will not be returned for any special place. We should have preferred a plan whereby the members of Council could, as in England, be invested with the special local interest of representing special and local interests. But we do not see how this could be achieved with any substantial show of truth unless the election were really and directly popular and candidates could appeal immediately to the people without the intervention of an Electoral College according to our scheme, or of Municipalities according to the scheme of Calcutta and Bombay. Without such an appeal the territorial naming of members would be an empty honour as at the best the task of assigning them to their respective Districts would be left to the Electoral College and not to

Members not to be named territorially.

the real constituencies. Nor do we desire to introduce here the long and ponderous system which in the House of Commons forbids the mention of any member's name.

Short re-
capitulation. 20. We may briefly sum up our review of the proposed Bill and of the Calcutta and Bombay schemes thus :

- (a) We approve the omission of legislation in the Bill for the India Council : (§ 2).
- (b) we approve the final settlement of any difference of opinion by a Standing Committee of the House : (§ 3)
- (c) we insist, so far as we can, upon the introduction of the elective element into the reconstituted Councils, the omission to do which would nullify all reform : (§ 4)
- (d) we entirely disapprove of the Calcutta and Bombay scheme that the electorate should be composed of Local Boards, Municipalities, Chambers of Commerce &c., and we reaffirm the necessity and the wisdom of an Electoral College : (§ 5)
- (e) we point out what we believe to be the fallacies of the rival scheme as to Local Boards and Municipalities (§§ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) :
- (f) as to Chambers of Commerce and Trades' Associations : (§ 13)
- (g) and as to the University : (§ 14)
- (h) we differentiate the Planting interest and suggest the true remedy : § 15)
- (j) we prefer that the electorate for the elected members of the Viceregal Council should be the Electoral College and not the elected members of the Provincial Councils : (§ 16)
- (k) we propose the introduction into the Bill of a section empowering the Governor to assemble the Electoral College on a vacancy arising ; and we suggest that an elected member accepting office shall resign but be eligible for re-election : (§ 17)
- (l) we fix 48 as the gross aggregate of the Madras Council (§ 18) and disapprove of naming members territorially : (§ 19)
- (m) and we endeavour to meet the three-fold objections advanced against our proposal (1) of uniformity ; (2) of creating the least resistance ; (3) and of following out Lord Mayo's policy. (§ 21.)

21. We are unable to agree with Mr. Bradlaugh in the weight which he would attach to the argument as to uniformity. It is no doubt desirable to secure uniformity if possible. But it is possible also to pay too a high a price for that commodity. In our opinion uniformity would be best secured by the acceptance on the part of our critics of our proposals. We believe we should be paying too high a price for it if for the sake of agreement with Calcutta and Bombay we abandoned a scheme which is the only one which assures to us the protection and development of the great principle of popular election. And what is the alternative for the sake of which we are asked to sacrifice a measure we have adopted only after careful and very anxious scrutiny ? The alternative is in reality a delusion possessed of none of the characteristics for which we have striven so long and at so much cost, an alternative which will leave this country exactly where she now is and render of no avail the labour of six long years. The Secretary of State and the Viceroy, it is said, have declared against the least concession of the elective principle. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand—we say this in no spirit of bitterness but in a spirit of regret—why the European Press should prefer the Calcutta to the Madras scheme. The former has all the glitter without the reality of power. The latter has both. The Calcutta and Bombay schemes shadow a system which, when scrutinized, will be found to place the power nominally in the hands of apparently independent bodies of men, but virtually in the hands of the Government. Whatever may be true of the North, this is a perfectly faithful representation of the condition of things here, where the non-official element is so small, and, as already stated, in many respects so welded for commercial reasons to support the Government, that an electorate of the Chamber, the Trades, the University, the Local Boards and the Municipalities would in very truth mean an electorate of the Government. The hands, indeed might be the hands of Esau, but the voice would be that of Jacob. Uniformity purchased at such a cost would be political suicide.

Objections
met as to
arguments
(1) of "uni-
formity."

It is further urged that to adopt the Calcutta scheme would be to "tread the path of least resistance." It is quite conceivable that this statement, though not in Mr. Bradlaugh's meaning, is true; for if our view be correct, and analysis seems to corroborate it, the adoption of the Calcutta scheme would be acceptable to Government because it would, under a change of words, leave all power as now still with them. In such event it would create not "the least" but no resistance at all. There are occasions in the history of nations when intellectual resistance is justifiable. Such an occasion, it seems to us, presents itself to-day in the political history of India when for the first time in her annals there dawns upon her the near promise of tasting the elixir of elective independence. If ever resistance could commend itself to a country who long ago effected her own political emancipation, and whose present inheritance of freedom has been secured only at a cost which she herself would not desire should precede the ultimate commemoration of a kindred triumph here, such a resistance should surely commend itself to the active intervention of England when, owing to unsympathetic counsels in high places both in India and at home, we see in grave and imminent peril the only force and principle which will ever raise this country from the slough and lethargy of political despair. England is slow to move to Indian reform. Upwards of thirty years have passed since the solemn promises of the Queen legitimately excited hopes which withered in their babyhood and ambitions that were strangled at their birth. For five and twenty years before that still uncanceled charter of Indian liberty—uncanceled, though the justice of its concessions and the solemnity of its utterance have been openly denied by one who would seek to prefer the casuistry of judicial reasoning to the moral value of keeping a promise unbroke—England contributed little to India's political nurture. If we concede to-day the elimination of elective independence, we shall cry in vain for the redress of our concession however plain its faults, till at the termination of another quarter of a century a new political upheaval may, perhaps, evoke a new instalment of reform. It cannot be urged with any show of truth that India is wholly unfit for the introduction of the elective element: for the Government have repeatedly in their own Legislative enactments admitted and made provision for the elective principle. The constitutions of the Municipalities and District Boards attest the avowal. [See *ante* §§ 10 (a) to 10 (f).] It reaches so far down as the humble Panchayatdar and his little Union. Its principle cannot be negatived. Its extension may be guarded with almost as many provisos as the Government desire. If the qualifications for our primary electorate, the people, are too wide, we shall be ready to accept qualifications more narrow. But with that readiness our willing concessions end. We cannot voluntarily be parties to any limitation upon the principle of partial election by the people.

The Bengal and Bombay scheme would not, we respectfully think, be in continuity of Lord Mayo's policy, for that large hearted statesman undoubtedly intended the peoples of this country to grow gradually into real and living political communities, and not into communities deluded by an arrangement of words into a complete surrender of all political privileges. If we fail to convert our dissentient sister Presidencies, we feel that we shall be lacking in courage and political prescience if we do not pray that the different social and political necessities and temperaments, if these exist, of the various Presidencies be taken into consideration in any contemplated legislative reform, and that we be permitted to start our new political career under the one and only system which can either ensure stable and genuine political *genesis*, or, having ensured it, train the zealous students of its slow and gradual evolution into that ultimate respect of themselves and of authority which, being based on reason not on faith, on gratitude not on fear, shall build up in the flow of time, on foundations not unworthy the labours of England's teaching, a system of political creeds and institutions which shall justify more eloquently than the pen of the historian and glorify more truthfully than the tongue of the orator the long and splendid history of England's supremacy in India.

P. SOMASUNDRAM CHETTIAR (*Chairman.*)
 EARDLEY NORTON.
 W. S. GANTZ.
 JOHN ADAM.
 G. SANKARA NAIR.
 S. RAMASAWMY MUDALIAR.
 P. ANANDA CHARLU.
 S. SUBRAMANIA IYER.
 N. SUBRAMANIAM.
 M. RANGASAWMY IYENGAR.
 G. SUBRAMANIA IYER.
 P. R. SUNDRAM IYER.
 C. V. SUNDARA SASTRI.
 S. PULNEY ANDY.
 M. RAMSAWMY NAIDU.
 M. VIRARAGHAVA CHARIAR.

MINUTE OF DISSENT

BY

Messrs. W. S. Gantz, G. Subramania Iyer, M. Viraraghava Chariar, and Eardley Norton.



The report, as it originally stood, contained a clause (§ 16, now omitted) advocating the inclusion of the Indian States for certain purposes and with certain limitations, within the scope of the proposed powers of interpellation. That clause was in Committee rejected by a majority of five to four. The majority consisted of Mr. Adam, Mr. S. Ramasawmy Mudaliar, Mr. P. Anantha Charlu, Mr. Ramasami Naidu, and Mr. Sundra Iyer. Its acceptance seems to us so important that we feel constrained to record our dissent from the excision of a proposal whereby, as we believe, an untenable restriction has been placed upon the rights and powers of the contemplated Legislative Councils, and a guarantee withdrawn as well for the better internal administration of Indian States as for the more efficient, because more public, discharge of their responsible duties by an important section of British officials. The knowledge that their actions would incidentally be made the topic of comment and discussion by members of Council, to whose keenness of criticism there could be placed no bounds other than their own sense of propriety and decorum, would quicken the servants of our Indian Princes and the Princes themselves into a livelier sense than exists in all places of their duties to their subjects, while nothing but good could flow to the officers of the British Government accredited to Indian Courts by the assurance that their conduct would for the future be subjected to a public, an impartial, and an intelligent review. Congress has, no doubt, more than once reaffirmed its readiness to exclude, as outside beneficial questioning, all matters of foreign policy. We desire in no way to withdraw our complete assent to the frankness of that avowal. But under that exclusion the Government will seek to shelter any attempt to elicit information from them touching their relations with the Princes of India. We press it that such relations are purely domestic not foreign; that they concern a body of men who are only nominally independent but who in practice are always under the supervision, and occasionally under the pressure, of British Residents or their equivalents; and that the accident that such States happen, for administrative convenience, to fall under the department of the Foreign Office in Calcutta does not convert them from British into foreign territories. These States cover about one-third of the total area, and their populations amount to one-tenth of the total population of India. Some of the administrations, euphemistically styled independent, of the Indian Princes cry aloud for investigation and redress, owing principally, perhaps, to indigenous incompetency, yet owing, it must be admitted, at times to the injudicious and occasionally highhanded interference of the local representatives of Imperial authority. Hyderabad, Cashmere, Bhopal, have been publicly and frequently cited as instances of provinces where misrule is made easy because of the active interference or passive indifference of British officers, and where its continuance is ensured only because of the absolute irresponsibility of the Government to public criticism and public enquiry. The disclosures on the late Parliamentary Committee into the mining scandals of the Nizam's Government afford a fair illustration of the desirability, in the interests of our Indian principalities and of England's reputation, of imposing upon the secrecy and unfettered independence of the Government the check of public investigation and debate. If the condition of the subjects of our Princes is to be bettered, and some hope held out to them of redress against their rulers, or to the Paramount Power of assistance against the derelictions of its own agents, the members of the reconstituted Legislative Councils must be clothed with the privilege by interpellation of throwing light upon the dark places of Indian administration and of British misfeasance.

It is no part of our purpose to subject the purely internal administration of the Indian States to enquiry, though in our opinion much might be advanced in favour of such a proposal. We ask no more than this, that the conduct of no British Official shall be sheltered from the scrutiny of query and response and the safeguard of public discussion merely because he is removed from the immediate service of the Government of India. Our right to interpellate regarding the actions of a Collector, or a Judge, or a member of the Executive Council, or of the Governor himself is not disputed. Why is criticism not to follow the Collector merely because he finds himself gazetted a Resident? Within our territorial jurisdiction such an official would find in a rudimentary public opinion and a press only just learning its functions as a moralist some check upon a disposition to excess. Within the jurisdiction of Indian State such salutary limitations are unknown. The true conclusion, it is submitted, is the one which points to the increased necessity for the exercise of the power of interpellation. Residents and Agents do not cease to be British Officers because of their assumption of a new dignity. Nor should the right to scrutinize and discuss their public acts be hindered in the exercise of its wholesome influence upon their careers.

It has been urged that to press this reform would be to imperil the whole scheme of the Reformed Councils. We have more faith in England's justice. We have been told we shall raise such a storm by our suggestion that in the side issues of its violence the larger proposal will be lost. We have more faith in England's intelligence. But should such a predicted storm arise, we would point to the tempest as in support of the merits of our prayer. For such a storm could only indicate the existence of a consciousness that there was much to bury and conceal in those quarters to which we would direct the glare of public investigation. It is in no spirit of grasping power, but in the sincere desire to preserve intact the privileges of the Councils yet to be, and in the belief that by our persistence if successful we shall best inaugurate and secure a brighter future for the subjects of those feudatory states whose destinies are in truth controlled by British power that we have dwelt upon this topic at such length. Such stress do we lay upon the question that we shall resuscitate it, if we may, at the Bombay Congress. We shall not ourselves attempt to revive it before our own Standing Committee to whom the whole report must be submitted, only because there is no time to discuss it, and we do not wish to snatch a hasty vote.

WILLIAM S. GANTZ.
G. SUBRAMANIA IYER.
M. VIRARAGAVA CHARIAR.
EARDLEY NORTON.

16th December, 1889.

MINUTE OF DISSENT

BY

Messrs. J. Adam and M. Rangasawmy Aiyangar.

We object to para. 3 approving of the appointment of a Standing Committee of the House of Commons to hear Indian Administrative appeals because we do not think the Bill should be loaded with a proposal involving such a serious constitutional change. In no other department of the Government is a court of this kind set up between the responsible Minister and the Parliament, that is, the country, to which he is responsible. The analogy of the Committees on Law and Trade is a false one; they merely discuss the details of measures, the principles of which have been adopted by the House. Further we fear that such a Standing Committee would be even pernicious. At present the Secretary of State is responsible to the country and if the country is dissatisfied with him he must go. His responsibility, especially if he be a timid man, must be inevitably lessened by the setting up of the Committee which will become practically the governing body. Moreover, the ultimate appeal will then, as now, lie to the House of Commons and the interposition of a Committee will be but one more obstacle to a speedy settlement of disputed questions. We understand the argument in favour of the Committee is that the House of Commons knows little and cares less about Indian affairs. Assuming this to be true, if the Committee is to be fairly representative, we do not see how it will be any better than the House. If it is to be formed of those who are supposed to know and are assumed to care for Indian affairs, it will degenerate into a bad reproduction of the India Council.

JOHN ADAM,
M. RANGASWAMY AIYANGAR.

APPENDIX E.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S DRAFT BILL.

Re-print of the articles from the "HINDU" a Daily paper published in Madras.

I.

BEFORE we discuss the various sections of this Bill it is, perhaps, desirable to state what is in exact terms the scope of the reform that the Bill seeks to effect in the administration of this country. The Bill is an embodiment of the resolutions of the Congress, and it is well-known how its views in regard to the reform in question have been misunderstood. The misunderstanding is intentional in some quarters and no amount of reasoning will avail to carry conviction to the minds of such men. But in other quarters, wherefrom a more thoughtful and sober criticism might be expected, the same misunderstanding has been apparent. It is in the memory of our readers how Lord Dufferin spoke of the Congress in the last days of his Viceroyalty. He is a statesman of great experience, caution and sympathy. Still he attributed to the Congress aims and methods which it never recognized. He said that it sought to apply to India democratic methods of Government, it aimed at the introduction of a Parliamentary system; and it wanted the power of the purse by which it would be able to bring the British executive into subjection to its will. Nothing can be a more grotesque misrepresentation of the objects of the Congress than this way of describing them, and yet it is not Lord Dufferin alone, but many others have similarly misunderstood them, no doubt from a vague apprehension of future consequences which may flow from the first step of departure from the existing system. It is therefore desirable that the leaders of the Congress movement should now and again place before the public their true objects and show how moderate they are, and how the well-being of the Empire, no less than the advancement of civilization among the people requires them, and how every well-wisher of continued attachment between Great Britain and India, is bound to sympathise with the movement. Well, we need not repeat here what Mr. Telang said so well at Allahabad about the ex-Viceroy's criticism of the Congress. Its leaders are not particularly wedded to democratic methods of Government; they do not want to usurp the function of the British executive; nor do they insist on the unconstitutional principle of a divorce between power and responsibility. It is not their aim to convert the present bureaucratic system of Government into a Parliamentary or representative system of Government. The Congress does not propose a system of

manhood suffrage; it does not propose that the Legislative Councils of India shall become as numerous as the legislative bodies of European countries or America; it does not propose that the members of the Executive Council should be men chosen from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. The proposals of the Congress claim no direct control over the business of the administration. That business will be conducted very much in the same way as it is at present. The executive will remain solely responsible for the good or bad administration of the country. It will possess full freedom to reject measures which do not commend themselves to its approval. What is then the change that the Congress urges in the present system of Government? It is merely this: that in every measure that the Government may adopt, it shall consult previously the regular and officially constituted representatives of the people. These representatives shall be the members of the Legislative Councils, and they shall be appointed in a manner which will make them genuine representatives. They shall be vested with such functions as will impart weight and authority to their opinions. This is in a word the substance of the reform which the Congress has urged during these five years, and about which so much alarm and misconception have been roused. That this is not our view only but is what has been officially put forth will be apparent from the following words of Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee who spoke at Allahabad about the resolution on Legislative Councils: "Our programme," he said, "for the expansion and reform of the Legislative Councils which we are called upon to re-affirm by this resolution is extremely moderate. It is neither a Parliamentary system nor representative Government, nor the application of democratic methods to Indian institutions that we seek for. Our demand is much more moderate than that. All that we want is to rescue the present Legislative Councils from their character as monstrous shams, and convert them into useful consultative assemblies which may help the Government in the difficult task which Providence has assigned to it; and in India more than in any country is such a step necessary where there are so many races and nationalities and such diversified interests. Therefore, even for administrative purposes, if for nothing else, the reconstitution of the Councils has become a

necessity. We desire to place non-official opinion on an organized footing for purposes of consultation by the Government. Non-official opinion is consulted now. We say it should be consulted in a more formal and methodical manner. We have no wish to assume sovereign authority. The supreme power will remain where it is vested as at present. We only desire that we may be consulted in its exercise." Thus it is clear that the Congress does not propose that our Legislative Councils should become so many Parliaments. They are to be in all their essential duties mere consultative bodies, which the Government will be bound to consult formally and under prescribed rules of procedure. Persons outside the Council are no doubt consulted now in a way: but there is no system; there is nothing which compels Government to do so, the individuals consulted give their opinions without sufficient information, without debate or discussion, and without a sense of responsibility to the people in whose behalf they are supposed to be consulted. The Official Secrets Act was passed at Simla without, so far as we are aware, a single native gentleman being consulted. Several native gentlemen are members of the Viceregal Legislative Council. But they cannot follow the Viceroy wherever he may go, and when important measures are taken up while he is at Simla, the supposed benefit of native gentlemen being members of the Council is lost. Even when the native members are present, they give their opinion without being answerable to the people. If they are answerable to any body at all, they are to the Viceroy and his Secretaries, whose good will procured them their seats in the Council and whose displeasure may deprive them of that honour. It is not, however, in legislation alone that the present system is defective and leads to mischief and misunderstanding. In the general administration of the country, in the broad policies that prompt the measures of Government in domestic and foreign matters, and in the disposal of the revenues, the Congress urges that men of light and leading in the country should be regularly consulted and their opinions given due weight as far as possible. The Government will not be bound to give effect to these opinions in every case. The proposals of the Congress, as we have said already, give it the right to adopt or reject the opinions of the Council, and the responsibility for the good Government of the country will remain absolutely where it is now. Thus the Congress wants to put an end to the present irresponsible, secret, and inefficient system of administration and legislation and substitute for it a system by which every administrative and legislative measure will be subject to full discussion by the public and Government itself will be compelled to explain publicly the policy, the object and the details of every important measure it may

undertake. That this end may be effectively secured the Congress insists on certain changes as essential to its plan of reform. It insists on the Executive Government consulting the Legislative Councils, whether it consults others or not, in all matters of administration as well as legislation; these Councils should be sufficiently large to make it worth while to Government to invite their opinion; that a sufficiently large proportion of the members of these Councils should be men depending in no way on the good will of the Government but entirely owing their position to the confidence of the people. There is also another essential part of the reform as put forth by the Congress; which is, that whenever the constituted representatives of the people are not satisfied with the decision of the Government in India, they should have the power to appeal to Parliament and that body should be bound to hear the appeal and give a decision. These are in short the basis and measure of the change which is urged by the Congress and which is condemned by some as revolutionary. The issue then is, whether the necessity for consultative bodies of the kind described above is established: if it is, whether the opponents of the Congress are prepared to suggest a plan which will fully realise the end in view without leading to any of the revolutionary consequences apprehended from the proposals of that body.

II.

To the scheme of Legislative reform as embodied in the Congress resolutions, that is, in Mr. Bradlaugh's draft bill, the late Viceroy raised an objection which is apparently the strongest and which has probably scared many that were inclined to favour the reform. He said: "In the first place the whole scheme is eminently unconstitutional; for the essence of constitutional Government is that responsibility and power should remain in the same hands, and the idea of irresponsible Councils, whose members could never be called to account for their acts in the way in which an opposition can be called to account in a constitutional country, arresting the march of Indian legislation or nullifying the policy of the British Executive in India, would be regarded as an impracticable anomaly." Here Lord Dufferin enunciates a theory which he assumes to be true of all constitutional Governments and, applying it to the scheme proposed by the Congress, condemns it as being against that theory. It is evident that in laying down the theory the late Viceroy had in his mind the constitution of Great Britain, and rather hastily extended its application to all countries enjoying a constitutional Government. It is only in England that there is a happy fusion of responsibility and power, of the responsibility of decision and the power of execution. The Legislative and Executive authorities in England are involved in each other, and each exercises control over the other. This

happy fusion of the two functions of Government does not exist, at any rate to the same extent, in other countries. In America, for instance, the system of Government is marked by a rigid separation of the Legislative and Executive power. No country in the world has a popular system of Government in a more thorough sense than the United States of America. The principle of popular Government is, as Walter Bagehot puts it, "that the supreme power, the determining efficacy in matters political resides in the people—not necessarily or commonly in the whole people, in the numerical majority, but in a chosen people, a picked and selected people. It is so in England, it is so in all free countries." In this sense, the American system of Government is of the most popular kind and America is the freest country in the world. Well, in such a country the divorce between responsibility and power, which Lord Dufferin pronounces to be an anomaly in a constitution, would appear to exist in a marked degree. Perhaps a few words on the contrast between the systems of popular, representative, or parliamentary Government, pursued in the two countries, would throw some light on the nature of the proposals contained in Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill. The English Government has been called the Cabinet system of constitutional Government and what obtains in the United States of America and France is the Presidential system. Our readers know how the Cabinet system is peculiar to England, being the growth of no paper constitution deliberately and more or less abruptly created; but the outcome of unwritten traditions and practices which have developed themselves in the course of generations. The Cabinet is strictly a committee of the legislative assembly, but it can dissolve the assembly which appointed it. "It is a committee with a suspensive veto—a committee with a power of appeal." "The English system," writes Bagehot, "is not an absorption of the Executive power by the Legislative power; it is a fusion of the two. Either the Cabinet legislates and acts, or else it can dissolve. It is a creature, but it has the power of destroying its creators. It is an executive which can annihilate the legislature, as well as an executive which is the nominee of the legislature. It *was* made, but it can unmake; it was derivative in its origin, but it is destructive in its action." "A Cabinet is a combining committee—a *hyphen* which joins, a *buckle* which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the states. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other." The Cabinet represents the sovereign so far as its executive power goes; but in its legislative capacity it is the creature of Parliament. This kind of connecting link which obviates all friction between the legislative and executive institutions is wanting in the American

system. The President of the American Republic is elected by the people by one process, and the members of Congress by another. The two powers are independent; and the wise framers of the constitution who had a dread of the executive exercising too much control over the legislature, intended them to be so independent. The political experience of America does not justify any doubt being entertained as regards the wisdom of the principle that was adopted. But on certain occasions this rigid separation of the two powers has led to embarrassment. Nor does it accord with the theory of a perfect constitution. "If the persons," we again quote from Bagehot, "who have to do the work are not the same as those who have to make the laws, there will be a controversy between the two sets of persons. The tax-imposers are sure to quarrel with the tax-requirers. The executive is crippled by not getting the laws it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility. The executive becomes unfit for its name, since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking decisions of which others (and not itself) will suffer the effects." It is the possibility of a permanent situation like this that Lord Dufferin apprehends that the congress proposals will create. But it should not be forgotten that the scheme of the Congress has nothing in it analogous to the Cabinet system of England or the Presidential system of America. The Viceroy and his Councillors will not be the creatures of the enlarged Legislative Council. They will be of course members of it just as the Cabinet Ministers in England are members of Parliament; but they will not be bound to the majority of the Council for the time being. If the majority are against the Viceroy and his Councillors, these latter will not be bound to resign, and appeal to the country to decide between them and the adverse majority. The executive authority will exercise material control on the Legislative Council, but this latter will have no control whatever over the executive authority. Nor is our system like the American system. The Viceroy and his Executive Ministers will not be appointed by the people as is the President of the Republic. The American President has no power of initiating any legislative measure. He has indeed the power to return to Congress any Bill unsigned, but if by a two-thirds majority the two Houses of Congress pass it over his veto, the President has nothing further to do, and the quarrel ends. Should there not be a two-thirds majority the Bill drops, and however important the question may be, nothing can be done till the current term of the Congress expires. Such is the relation between the legislative and the executive power in America. The divorce between responsibility and power which Lord Dufferin attributes to the Congress proposals is very apparent in that relation. Still, in

practice, if Mr. Bryce's opinion is correct, the national Government of America is worthy of admiration and popular attachment to it is growing stronger every year. But the reform urged by the Congress contemplates no relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Government such as subsists between the two powers in the United States. The Legislative Council will remain a body subordinate to the Executive Government. It will arrogate to itself none of the powers which now belong to the Governor-General. It will be a sort of "Her Majesty's opposition" in India, only it will be an opposition which will never have a change of assuming the power of Government. Every species of power will continue to be vested in the Executive Government, and the responsibility of the Council will consist merely in the advice it will be called upon to give. The Governor-General may accept or reject that advice according as he may be advised by his Cabinet to do. The responsibility as well as the power of good or bad legislation and administration will rest on the Executive Government; and there will be therefore no separation of the two. The Press is a sort of opposition at present in this country; but it is without authority or status. This authority and status, so far as they are necessary for public opinion to influence the administration, will be possessed by the reformed Legislative Councils which will exert no more direct influence on Government than the organized expression of public opinion does in every country.

III.

IN our former articles we indicated the essential features of the reform which Indian public opinion urges on Government. We pointed out that our Legislative Councils should cease to be the sham, that they are now and be so re-organized as to exercise real and substantial control over the administration as well as the legislation of the country. The reformed Councils, according to the proposals of the Congress, will not take away the lest part of the power now vested in the Executive Government, and the responsibility therefore will remain where it is now fixed. They will be mere consultative bodies vested with certain powers which will make consultation of them regular, formal and effective. In order to give this character to the Councils it is essential that they should be enlarged in regard to their numbers; that a portion of these members should be direct representatives of the people; they should possess the power of interpellation; and no measure or no policy of Government with certain well-defined exceptions should be beyond the scope of these Councils to discuss and offer an opinion upon. These are the lines of reform which the Congress insists upon, and while no measure which does not proceed exactly on these lines will satisfy public opinion in its present state, the

Congress is willing to consider any other scheme which will secure this end. But it is remarkable that till now no critic of the Congress has put forward any scheme as more moderate and practical than that of the Congress. The criticism has manifested such a degree of prejudice and of reluctance to grapple with the subject that it can afford no help to Government in arriving at a wise decision. If the opponents are not ready with a definite scheme, and if they are honest in their desire to advance the cause of good and popular administration, they cannot object to an official inquiry being instituted into the whole subject or into parts of it. This the Congress has repeatedly asked for Mr. George Yule referred to it in his speech at Allahabad: "We are not wedded to these proposals," he said. "The principle of election being frankly accepted, there will be little difficulty in satisfying us in the matter of the constituencies, or as to the size of the Councils. The devising of a suitable elective body might be left to the Government, or better still, by way of a preliminary to the final judgment of the Government, to a small commission which could easily be rendered acceptable to the whole community. Happily there is no scarcity of men both among official and non-official classes, abundantly qualified for such a work. I should like to mention the names of half a dozen such men, chiefly for the purpose of dissipating the fears of those who seem to think we have some revolutionary scheme in view." But we are prepared to go further than Mr. Yule. We should like the enquiry to embrace the details of all or most of the leading principles of reform which Parliament may lay down. Some of our contemporaries have suggested that the required legislation should be undertaken by the Government of India in this country and not by Parliament. The *Indian Nation*, which is generally thoughtful in its criticisms thinks that "no measure dealing with the details of the constitution of the Indian Councils should be introduced into Parliament. For the English public are not competent to discuss such a measure intelligently; Parliament itself is not competent. Such criticism as may be made in India will not receive that attention in England which it ought to receive. A measure dealing with details of reform should be introduced in the Legislative Council of India; and the English Parliament should be invoked only to pass a law enabling the Viceregal Council to introduce, discuss, and pass such a measure. When an Indian Reform Bill has been introduced into the Viceregal Council, there is every chance of its being properly discussed in India and satisfactory decisions arrived at. If the English Parliament can pass laws affecting its own constitution, the Indian Legislative Council may very well pass laws affecting its own constitution, and if it lacks legislative power, Parliament may pass an enabling

measure. Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill ought to be simply an enabling measure and ought not itself to arrange for details." There is much in the above of which we approve. But it must be remembered that the present Act is a Parliamentary Act and it is not in the power of the Indian legislature to meddle with it. If then Parliament should take the initiative, it is unavoidable, it is desirable, that it should do more than merely pass an enabling measure. The Councils Act of 1861 is more than an enabling measure. It defines what the Council shall do and what it shall not do. It lays down the number of members and the manner of appointing them. It prescribes the quorum and the privilege of the President in case of difference of opinion. The Governor-General in Council has indeed power to make rules for the conduct of business; he can introduce the Act in Provinces where no separate Legislative Council now exists; and he can fix the place of meeting, and so forth. But these latter are comparatively unimportant matters; in all essential respects concerning the constitution and functions of the Council the Indian Government is left no discretion. If nearly 30 years ago Parliament could be trusted to legislate on the constitution of the Indian Government, we do not see why its competence should be suspected at present. Since 1861 the British Parliament and the public have learnt to take an interest in Indian matters and they cannot be said to be quite ignorant of them. Moreover, Parliament will not agree to give up all its control over Indian Government. Our contemporary will remember what the Duke of Argyll said as to the true position of the Governor-General. He said that the Governor-General and his Council "were merely executive officers of the Home Government." England values her Indian possession too highly to the discretion of local authorities matters which affect its most vital interests. The subject of admitting the people of India to fresh political privileges and the means by which these privileges can be exercised without detriment to England's interest are too important to be entrusted for disposal to the authorities in India. At any rate, all the essential features of reform on which we insist are such that the Viceroy will not take and will not be permitted to take upon himself the responsibility of conceding or withholding. Nor is it in our opinion to our advantage that on such important matters we should lose an opportunity to elicit the views of the English public and Parliament. We are distinctly of opinion therefore that most of the provisions contained in Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill are such as require to be included in a Parliamentary enactment. Still, we agree with our contemporary in thinking that there will be a large number of details which will have to be left to the discretion of the Government of India. The question as to the fitness of certain backward provinces to receive a Legisla-

tive Council, how far the elective principle can be recognised in the constitution of Councils in such backward provinces, how the elective bodies should be constituted, the qualifications of the elector and the candidate, and such other subordinate matters might be left to the Indian Government. It is in respect to these matters that a Commission of Inquiry seems to be desirable. We have had Commissions after Commissions of late; and considering what little good they have done, we are slow to recommend that the whole subject of legislative reform should be entrusted to another Commission. We think that Parliament should settle the principles and the limits of the proposed change; and in regard to the filling up of the outline thus defined it might call to its aid a body of gentlemen who will institute local inquiry and report their conclusions. We should certainly prefer the House of Commons to any Commission in deciding whether the Indian Councils are to be enlarged, whether any of the members are to be elected, whether they are to be given any control over the administration as well as legislation, and whether and within what limits the power of interpellation is to be granted. In such broad questions the Indian people can better trust to the world known sympathy and generosity of the House of Commons than to a Commission which is sure to be affected by the spirit of the Indian bureaucracy. Of this latter fact we have had better experience.

IV.

THE VICEREGAL AND PROVINCIAL COUNCILS.

OUR contemporary of the *Bombay Gazette* is informed that it is the intention of Lord Cross to introduce in Parliament in the course of next year a Bill to reform the Legislative Councils of India. According to this Bill the Supreme Legislative Council will be left as it is at present, save a limited right of interpellation and a provision for a fuller discussion of the budget. The number of members will not be enlarged; much less will these members or any portion of them be permitted to be elected by the people. Indeed this principle of election will not be recognised at all; because Lord Cross and Government of India believe that India is not fit for any such privilege and it is not possible to constitute working electoral bodies. The members of the Provincial Councils will therefore continue to be appointed by Government. They will be, however, increased in number; they will be given the power of interpellation and of discussing the provincial budgets. These are the chief features of the reform as it has commended itself to the approval of the Secretary of State. We are told that Lord Cross's scheme is more in accordance with the proposals of Lord Lansdowne than with what his predecessor recommended. If this is so, the Viceroy that abused the Congress has dealt with its proposals more liberally than his

successor who was believed to be in favour of reform. Lord Dufferin was in favour of adopting the elective principle to a modified extent. Not only Lord Dufferin but some of his Councillors also were of that opinion. But as is curiously the case in India, a change of Viceroys has produced a change in the opinion of the Government. Lord Dufferin hoped "by associating with ourselves in the task of administration considerable number of persons, selected and elected from the educated classes, to place ourselves in contact with a larger surface of native opinion and to multiply the channels through which we may make ourselves acquainted with the wants and feelings of the various communities for whose welfare we are responsible." The present Government of India evidently thinks that this advantage need not necessarily be secured by the elective principle. It was Lord Dufferin's idea that nominated members of the Provincial Councils should exceed the elected ones, and Lord Cross's scheme of course retains this principle. The *Bombay Gazette* is kind enough to advise the Congress to accept these proposals and show its practical sense. Our contemporary takes care to add that the contemplated reform owes no part of it to the agitation of the Congress; and that as it was the outcome of advice which had its origin outside the Congress, so the Congress cannot claim a right to judge of it. We do not know that the Congress will accept this gratuitous piece of advice from a quarter where consistency has not been conspicuous of late. The reform of the Viceregal Council and the principle of election are the chief features in the programme of the Congress. The concession which the Secretary of State is willing to make is no doubt valuable, and will help in producing greater harmony than exists at present between public feeling and Government's policy. Still if the Council itself is not enlarged and the people are not permitted to nominate their own representatives there will be no efficient means of turning the concession to the best advantage. With members like Raja Siva Prasad in the Council, any privilege must lose, much of its value. Under the proposed scheme the Council will have an opportunity to discuss and criticise the budget; but it will not be permitted to vote in regard to its various items. But the Congress looks upon this last as a necessary reform. A mere discussion and criticism of the budget by members nominated by Government will be of no practical value. Government does not of course admit that its financial or general administration is defective or will improve by outside criticism. But the public has a different opinion and if the sentiments and convictions of the people are to be brought into accord with the measures of Government more extensive powers should be given to the Council. Still if the principle of election were adopted

the scheme would be satisfactory so far as it goes. The difficulty regarding the constitution of electoral bodies is imaginary. The *Bombay Gazette* is wrong in thinking that every province must have the same method of election. The Madras Congress Committee has suggested the establishment of Electoral Colleges as the best means of working the elective principle without detriment to the various conflicting interests of the country. In Bengal public opinion is in favour of recognizing local institutions such as Municipalities and District Boards as fit constituencies to elect members of Council. In other provinces a system of direct election by a body of voters possessing certain qualifications might be adopted. To say that an electorate is nowhere to be found in India is a too perfunctory way of shirking responsibility. In a country the value of whose foreign trade annually amounts to hundreds of millions sterling, which contains $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions of students in its schools, and which has millions of men employed in Government service, in the service of public companies, in the various learned professions, not to speak of the large population engaged in agriculture and industrial arts, it is too sweeping an assertion to state that no electorates can be created. Our Municipal and rural institutions have been, notwithstanding certain drawbacks, pronounced officially to have been on the whole successful. They are mostly constituted on the elective principle. The people have taken to it congenially on the whole. If the principle has not proved a failure in regard to municipalities and has on the other hand been serviceable in rousing a general interest among the rate-payers in local affairs, there can be no reason for supposing that in the more interesting and important matters of legislation for the provinces or the whole Empire the principle will prove a failure. At any rate, it is certain that no reform which does not include this principle will give satisfaction to the people. The Madras Congress Committee referring to this essential element of reform remarks: "We insist, as a fundamental principle from which we cannot depart, that whatever be the number of seats ultimately accorded to us, the men who fill these seats shall be elected wholly by the people as distinguished from the Government." Irresponsible writers in the Anglo-Indian Press may affect to ridicule the opinions of the Congress; but to honest and observant minds the ever-growing influence of the educated Indians is apparent, and it will strike them that it is wisdom to enlist their sympathy and co-operation in the task of administration.

V.

THE QUESTION OF ELECTORATES.

THERE is no doubt that this question will be very warmly debated in the Bombay Congress. Opinion is divided as to the best

means of constituting electoral bodies to elect members to the Legislative Councils. Bengal and Bombay will stand on one side and the other Provinces led by Madras will be on the other. The former are for utilising the existing Municipal and rural institutions as the required constituencies, and Madras is strongly for establishing an Electoral College of which the members shall be elected by persons possessing certain qualifications and shall elect members to the local and supreme Legislative Councils. Mr. Bradlaugh himself is in favour of the former plan. "Judging from material placed before me," he says, "it has seemed to me that it would be wiser in drafting this measure, in view of the clause of the Resolution of 1886, quoted above, to provide for the electing body for Provincial Councils being composed of members of the various public bodies set out in the Section (24) now under consideration. One reason for this is that, in introducing quasi-representative institutions into India you would, by this course, be proceeding along the line of least resistance and be preserving a continuity of the policy introduced by Lord Mayo and continued by each of his successors in the Governor-Generalship. Public opinion in India, too, so far as I have been able to gather it from newspapers, seems to me to be more in favour of the public bodies becoming the constituency than the Electoral Colleges." In accordance with this view Section 24 of the Draft Bill lays down that "The electors shall be the members of the Local Boards and Municipalities duly nominated or elected thereto, and if all members of Chambers of Commerce, Trades' Associations, Planters' Associations, and similar organizations a list of which Chambers and Associations, &c., shall be annually prepared and printed, and shall be supplied on or before a particular day in each year by the official (named in schedule) of the respective organizations, to the Secretary Legislative Department of each Presidency or Province and published in the Government *Gazette* of the respective Presidencies or Provinces of March 1st in each year, such list to remain in force for twelve months from the date of such publication. Lists of graduates of the respective Universities shall be prepared and printed and supplied in like manner by the Registrar of each University." This is the provision for the election of members to the local Legislative Councils. Of the Viceregal Council the members are to be elected by the elected members of the Local Councils. This last provision is a reproduction of a resolution passed by the Congress to the same effect. Evidently those that would constitute local institutions and associations into electing constituencies adhere to this scheme of electing members to the Supreme Legislative Council. We have received a memorandum on the subject from the Secretary of the Sarvajanik Sabha of

Poona, and this memorandum is silent on this point. But it refers to the scheme of the Madras Congress Committee and says that the Sabha does not view it with much favour. It adopts Mr. Bradlaugh's view, although it omits to say whether Chambers of Commerce and such quasi-public bodies are also to be recognized as electing units. For the purpose of enabling our readers to know both sides of the question, we quote in full the remarks of our Poona friends:—"The Committee thinks that the Local Boards and Municipalities of the several districts should elect members to the Council for those districts,—one or two for each district according to the total number allowed by Government, special bodies such as the Universities and the Chamber of Commerce being allowed special representation. By adopting such a plan, you would, as Mr. Bradlaugh rightly observes, be proceeding along the line of least resistance and be preserving a continuity of the policy of self-government initiated by Lord Mayo and successively enlarged by the Viceroys who came after him. The Local and Municipal Boards, being elected in part by all who have a stake in the good government of the country, and being further supplemented by official nominations intended to secure the interests of minorities, will thus reproduce in India the borough, shire, and county representation of the English constitution and afford by reason of their definite and manageable numbers sure guarantees for careful selection. Such a scheme is more likely to commend itself to the governing authorities than a radical measure of indefinite proportions which will be open to endless objections by reason of the novelty of the experiments. The other details of the scheme such as the number and qualification of members and the proportion of official and elected Councillors need not be enlarged upon here as they can be easily decided after the question of principle noted above is settled. The Committee of the Sabha would make the district as the unit and would allow one councillor to be elected for each district by the members of its Local and Municipal Boards and after making room for the large interests represented by the Presidency town would allow Government to supplement by its own nominations the deficiency that might be left." The Madras Committee does not accept these views. At the Calcutta Congress it was the Madras delegates that fought strongly for Electoral Colleges. Still they were then willing to recognise the other alternative of constituting local institutions as electoral bodies. But when the Committee had to deliberate upon the subject a few months ago, it discarded this latter alternative and concluded that their present plan was preferable. The Committee adds by way of reasons that "the members of these various bodies sit there as electors for a certain specific purpose. The members who will sit in Council will sit for

other and distinct purposes. It would be inexpedient to give bodies elected for one specific object the right to elect on behalf of the people, whom they do not represent for this purpose, members to sit for another and a different object in another and a different assembly." A principle is here pressed for consideration, which cannot be ignored. The members of the Municipal and rural Boards are not elected with a view to provincial or imperial legislation. They are chosen from among those who possess local interest and local knowledge. The qualifications required for members of Local Boards are not the same as those required for members of Legislative bodies. The former would be excellent men of their class if they are men of influence in the locality and are fairly acquainted with local wants. In the members of the legislature these will be desirable qualifications, no doubt. But it is more desirable that they should be men of the highest culture in the country, men who would take broad and statesmen-like view of things, and above all would couquet with no official freaks but would always speak out boldly and conscientiously, being prompted by nothing but the interests of the public. It would be also observed that in no country in the world are members of the legislature elected by Local Boards. This is a strong objection to the suggestion adopted in Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill. But the strongest objection in our opinion is the fact that it will ignore the large and important interest of every other section of the people than the Hindus. At any rate it will have that effect in this Presidency; and we believe in some other parts of the country also it will have the same effect. Our Municipalities and District Boards consist almost entirely of representatives of the Hindu community. The Mahomedan community which forms a large proportion of the population is represented by a dozen members or so over the whole Presidency. The Europeans, the Eurasians, and Native Christians are conspicuous by their absence. How can these communities be fairly or wisely ignored? The inclusion of the Chambers of Commerce and Planters' Associations among the constituencies will rectify this defect in the scheme to a certain extent so far as Europeans are concerned. But these bodies possess neither an official nor a public status. Their members are chosen with no regard to the interests of the people at large or to the legislation of the country. They represent distinct and limited interests. They are merchants and planters, and neither the public nor Government have control over the selection of members to these bodies. If they are empowered with the power of electing members to Legislative Councils, the Government would claim the right of fixing the qualifications of the members of those bodies, and the merchants and planters might not like this interference of

Government. Moreover, merchants and planters do not exhaust the community of European residents in India. There are Barristers, Missionaries, Schoolmasters and a number of others who cannot be excluded from the privilege of election for any satisfactory reason. Even among merchants and planters, all are not enrolled as members of the Chambers of Commerce and Planters' Associations. They admit only a limited number and their admission is managed often by a clique in an irresponsible way. Further, some may not care to become members of these bodies and may care very much to exercise the privileges of the citizen. The qualifications of the electors should be fixed by Government, and none possessing these qualifications should be debarred from exercising his right because for special reasons he does not care to conciliate the favour of a clique or a limited body of men. Thus the proposal is not likely to satisfy the Europeans themselves. But what about the other communities, the Mahomedans, the Native Christians and Eurasians? Are they to be called upon to form Associations similar to the Chambers of Commerce? And are the members of these communities who may not choose to join such Associations to be denied the valuable privilege of taking part, though an indirect and comparatively insignificant part, in the legislation of the country? It will be said that the Government will be given the power to nominate members to the Councils to conciliate the minorities. But these minorities can very justly complain that they are allowed no direct representation in the Councils. Just as the Hindus do not like their representatives to be nominated by Government the other communities too might prefer their representatives to be nominated by themselves rather than by Government. There are other objections to this scheme, which we shall consider in another issue.

VI.

THE QUESTION OF ELECTORATES.

IN our last article we said that the adoption of Municipalities and District Boards as the constituencies to elect members of the Legislative Councils would do great injustice to all other communities than Hindus. We have since looked into official reports and found our impression confirmed that the Mahomedans and Europeans are represented by a comparatively few numbers in these institutions. Of the 54 Municipalities of our Presidency, the sanctioned strength of the Councils as they will stand when all the elective seats provided by the present rules have been filled, is 463 nominated and 452 elected members. Of this total of 915 members, there are only 88 Mahomedans and 185 Europeans. Most of these Europeans however are *ex-officio* members, and the same officer being a member of all the Municipalities in the district, the actual number will be much

less than we have given. But even these will represent only the official class of Europeans, and will leave the important class of non-official Europeans, altogether unrepresented. The merchants, the planters, and the other miscellaneous class consisting of barristers, professors, &c., form too important and influential a community to be omitted in any scheme of representative legislation. The Mahomedans are only 85 out of a total of nearly a thousand; and these are mostly men appointed by Government. The Eurasian and Native Christian communities are represented by a handful of men, and they will have every reason to complain against a scheme which leaves them altogether in the cold. In the District Boards, the state of things is worse. There are 21 District Boards. The sanctioned total strength of these Boards is 708 members. But the number of elected members are at present only 108, the election being made by the Taluk Boards of which however all the members are nominated by the Collector of the District. Of Mahomedan members there are only 42 and of Europeans 115. The remarks that we made about the injustice which the Municipalities will do to these classes hold good in regard to the District Boards also. So far as purely Municipal interests are concerned perhaps the number of Mussulman members might be assumed to be sufficient. But for the purposes of the legislation of the whole province, the 88 gentlemen distributed in exceedingly small numbers in different localities, who will have to vote along with an overwhelming majority of Hindu voters, cannot be expected to do anything like justice to the large Mahomedan community of the whole Presidency. Even supposing that this defect in the proposal under consideration does not exist, the District Boards and Municipalities, more especially the former, can hardly be said to represent the people at large in any satisfactory sense. We saw how few of the members of the District Boards owe their seats to election and how the election itself, being made by the members of the Taluk Boards, is an inconsequential process. But the rules now in force for the election of members to the District Board clearly point out what a farce it will be to look upon District Boards as in any sense representative of the great majority of the population living in rural areas. The following rule may be quoted for the information of our readers:—

“When the Government shall have directed that any number or proportion of the member of the District Board of any district shall be elected by the Taluk Boards situate within such district, the President of such District Board shall, as soon as any vacancy occurs among the non-official members of the District Board, report the occurrence of such vacancy to Government, stating that the Taluk to which each member of the existing

District Board belongs and the Taluk Board by which, in his opinion, the vacancy should be supplied. The Government will thereupon determine by which Taluk Board a member of the District Board shall be elected to fill the vacancy, and will direct an election to be held. Provided that when once all the Taluk Boards in the District have secured their full complement of elected representatives on the District Board, the President of the District Board shall, without reference to Government, himself direct, on the occurrence of any vacancy as aforesaid, that the Board of the Taluk to which the outgoing member belonged shall elect a new member to fill the vacancy.”

Even in the case of Municipalities the law gives so much power to Government to interfere in and modify the constitution of the Councils that at any time their position as representative bodies might be altered by an order of the Executive Government. The number of members in each Municipality, the privilege of the rate-payers to elect the councillors, the number and proportion of councillors to be elected, the qualifications of voters and councillors, and the rules, &c., to regulate the election, all depend upon the will of the Governor in Council. How then can the Municipalities, constituted on such uncertain basis, be accepted as fit representatives of the people?

Another great objection to these local institutions being made the electoral bodies is, that the moment they are given the power to elect members of the Legislative Councils, an element of faction will be introduced into them. In America and in England, without the local institutions having anything directly to do with the election of members to the legislature, they have become contaminated with a vicious spirit of faction. It is true that in this country for many years to come political factions will be more or less unknown in the sense in which they are known in Western countries. But if there will be no factions arrayed under rival ideas and interests, there will be factions formed round individuals. Our Municipal institutions are not at present free from this unwholesome spirit. It now rages round and in the interest of particular individuals. Some of the more prominent members of these bodies will be candidates for seats in the legislature; and round each candidate a clique or faction will at once be formed. The interests of the local community will soon be forgotten, and one faction will oppose another for the sake of opposition. This kind of factious antipathy is inseparable from all small bodies. Our Municipal Councils consist each of about 25 members, many Municipalities containing a smaller number. We suppose that for the purposes of election the existing division of the Presidency into revenue districts will be recognized, and each district will be required to send its own representatives. Well, very

few districts contain more than three Municipalities, and the members of these Municipalities added to the members of the District Board will give about 70 or 80 persons voting for one or two members for the Legislative Council. Now, the number of voters being so small and the area also being limited, it is very easy for influential persons in the District to manipulate an artificial majority in their favour. Those that voted for the defeated candidate will look upon the friends of his successful rival with any but friendly feeling, and this feeling, instead of being confined to matters relating to the Legislative Council will necessarily interfere in the administration of local affairs also. Moreover, it is probable that the Municipal and District Boards will become as the Electoral College has become in the United States. This latter body was created with a view that the President, who is the chief officer of the Federal Government, should be elected without the contamination of party strife. But this object has not been realised. No candidate for a seat in the College is elected unless he pledges himself beforehand to vote for a particular candidate to the Presidential office. Each party sets up its own candidate for this office and every member of the Electoral College is required, before he is elected to that College, to pledge himself to vote for the Presidential candidate favoured by his electors. Such a thing is quite probable in case the Municipal and District Boards are constituted into electoral bodies, because the total number of voters being small and distributed over the limited area of a district, it is easy to receive a pledge from a large number of them before they are nominated or elected as members of these Boards, that they will vote for a particular candidate to a seat in the legislature. We need not say how the administration of our local affairs will suffer if these bodies are used in this way and for such purposes. The proposal of the Madras Committee to establish an Electoral College is singularly free from the defects we have pointed out above.

VII.

WE are glad that our shrewd brother of the *Amrita Bazaar Patrika* does not approve of constituting these bodies into agencies for the election of members to the Legislative Councils. He thinks that this proposal would shut out in many cases men pre-eminently fitted for the privilege, and proposes therefore that other men who are not members of these Boards but who possess certain property or educational qualifications should be added, thus bringing within the electoral constituencies all classes and professions *prima facie* eligible as electors. Our contemporary thinks that these qualifications should be different in the metropolitan and mofussil divisions. In the case of the metropolitan division the electors should be

(1) all members or Commissioners of the Calcutta Corporation, all members of the Chambers of Commerce, Trades Associations, the British Indian Association and other recognised Associations (of which a list is to be made by the Government,) existing within the limits of the Town; also graduates of the Calcutta University; (2) all land-owners and house-holders paying a certain amount of Municipal tax to be named; (3) all traders, shop-keepers and merchants paying a certain amount of income-tax to be named; (4) all persons carrying on the profession of medicine, law, or any other profession and trade paying a certain amount of income-tax or municipal tax to be named. As regards the mofussil electoral divisions the qualifications of electors should be as follows: (1) all members of district and local Boards and Municipalities duly nominated or elected thereto, also graduates of the Calcutta University; (2) all zemindars and tenure-holders paying a certain amount of road-cess to be fixed; (3) all traders, shop-keepers and merchants paying a certain amount of income-tax to be fixed; (4) all professional men, that is, doctors, lawyers, muktars, *moulvis* and *Adhyapaks* paying a certain amount of license tax to be fixed; (5) all planters and manufacturers and men in private service paying a certain amount of income-tax to be fixed; (6) all ryots who have sometime or other served as members of a Panchayet under the Choukidari Panchayet Act, or as members of a Union Committee.

These qualifications secure, in our contemporary's opinion, 'the representation of all interests—landed interests, commercial interests, professional interests, planting interests and ryots' interests, &c.'" "As regards the different communities," it is added, "such as the Hindus, Musulmans, Europeans and Anglo-Indians, all have a fair and free share in the matter of election according to these qualifications. But yet complaints and murmurs may be raised if by the result of election, a due proportion of all the communities and of all the interests is not secured in the elected members. To provide against such complaints and murmurs, there should be a rule requiring the Government to exercise its power of appointment of non-official members as regards the remaining one-fourth of the members, so as to meet such complaints. Thus assuming that the total number of members for the Bengal Legislative Council is to be 48, twelve will be official members, 24 elected as above, and twelve non-officials appointed by Government to neutralize the inequalities in the result of election as regards the claims of different communities and of different interests." We have already remarked on this way of redressing any inequality to which the minorities may be subjected. They have as much right as the Hindus to be represented in the Councils by men chosen by them.

selves and to object to Government usurping this function. There is one more objection to our contemporary's plan, and that is, his plan would give in most cases a double vote to the members of the Municipal and rural Boards. If these gentlemen are to vote by virtue of the property or educational qualifications fixed by the legislature, why should they be given another vote in the capacity of being members of Local Boards? In our contemporary's scheme, to constitute these members into *ex-officio* voters is a superfluity. We believe that it is the opinion of many in Bengal as well as in Bombay that members of the Local Boards should be made the sole electors. We have come across the following objection to this plan so far as Bengal is concerned. The members of District Boards in Bengal last year numbered 785, of whom 433 were nominated by Government and 352 were elected by the Local Boards. Of the elected members, 29.8 per cent. were zemindars or representatives of the landed interest, 26.4 per cent. pleaders, 17.7 per cent. Government servants, 2.3 per cent. muktears, only .7 per cent. traders, and the remaining 23.1 per cent. are unspecified. Thus only .7 per cent. of the members of District Boards are drawn from the trading population and this fact is of itself a proof that a system of election, through the agency of these local bodies, would afford extremely slight guarantee for the interests of large and important sections of the community being adequately represented. Going beyond the District Boards to the Local Boards, of which there are 106 in Bengal with 1,201 members, we find that 376 of the latter were elected. Of these 51 per cent. are described as zemindars, 24.4 per cent. as pleaders, 4.2 per cent. as Government servants, 3.8 per cent. as traders, and 3.3 per cent. as muktears: leaving 13.3 per cent. unspecified. Here, again, the feasibility of the system, from the standpoint of representation, is not conspicuous.

We have dwelt on the injustice this system would involve to other classes of people than the Hindus. Probably in the Bombay presidency this injustice will not be very perceptible so far as Mohamedans are concerned, because we believe there are not many of this class permanently living in the interior of the Presidency. The whole area can be divided into portions containing a compact and homogeneous population, such as the Maharrattas the Guzerattees, the Konkanasts and so forth. This is an advantage, no doubt, still we do not think that any such division on an ethnological basis will secure thorough symmetry and equality of treatment to all classes of people. In Sind, in the Punjab and in the North-West Provinces, the system adopted in Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill will prove a complete failure. In these provinces the experiment of local self-government is in a crude condition, and not only will the country fail to enlist in its service the best

men available but the important and conflicting interests of various classes and professions will not receive equal consideration.

VIII.

ONE of the changes which Mr. Bradlaugh's Draft Bill proposes to introduce in the present constitution of the Government of India is the creation of a Standing Committee of the House of Commons. The section relating to this Committee is as follows: "The Governor-General in Executive Council shall possess the power of over-ruling the decision arrived at by the majority of the Legislative Council, in every case in which, in his opinion, the public interests would suffer by the acceptance of such decision; but, whenever this power is exercised, a full exposition of the grounds on which this has been considered necessary shall be published within one month, and the Governor-General in Council shall report and explain to the Secretary of State; and in such case on a representation made through the Government of India and the Secretary of State by the over-ruled majority, it shall be competent for a Standing Committee of the House of Commons, appointed for the consideration of Indian Legislative Council Appeals, such Standing Committee to be appointed at the commencement of each session, to consider the matter, and to call for any and all papers for information, and hear any persons on behalf of such majority or otherwise, and thereafter report thereon to the full House." This section makes clear the position which the proposed Committee will occupy in the various links of the governmental machinery of India. It will be at once seen that the objections that are generally brought forward against Parliament interfering in Indian matters, do not hold good in this case. As a fact, the Committee is given no power of interference. It will act only when it is set in motion by an appeal from India. It has no power to initiate any measure, nor can it thrust its opinion or advice on the Government of India. It is a sort of judicial court of appeal in Indian political matters. But it may be asked, what is the necessity for such a court of appeal? The necessity arises from the fact of the Indian bureaucracy being otherwise left the sole master of the field. Our scheme provides that the Governor-General has the power to over-rule the decision of the majority of his Legislative Council. When he does so, he will have to publish the reasons which induced him to take that step. We may take for granted that the majority of the Council will not frequently vote against the Government. It will less frequently happen that the Governor-General will over-rule the decision of the majority. It may however be assumed that every time that the majority is so over-ruled, the power to appeal to the Parliamentary Committee will be exercised. Still these appeals will be very few, rarely more than

one in the year, we fancy. But in all cases where this difference arises, the principle or the interests involved will be of great importance, and as the whole aim of all our struggle for reform is to take away from the Indian bureaucracy the final control over the Indian administration, it will be imprudent if the Viceroy's Executive Council or the Council of the Indian Secretary were to decide every dispute finally. The Viceroy and the Secretary of State are supposed to check and direct this bureaucratic control. But as a fact they do nothing of the kind. In all matters not affecting the English tax-payers—when the Cabinet does not intervene and pass the final decision—the Secretary of State is the passive instrument in the hands of his Council. This Council too being a portion, and a worse portion than the best—of the Indian bureaucracy, an appeal from the Government in India to that in England will be perfectly useless: it will be an appeal from the best portion of the bureaucracy to an antiquated and effete portion which has not in any single case advocated or succeeded in its advocacy of reform. We want to rectify the present system of disposing of the most serious interests of the country in a cynical, offhand and secret fashion. The English Parliament is the authority ultimately responsible for the good government of India and the well-being of her people. But in the existing arrangements this authority has absolutely no place, or rather is incompetent to exercise the function which its place imposes on it. It has no time, no knowledge, and no inclination to take up Indian questions. In the interest of this country and in the interest of England herself it is highly necessary that this ignorance and apathy should disappear. We want that all discussed about our matters should be disputes in the full glare of publicity and with all the advantage of a tribunal prejudiced or previously committed in no way. We want also to place our own case before the English nation directly so that it may not see the official side merely but may see the popular side also. England herself has an enormous stake in the good government and prosperity of India, and, as the late Mr. John Slagg said, "the duty which Parliament thus owes no less to the people of India than to the British nation, demands that it should be able to know and to judge of the things which are done under the sanction of its authority in our Oriental Empire. A Standing Committee is the only machinery by which the information essential to the discharge of these high functions can be placed at its disposal."

It has been objected to this proposal that it will do more harm than good to this country: because of this committee men like Mr. J. M. Macleane and Sir Richard Temple will be appointed members, and their influence will always prevail to the detriment of true Indian interests. We do not think that this will happen. In the first place it is not reasonable to suppose that all the members of this Committee will be retired Anglo-Indians. As the Committee is appointed to revise the decisions of the Indian bureaucracy, the Ministry for the time being will have the sense of fairness to appoint a sufficient number who are not retired Indian officials. Moreover, all retired Indian officials are not like Sir Richard Temple. Men like Sir William Wedderburn may get into Parliament and they may be expected to be appointed to the Committee as well as the reactionaries like Sir Richard. Further, the Committee will be a judicial body, deciding on the facts placed before them. Our Bill proposes that the over-ruled majority of the Indian council can be heard by means of counsel and this safe-guard against decisions on imperfect knowledge, added to the publicity which our access to the chief organs of English public opinion will secure to our view of the question, is enough to warrant substantial justice being done to us. We referred to Mr. Slagg's opinion a few lines before. So long ago as February 1834, he made the same proposal in an article in the *Contemporary Review*. His words may perhaps be quoted here:—"The Secretary in the House of Commons should be made a *really* responsible Minister, assisted by a sufficient staff of Under-Secretaries and officials. Further, in the House of Commons there should be a Standing Committee on Indian affairs similar to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the United States Senate, with power to call for the production of all Indian papers *without exception*, and to raise debates upon and questions of Indian policy. No member of this Standing Committee should have any post under Government. It is vain to hope that members of the House of Commons will ever get control over Indian affairs until they have power to initiate discussions with full information of the subject discussed placed in their hands independently of the Government. Under such a system there would be much hope for the early application of those measures of development and reform which our great dependency so sorely needs, and the adoption of which would react so favourably on the commerce and general welfare of our own country."

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APPENDIX F.

List of Delegates Elected in the Presidency of Madras.

Madras City (1st Electorate), Black Town:—

- Mr. A. O. Hume, Retired Civil Servant, Simla.
 Rev. G. M. Cobban.
 Mr. John Adam, M.A., Principal, Patcheappa's College, Madras.
 „ K. P. Viswanada Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tondiarpet.
 „ C. V. Sundra Sastriar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tondiarpet.
 „ S. Gurusawmy Chetty, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, B. Town.
 „ V. Arunagiri Naidu, B.A.
 „ M. Rungasamy Iyengar, Barrister-at-Law.
 „ C. Annadurai Iyer.
 „ C. Kistnasamy Naidu.
 „ C. N. Caliana Sundra Mudaliar.
 „ C. Appadurai Mudaliar.
 „ M. Theruvankadasamy Naicker.
 „ C. Kistnasamy Pillai, Merchant, Mint Street, B. Town.
 „ T. V. Apparow Naidu, Merchant, B. Town.
 „ C. Akambra Mudaliar.
 „ Loganada Mudaliar.
 „ S. Ramiah Chetty, B.A.
 „ G. Bhakta Vathsulu Naidu.
 „ M. Kistnasamy Chetty, B.A., B.L.
 „ M. Sivagyana Mudali, B.A., B.L.
 „ N. Appulraju Naidu.
 „ Linga Murti, B.A.
 „ V. J. Manicka Valu Mudaliar, Proprietor, "Irish Press," Madras.
 „ Venkataramiah Chetty, B.A., B.L.
 „ A. Akambraiah.
 „ N. Lutchmanasamy Mudaliar, B.A.
 „ T. Cunniah Naidu, Dubash, Arbuthnot & Co., Tondiarpet.
 „ Laljee Valjee Sait, Merchant, B. Town.
 „ Abdul Rahiman Sahib.
 „ Hajee Ibrahim Sait.
 „ P. Venkataramalingaswara Sarma.
 „ K. C. Streenivasa Chariar.
 „ C. P. Annasamy Mudaliar.
 „ P. Thanigachella Mudaliar.
 „ Yethiraja Pillai.
 „ Subrama Iyah Chetty.
 „ T. Numberumal Chetty, B.A.
 „ Subbiah Chetty.
 „ E. Balasundra Mudaliar, B.A.
 „ M. Ramasawmy Naidu, Timber Merchant, Acharappan Street, B. Town.

2nd Electorate, Porasawakam:—

- Sir Savalai Ramasawmy Mudaliar, Kt., C.I.E., Dubash, Egmore.
 P. Rangiah Naidu Rao Sheb, Zemindar and Municipal Commissioner, Egmore.
 Rai Bahadur S. Ramasawmy Mudaliar, M.A., B.L., Mittadar and Municipal Councillor, Poonamallee Road.
 Rai Bahadur P. Ananda Charlu, B.L., Vakil, High Court, Poonamallee Road.

2nd Electorate, Porasawakam—continued.

- Mr. M. Rungasawmy Iyengar, Barrister-at-Law.
 „ W. S. Venkataramanjulu Naidu, Zemindar and Municipal Commissioner.
 „ C. Iyasawmy Pillai, Merchant.
 „ Raju Pathur, Merchant and Type Founder, Pudupet.
 „ T. Rathnasawmy Nadar, Abkarry Contractor, Poonamallee Road.
 „ V. A. Rajarathna Mudaliar, Attorney-at-Law, Porasawakam.
 „ N. Kristnasawmy Naidu, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Egmore.
 „ C. Theagaraya Mudaliar, Merchant.
 „ M. P. Narainasawmy Naidu, Merchant.
 „ V. Masilamony Pillai, B.A., B.L.
 „ V. S. Streenivasa Ragava Charlu, Landed Proprietor.
 „ Balasubramania Naidu, Station Master.
 „ Mahomed Sheriff, Municipal Commissioner.
 „ Charles Bradlaugh, M.P.
 Rai Bahadur A. Danakoti Mudaliar, Merchant.
 Mr. Seshaghella Row, Merchant.

3rd Electorate, Triplicane:—

- Mr. Rajah T. Rama Row, Vakil, High Court, and ex-Member of Legislative Council, Triplicane.
 „ Eardley Norton, B.A., Barrister-at-Law, Luz.
 „ R. Shadagopacharyar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Triplicane.
 „ T. Subba Row, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Triplicane.
 „ G. Subbramania Iyer, B.A., Editor of the "Hindu."
 „ M. Viraraghava Chariar, B.A., Joint Editor of the "Hindu."
 „ Hajee Abdulla Batcha Saib, Merchant.
 „ M. O. Parthasarady Iyengar, M.A., M.L., Advocate.
 „ T. V. Shashaghiri Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court.
 „ M. E. Sreerangachariyar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court.
 „ M. A. Singarachariar, Cashier, Bank of Madras.
 „ T. P. Kothandarama Iyer, B.A., B.L., Triplicane.
 „ M. Cuppusawmy Chettyar, Salt Merchant, Triplicane.
 „ G. Logiah Naidu, Triplicane.
 „ Hajee Mahomud Abdul Shakar Saib, Merchant.
 „ G. Ramasamy Naidu.
 „ S. Bilgiri Iyengar, Attorney-at-Law.
 „ M. K. Lukshamanachariyar, Agent, Oriental Life Office, Triplicane.
 „ R. Venkatasubba Row, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Triplicane.
 „ A. C. Parthasarady Naidu, Editor "Andra Prakasika."
 „ Viswanada Sastriyar, No. 21, Tholasinga Perumal Co Street, Triplicane.
 „ S. Kuppasawmy Surma, B.A., B.L., Secretary, Literary Society.
 „ P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, Pleader, District Court of Chingleput, Triplicane.
 „ Kadhar Muhideen Saib, Merchant, Triplicane.
 „ T. Balakishna Doss, Landed Proprietor, Triplicane.
 „ S. Varadacharyar, Printer and Publisher, Triplicane.
 „ C. Gopal Row, Asst. Master, Patcheappa's College, Triplicane.
 „ S. Raghava Chariar, Merchant, Mount Road.

rd Electorate, Triplicane—continued.

- Mr. S. Viraraghavachariyar, Merchant, No. 18, South Mada Street.
 „ G. Krishnamachariar, Merchant, No. 21, South Mada Street.
 „ Dewan Bahadur R. Raghunatha Row Avergal.
 „ S. Subramania Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Triplicane.
 „ D. S. Balajee Row, B.A., Mirasidar, Triplicane.
 „ M. A. Gopala Chariar, B.A., Member, Literary Society, Triplicane.
 „ M. A. Parthasarady Iyengar, B.A., Member Literary Society, Triplicane.
 „ C. Sreenivasacharyar, Printer and Publisher, Triplicane.
 „ P. Rungiah Naidu, Rao Sahib, Vakil and Zemindar, Egmore.
 „ Tinnevelly Venkataranga Chariar, Landholder, Tinnevelly.

h Electorate, Mylapore :—

- Moulvi Mahomed Nizamudin Khan Bahadur.
 Rai Bahadur S. Subramania Iyer, Vakil, High Court, Mylapore.
 Mr. Eardley Norton, Barrister-at-Law, the Luz.
 „ W. S. Gantz, Barrister-at-Law, the Luz.
 „ C. Ramachendra Row Sahib, Vakil, High Court, Teynampet.
 „ N. Subramaniam, Barrister-at-Law, the Luz.
 Hon'ble C. Sankara Nair, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, the Luz.
 Mr. K. P. Sankara Menon, B.A., B.L.
 „ V. Kristnasawmy Iyer, B.A., B.L.
 „ P. R. Sundram Iyer, B.A., B.L.
 „ V. Rangachariar, B.A., B.L.
 „ A. Sambamurthi Iyer.
 „ K. Naraina Row, B.A., B.L.
 „ C. Venugopal Pillai.
 „ K. P. Govinda Menon.
 „ D. V. Narasimha Chary.
 „ P. Subramania Iyer, Attorney-at-Law, Mylapore.

urAsian Association :—

- William S. Gantz, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
 E. S. Wilkins, Esq.
 Dr. Sausman of Bangalore.

ahajana Sabah :—

- Mr. P. Rangiah Naidu, Rao Sahib.
 Rai Bahadur S. Subramania Iyer, B.L.
 „ „ S. Ramasawmy Mudaliar, M.A., B.L.
 „ „ P. Ananda Charlu, B.L.
 Mr. M. Viraraghava Chariar, B.A.
 Dr. S. Pulney Andy, M.D.
 Mr. C. Vijiaraghava Chariar, B.A., Pleader, Salem.
 „ K. Sreenivasa Row, Bellary.
 „ Valia Thambiran of Panikar, Kovilgam, Calicut.
 Hon'ble C. Sankara Nair, B.A., B.L.
 Mr. N. Subramaniam, Barrister-at-Law.
 „ M. Venkataramiah Iyah.
 „ G. Mahadeva Chettiar.
 „ T. Rathnaveloo Mudaliar.
 „ V. J. Manickaveloo Mudaliar.
 „ K. Naraina Row.
 „ K. P. Pathmanabha Menon.
 „ P. V. Kristnasawmy Chetty.
 „ K. Vythianatha Iyer of Mayaveram.
 „ B. Thirunaraina Iyengar of Masulipatam.
 „ K. S. Kristnama Chariar, Asst. Master, A. V. High School, Triplicane.
 „ J. Kristna Rao, B.A., Tutor, Madras Christian College, Chintadripet.
 „ P. Denadayalu Mudaliar, Mount Road.
 „ P. Somasoondra Chettiar.

Godavery District :—

- Mr. Badam Venkatarathnam Garu, Merchant, Cocanada.
 „ Badam Venkatachellam Garu, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Cocanada.
 „ K. Chelamayya Garu, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Cocanada.
 „ E. S. Wilkins, Barrister-at-Law, Cocanada.
 Rao Sahib N. Subha Row Pantulu, B.A. B.L., Vakil High Court, Rajamundry.
 Mr. N. Chelva Iyengar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Rajamundry.
 „ Ganjam Venkatarathnam Garu, First Grade Pleader, Cocanada.
 „ S. Sankaraya Garu, B.A., Head Master, Pittapur Rajah's College, Cocanada.
 „ D. Subramaniam Garu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Cocanada.
 „ V. Perrazu Garu, Secretary, Native Chamber of Commerce, and Merchant, Cocanada.
 „ Akoji Sahib, Merchant, Cocanada.
 „ N. Venkata Somayajulu Garu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Rajahmundry.
 „ T. S. Muthusami Sastri Garu, Head Master, Mahratta High School, Rajahmundry.
 „ Rao Sahib D. Kasivisvanadham Garu, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Rajahmundry.
 Khan Sahib Mahomed Ameerudeen Sahib, Abkari Contractor, Inamdar, Rajahmundry.
 Khan Sahib Khaja Ahmedulla Khan Sahib, Inamdar and Municipal Councillor, Rajamundry.
 Mr. Chintaluri Lakshminarayana Row Garu, B.A., 1st Grade Pleader, Rajahmundry.
 „ Saripella Sambasiva Row Garu, 1st Grade Pleader, Rajahmundry.
 „ Kuruchetty Ramabrahmam Chetty, 1st Grade Pleader, Rajahmundry.

Krishna District :—

- Mr. K. Krishnamachariyar, B.A., Rao Sahib, Head Master, Hindu High School, Masulipatam.
 „ V. V. S. Avadhani, B.A., Vakil, Dist. Court, Masulipatam.
 „ M. Venkatarathnam, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Masulipatam.
 „ J. Gourinadha Sastri, B.A., Asst. Master, Hindu High School, Masulipatam.
 „ P. Venkatappiah, B.A., Public Prosecutor, Masulipatam.
 „ M. Kalyana Nagabushana Naidu, Merchant, Masulipatam.
 „ Asamalli Khan Bahadur, young Nabob of Masulipatam.
 „ T. Venkareddi Naidu, Pleader, Dist. Court, Masulipatam.
 „ Srimantha Raja Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasadha Naidu, Bahadur, Zemindar of Devarkota, Masulipatam.
 Munshi Mastan Sheriff Sahib Khorisy, Pensioned Police Officer, Masulipatam.
 Mr. N. Purushotham Garu, Head Master, Hindu Branch High School, and Editor, "Budhavidhyaini," Masulipatam.
 „ C. H. Purushottamiah Pantulu, Editor of the "Hindu Dasabhimani," Masulipatam.
 „ A. Raghunatha Row Pantulu Garu, B.A., Pleader, Dist. Court, Masulipatam.
 „ V. Bhavanacharulu Garu, F.T.S., Pleader, Guntur.
 „ P. Sreeramulu Pantulu, F.T.S., Pleader, Guntur.
 „ C. Venkatappayah Garu, Sowcar, Merchant, Guntur.

Ganjam District :—

- Mr. D. Venkata Ramaiah Pantulu, Govt. Pleader, Berhampore.
 „ Rao Sahib P. Venkama Pantulu, 1st Grade Pleader, Berhampore.

anjam District—continued.

- Mr. Jagannada Pantulu Garu, 1st Grade Pleader, Berhampore.
 „ M. V. Chellapathi Row Pantulu, do. Berhampore.
 „ S. Abdul Khadar Saheb Garu, Merchant, Berhampore.

Nellore District :—

- Mr. T. V. Venkatarama Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Nellore.
 „ V. Ananda Row Pantulu, Pleader, Dist. Munsiff's Court, Ongole.
 „ Dhara Markandaya Sastrulu, Sowcar and Municipal Councillor, Ongole.
 „ K. Lakshminarasimha Rao Pantulu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Ongole.
 „ O. Lakshminaraina Rao Pantulu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Ongole.
 „ C. Kottayya Chetty Garu, Rao Sahib, Pensioner and Municipal Councillor, Nellore.
 „ Mahomed Abul Hussain Sahib, Shrotriendar, Nellore.
 „ Syed Shah Sultan Mohideen Sahib, Landholder, Nellore.
 „ Mahomed Abdul Khadir Sahib, Landholder, Nellore.
 „ Bezawada Balakrishna Reddy Garu, Landholder, Nellore.
 „ M. Venkata Subba Row Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ N. Venkataranga Charlu Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ N. Surianaraina Row Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ N. Venkatarama Charlu Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ Varnasi Krishnayya Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ R. Jagannadha Row Garu, Pleader, Nellore.
 „ P. Lakshminarasu Pantulu, Public Prosecutor, Nellore.
 „ Mangu Ramanuja Row Garu, Landholder, Nellore.
 „ Ayyaloor Venkiah Pantulu, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Dist. Court, and Municipal Councillor, Nellore.
 „ Esala Venkatasubbiah Chetty Garu, Merchant, Nellore.

Chingleput District :—

- Mr. Sivami Sastriyar, Zemindar, Tiruvallur.
 „ M. Bashyam Iyengar, Pleader, Tiruvallur.
 „ B. S. Raghuttama Charya, B.A., Head Master, Native High School, Tiruvallur.
 „ C. Venkatsubramania Iyer, Zemindar, Vidayur, Tiruvallur.

North Arcot District :—

- Mr. M. G. Visvanatha Sastri, 2nd Grade Pleader, Arni.
 „ Mir Ali Sahib, Vellore.
 „ Balakrishna Pillai, Vellore.
 „ Abul Naidu, Vellore.
 „ V. Gopalachariyar, B.A., Pleader, Chittoor.
 „ C. V. Srinivasa Chariyar, B.A., Pleader, Chittoor.
 „ D. V. Rajagopala Chariyar, Pleader, Chittoor.
 „ N. Srinivasa Varada Chariyar, Pleader, Chittoor.
 „ Subramania Iyer, Landlord, Chittoor.
 „ Imah Sahib, Sowcar and Landlord, Chittoor.
 „ T. A. Narasimha Chariyar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Chittoor.
 „ Chandrappa Naidu, Landlord, Chittoor.

South Arcot District :—

- Mr. A. Subrayulu Reddiar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Cuddalore.
 „ B. Krishna Iyer, B.A., Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, New Town Cuddalore.
 „ V. Sankariah Naidu, Rao Sahib, Zemindar, Tirupapuliyur, Cuddalore.
 „ V. Krishnamurthi Row, B.A., B.L., Vakil, Cuddalore.
 „ P. T. Sadagopachariar, Proprietor and Editor of the "Desabhimani," Tirupapuliyur, Cuddalore.

South Arcot District—continued.

- Mr. K. Sambasiva Iyer, 1st Assistant Master, Town College, Cuddalore.
 „ J. P. Kotalingam, M.A., Head Master, Town College, Cuddalore.
 „ Mahomed Ghonse Sahib, Durga Manager & Landlord, Panruti.
 „ T. V. Kuppusawmi Sastriar, B.A., 1st Assistant Master, St. Joseph's College, Cuddalore.
 „ Toke Narainasawmy Naidu Garu, Mirasidar, Chidambaram.
 „ M. C. Ramasawmy Iyer, and Rao Sahib, Pleader, Chidambaram.
 „ V. Desika Chariyar, Rao Sahib, Pleader and Municipal Councillor, Chidambaram.
 „ T. M. Desika Chariar, Pleader and Mirasidar, Chidambaram.
 „ V. Ramanuja Iyengar, Pleader and Mirasidar, Chidambaram.
 „ C. V. Arunachella Aiyar, Pleader, Chidambaram.
 „ Adur Avaranam Pillai, Mirasidar and Merchant, Chidambaram.
 „ Odayer Srinivasa Pillai, Mirasidar and Merchant, Chidambaram.
 „ G. Appasawmy Iyer, Rao Sahib, Pleader and Municipal Councillor, Chidambaram.
 „ M. Comarasawmy Pillai, 1st Grade Pleader, Cuddalore.
 „ A. Rama Row, 1st Grade Pleader, Cuddalore.
 „ C. Subramania Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tirupapuliyur, Cuddalore.
 „ S. Panduranga Mudaliar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Cuddalore.
 „ V. Rajarathna Mudaliar, Manager, Erivalpet Sugarcane Factory, Cuddalore.
 „ N. Chokkalinga Nainar, Landholder and Merchant, Nellikuppam, Cuddalore.
 „ N. Paramasiva Iyer Avergal, B.A., Assistant Master, St. Joseph's College, Cuddalore.
 „ V. Srinivasa Row, Pleader and Taluq Board Member, Tirukoilur.
 „ D. Sama Row, Pleader and Mirasidar, Tirukoilur.
 „ T. Sundaramiah, 2nd Grade Pleader and Mirasidar, Tirukoilur.
 „ V. Krishnasawmy Aiyar, Mirasidar, Tirukoilur.
 „ Muthukomarappa Reddi, Taluq Board Member and Member, Temple Committee, Tirukoilur.
 „ M. Parthasarathy Raju, Landholder, Panruti, Cuddalore.
 „ P. D. Rajarathna Mudaliar, Landholder, Panruti, Cuddalore.
 „ Subbu Singh Avl., Merchant, Villupuram.
 „ Sundra Iyer, 1st Grade Pleader, Villupuram.
 „ Sivarama Iyer, 2nd Grade Pleader, Villupuram.

Tanjore District :—

- Mr. Bana Krishnasawmi Mudaliar, Mirasidar, Chairman, Major Union, Tiruvalur, and Member of the Taluq Board, Negapatam.
 „ K. Virasawmi Iyer, Pleader, Tiruvalur.
 „ P. Rathnasabapathy Pillai, B.A., 1st Grade Pleader, Negapatam.
 „ S. A. Ananthanarayana Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Negapatam.
 „ V. Chinna Maricar Malumiar Avl., Merchant and Trustee Durga, Nagore, Negapatam.
 „ N. P. Subramania Iyer, 1st Grade Pleader, Negapatam.
 „ R. Balakrishna Naidu, Rao Sahib, Mirasidar, Negapatam.
 „ M. K. Mahomed Mustafa Maricar, Merchant, Mirasidar, Sowcar, Negapatam.
 „ N. Subramania Iyer, Head Master, Municipal Mahomedan School, Negapatam.

Tanjore District—continued.

- Mr. P. Somasundaram Pillai, Tanjore.
 " T. A. Alagappa Pillai, Rai Bahadur, Chairman of the Municipality, and Hony. Magistrate, Mayaveram.
 " K. Lakshmana Iyer, 1st Grade Pleader, Landholder, Mayaveram.
 " V. Sivasawmy Sastrial, B.A., Landholder, Mayaveram.
 " N. P. Krishnasawmy Iyer, B.A., Schoolmaster and Landholder, Mayaveram.
 " T. Kothandarama Iyer, Mirasidar, Mayaveram.
 " S. P. Srinivasa Pillai, Landholder and Devasthanam Trustee, Mayaveram.
 " D. Natasa Aiyar, Landholder, Kolivangudy, Nannilam Taluq.
 " T. Subramania Aiyar, Mirasidar and Secy., Congress Committee, Mayaveram.
 " S. A. Raja Aiyar Avl., Landholder, Mayaveram.
 " K. Krishnasawmy Aiyar, Mirasidar, Kurungulam, Nannilam Taluq, Tanjore District.
 " V. Kristnasawmy Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Combaconam.
 " N. Kristnasawmy Iyengar, B.L., Vakil, High Court, Combaconam.
 " A. Sambasiva Sastrial, Combaconam.
 " Kothangudy Strinivasa Iyer, Combaconam.
 " Rai Bahadur T. Appa Sastrial, B.A., Manager & Propr. and Head Master, Native High School, Combaconam.
 " T. S. Sivasawmy Oodayar, Mirasidar, Combaconam.
 " Annakudy Ramasawmy Pillai, Combaconam.
 " M. Subbaramier Avl., Combaconam.
 " A. L. Thiruvengadam Pillai, Combaconam.
 " Sankaranayana Sastrial, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Combaconam.
 " A. C. Narayanasawmy Iyer, Combaconam.
 " C. S. Ramasawmy Iyer, do.
 " T. Kristnama Chariar, do.
 " Mahalingasawmy Chettiar, do.
 " R. Sawminada Vijia Tevar Avl., Zemindar of Papanad, Patukotah Taluq.
 " K. Kalianasundaram Iyer, B.A., B.L., Rao Sahib, Vakil, High Court, Tanjore.
 " S. A. Sawminatha Iyer Avl., Rai Bahadur, Govt. Pleader, Tanjore.
 " K. S. Srinivasa Pillai Avl., 1st Grade Pleader, Tanjore.
 " T. A. Saminatha Sastrial, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tanjore.
 " P. V. Rama Chendra Iyer, Editor, "Southern Star," Tanjore.
 " Veeriah Vandiyar Avl., Rao Sahib, Landholder, Pundi; Municipal Councillor, and District Board Member, Tanjore.
 " Huzerath Gulam Ghose Kadiri Sahib, Mukhandar, Big Makkan, Tanjore.
 " T. R. Viswanatha Pillai, Landholder and Proprietor, the "National Press," and the "Southern Star," Tanjore.
 " S. M. Govinda Rao Avl., Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Tanjore.
 " Manoba Sahib, the Tanjore Rajah's family, Rao Sahib, Landholder and Municipal Councillor, Tanjore.
 " Rangasawmy Aiyar, B.A., Prof., St. Peter's College, Tanjore.

Trichinopoly District:—

- Mr. P. T. Sreenivasa Iyengar, Prof., St. Joseph's College, Trichinopoly.
 " B. Nilakanta Iyer, Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Kulitalai.
 " V. K. Krishna Iyer Avl., Rao Sahib, Mirasidar and Chairman, Kulitalai Union, Trichinopoly.
 " Rangasawmy Iyengar, Mirasidar, Pillalpalayam, Kulitalai Taluq.

Madura District:—

- Mr. L. Narasimha Chariar, 1st Grade Pleader, Madura.
 " S. M. Sundaram Aiyar, B.A., Rao Sahib, Editor and Proprietor, "Madura Mail," Madura.
 " G. Subbrayulu Naidu, Rao Sahib, Landholder, Madura.
 " P. S. Santanakrishnam Pillai, Pleader, Paramagudy.
 " M. Nagalingam Pillai, Pleader, Paramagudy.
 " S. S. Venkatarama Aiyangar, Madura.
 " Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, Madura.
 " P. R. Venkatasulu Naidu, Madura.
 " Pundu Rangi Row, Madura.
 " Rao Bahadur R. Ramasubba Iyer, B.A., B.A., Vakil, High Court, Madura.
 " M. S. Narainasawmy Aiyar Avl., B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Madura.
 " Syed Mustaksha Sarguru, High Priest, Madura.
 " M. S. Sundaram Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Madura.
 " Visvanatha Iyer, Pleader, Madura.
 " C. Venkatarada Rao, Rao Saheb, Agent, Carrying Company, Madura.
 " M. Alagirisawmy Naidu, Rao Sahib, Member of Devasthanam Committee, Madura.
 " Virasami Naidu Garu, Propr., Soap Manufacture, Madura.
 " T. R. Seshaiyer, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Madura.
 " P. S. Subramania Iyer, Pleader, Madura.
 " J. M. Nallasawmy Pillai, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Madura.
 " P. Subbaraya Iyer, B.A., Rao Sahib, Pleader, Madura.
 " M. K. Vydiyanatha Iyer, B.A., B.L., Pleader, Madura.
 " G. Srinivasa Row, B.A., Rao Sahib, Pleader, Madura.
 " D. M. Srinivasa Iyengar, Pleader, Manamadura.
 " Maganasundara Pandia Taver Avergal, Sub-division Zemindar, Sivagunga, Madura.
 " Kolandasawmy Taver Avergal, Sub-division Zemindar of Sivagunga, Madura.
 " K. Annasawmy Aiyar, Agent and Manager of the Zemindar of Sivagunga, Madura District.
 " R. V. Streenivasa Iyengar, Pleader, Sivagunga.
 " P. Ananthanaraina Iyer, Pleader, Sivagunga.
 " V. Subba Iyer, Pleader, Sivagunga.
 " Viswanada Iyer, Pleader, Sivagunga.
 " G. Sankaranaraina Iyer, Pleader, Sivagunga.
 " M. Ramasawmy Pillai, Joint Secretary, Congress Committee, Sivagunga.
 " S. Chinnasawmy Pillai, Landlord, Sivagunga.
 " T. Seshaiyer, Vakil and Landlord, Tripatore, Madura.
 " S. A. Ramasawmy Iyer, District Board Member, Tripatore, Madura.
 " Kana Vena Chithambaram Chettiar, Merchant, Kanadukatham, Sivagunga.
 " Vena Ravanna Mana Vena Venkatachellam Chettiar Avergal, Merchant, Karakuday, Madura.
 " M. S. Sankara Iyer Avergal, B.A., Head Master, Zemindary High School, Sivagunga.
 " Sesha Aiyar Avergal, Hakdar, Muthanandal, Sivagunga.
 " Krishnasawmy Naidu Garu, Merchant, Dindigal.
 " R. Sundaramier, B.A., Head Master, H. H. School, Dindigal.
 " T. Rajagopal Naidu Garu, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " P. N. Subramania Iyer, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " A. Athmanatha Iyer, Pleader and Municipal Councillor, Dindigal.
 " Karuppan Chettiar, Cultivator and Merchant, Dindigal.
 " P. M. Rama Iyer, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " Ponnambala Mudaliar, Landholder, Dindigal.
 " V. P. Rajamier, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " Vadagiri Pillai, Merchant, Dindigal.
 " N. Alumalu Chettiar, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Dindigal.

Madura District—continued.

- Mr. Ghouse Meah Sahib, Khan Bahadur, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Dindigal.
 " R. Vengu Iyer, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " P. R. Narayana Sastrial, Pleader, Dindigal.
 " Thandavarayan Thambiran, Agent, Peramalai Mutt, Tripatore, Madura.
 " Savanna Ana Annamalai Chettiar, Merchant, Kanadukatham, Sivagunga.
 " Ana Muna Murugappa Chettiar, Merchant, Palathur, Sivagunga.
 " Ana Lana, Ana Runa, Ravanna Mana Arunachellam Chettiar, Merchant, Devakotta.
 " Murayur P. L. R. M. Raman Chettiar Avl., Merchant, Tripatore.
 " Savanna Mana Chithambaram Chettiar, Merchant, Kanadukatham.
 " Muthu Kana Runa Venkatachellam Chettiar Avl., Merchant, Devakotai.
 " Ayathorai Ambalagarar Avl., Village Headman, Tirupatur, Madura.
 " Peer Mahomed Sahib, Village Munsiff, Tirupatore, Madura.
 " Nur Mahomed Sahib, Merchant, Tirupatore, Madura.

Tinnevely District:—

- Mr. R. M. Chithambaramier Avl., Pleader, Srivilliputtur.
 " S. Desika Chariyar, 1st Grade Pleader, Srivilliputtur.
 " Paul Peter Pillai, Agent, Landholders' Association, Srivilliputtur, Tinnevely.
 " N. G. Kristnasawmy Iyer, B.A., Srivilliputtur.
 " P. N. Subha Iyer, Kalakad.
 " P. L. Pichumani Iyer, Village Munsiff, Kalakad.
 " N. Padmanabha Iyer, Landholder, Kalakad.
 " S. Aiya Iyer Avl., Teacher, Middle School, Kalakad.
 " N. Subha Iyer, Teacher, Pial School, Kalakad.
 " S. Appasawmi Pillai, District Court Vakil, Palamcottah.
 " Roche Victoria, Landlord, Tuticorin.
 " P. A. Thoppy Aiyar Avl., Punnar (Rich Landlord, Kalakad).
 " A. Kristnasawmy Aiyar Avl., Dist. Court Pleader, Tinnevely.
 " Kallianaramier Avl., Vakil, High Court, Tinnevely.
 " P. Peramanayagam Pillai Avl., Tinnevely.
 " V. A. Mahomed Ali Taraganar Avl., Mirasidar of Melapalayam, Tinnevely.
 " V. M. Mahomed Kanni Rowther Avl., Petai, Tinnevely.
 " Venkatachellam Iyer, Tinnevely.
 " Chandrasakara Iyer Avl., Tinnevely.
 " M. R. Ramakristna Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, Tinnevely.
 " M. Panduranga Row Avl., Tinnevely.
 " Sundara Sastriar, District Court Pleader, Tinnevely.

Cuddapah District:—

- Mr. T. Nayana Sastri, 1st Grade Pleader, Madanapalle.
 " G. Sambhoo Row, Law Agent, Vayalpad.
 " Bellary Bujanga Row, Inamdar, Vayalpad.
 " P. Chinnah Venkataramiah, Saokar, Vayalpad.
 " O. Lakshmana Sarma, Pleader, Madanapalle.
 " M. K. Subba Row, Pleader, Madanapalle.
 " V. R. Chakravarthi Iyengar, Pleader, Madanapalle.
 " R. Giri Row, B.A., Headmaster, Congress High School, Madanapalle.
 " R. Seshagiri Row, Assistant Master, Madanapalle.
 " Sandagar Sheik Hussain Sahib, Merchant, Madanapalle.
 " Y. Nagayya Garu, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " Lalgudi Radhakristna Iyer, Vayalpad.
 " Varnasi Ramasawmy Reddi Garu, Abkari Contractor, Piler, Cuddapah.

Cuddapah District—continued.

- Mr. Nallappah Reddy, Konda Reddy, Landhold Cuddapah.
 " Nadigadda Mulla Reddi, Merchant and Land Piler, Cuddapah.
 " Ekkalore Nabhi Sahib, Merchant, Piler, Cuddapah.
 " S. Rangiah Garu, Landholder, Piler, Cuddapah.
 " S. Sreenivasa Chariar, District Court Pleader, Cuddapah.
 " C. Jambulinga Mudaliar, B.A., M.L., Rao Bah Vakil, High Court, Cuddapah.
 " K. Venkatasubbiah Chetty Rao Sahib, 2nd Grade Pleader, Cuddapah.
 " Y. Paupiah Chetty, Merchant, Cuddapah.
 " A. Nanjundappah, B.A., B.L., 1st Grade, Pleader, Cuddapah.
 " C. Mulla Reddy, Landholder, Cuddapah.
 " N. Mohidin Sahib, Landholder & Merchant, Cuddapah.
 " C. Rathna Mudaliar, Shopkeeper and General Merchant, Cuddapah.
 " K. Thimma Reddi Garu, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " C. P. Gurumurthy Sastry Garu Rao Sahib, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " D. Sanjeeva Row Garu, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " H. Ranga Row, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " C. Sundara Charlu, Pleader, Proddutore.
 " P. Bara Sahib, Merchant, Proddutore.

Kurnul District:—

- Mr. T. Chidambara Row Garu, B.A., Rao Sahib, Piler, Kurnul.
 " Adoni Subba Row, Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Kurnul.
 " Kodumur Lakshmana Charlu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Kurnul.
 " Atmakur Venkoba Row, Rao Bahadur, 1st Grade Pleader, Kurnul.
 " Bijenapally Seshachellam Setty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Ananta Sambayya Setty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Polimera Ramanna Setty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Isakala Krishnasawmy Setty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Jutur Chelamaya Chetty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Pandala Beechaya Chetty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Narayana Kristnayya Chetty, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Misrikhan Khalil, Khan Sahib, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Kodumur Dade Sahib, Khan Sahib, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Sheik Burandin Sahib, Municipal Manager, Kurnul.
 " Nawazeishalli Khan Khalil, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Abdul Razakh Khan Khalil, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Mirshikari Ahmed Sahib, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Ahmed Sahib, Merchant, Kurnul.
 " Bavanchikara Konary Rao, 2nd Grade Pleader, Nandyal.
 " Acholi Subbanna Setty Garu, Merchant, Nandyal.
 " Medavaram Sivaramayya Garu, Inamdar, Maddur, Kurnul.
 " Gazulu Basayya Garu, Merchant, Maddikera, Kurnul.
 " Pocha Chenchi Reddi Garu, Rao Sahib, Landholder, Paramanchela, Kurnul.
 " Atmakur, Krishen Singh Garu, Rao Sahib, Landholder and Contractor, Atmakur, Kurnul District.
 " Alavala Balaya Chetty, Merchant, Nandikotkur, Kurnul.
 " Chitrala Mangaya Setty Garu, Merchant, Parachala, Kurnul District.
 " Gandla Chenna Basanna Garu, Landholder and Merchant, Kodumur, Kurnul District.
 " Gandla Tippanna Garu, Landholder and Merchant, Kodumur.
 " Chinta Buddapah Garu, Sowcar, Kodumur, Kurnul District.
 " Kasi Setty Pede Alpurappa Garu, Merchant and Landholder, Kodumur, Kurnul.

District—continued.

- Mr. Setti Matangappa Garu, Ryot and Shopkeeper, Kodumur.
 „ Guntakanti Malla Reddi Garu, Landholder, Kodumur.
 „ Medam Subbannah Chetty Garu, Rao Sahib, Sowcar, Kurnul.
 „ Eapum Subbayya Chetty Garu, Merchant, Kurnul.
 „ Perugu Pulla Reddy Garu, Landholder, Salkapuram, Kurnul.
 „ M. Srinivasa Row, M.A., Head Master, Municipal High School, Kurnul.
 „ P. Seethapathi Iyer, B.A., Assistant Master, Municipal High School, Kurnul.
 „ Gudur Ramachendrayya Garu, Rao Sahib, Inamdar, Gudur, Kurnul.
 „ Chanugondla Gokari Sahib, Landholder, Chanugondla, Kurnul.
 „ Chanugondla Hussain Reddi Garu, Landholder, Chanugondla, Kurnul.
 „ Banur Rami Reddy, Landholder, Midatur, Kurnul.

District:—

- Mr. S. Mari Siddappah, Rao Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ G. Lakshman Rau, Head Master, Wardlaw Institution, Bellary.
 „ Bahadur A. Sabapathy Mudaliar, Merchant and Landholder, Bellary.
 „ Bahadur K. Venkata Row, Pleader and Municipal Chairman, Bellary.
 „ T. Chella Perumal Pillai, Rao Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ T. Hampayya, Merchant and Municipal Councillor, Bellary.
 „ Khan Sahib Abdul Kareem Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Kadir Pacha Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ M. Vasudeva Naidu, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Bellary.
 „ S. Nilakantappa, Rao Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ G. Kristappa, Rao Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ C. Doraswamy Naidu, Attorney-at-Law, Bellary.
 „ S. Venkata Charlu, Pleader and Editor of "Vizia Dhwaja," Bellary.
 „ Sowdagar Dade Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ P. Balayya Chetty, Rao Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Jannardanam Pillai, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ M. Ramanuja Naidu, Railway Contractor, Bellary.
 „ P. Rama Row, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Bellary.
 „ D. Krishnama Charlu, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Bellary.
 „ Kuppusawmy Mudaliar, Rao Sahib, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ R. Venkatanarasayya, Manager, S. W. Mill, Bellary.
 „ T. Venkataraghava Charlu, Physician, Bellary.
 „ P. Purushotama Row, Pleader, Bellary.
 „ Goodudoor Venkanna, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Pootayya Chetty, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Muthyalu Venkatadappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Hosoor Latshamayya, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Nagamalli Govindappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ A. Mooneyya, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ Sheirkhan Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Khan Sahib K. Sathar Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Allam Dadappa, Merchant and Landholder, Bellary.
 „ Annagondi Mariappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Hagalchukki Maribasappah, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Rotti Gandappah, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Holay Basappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Chimti Mallikarjunappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ S. Jayaram Naidu, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ Ganapatti Pillai, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ Guntakal Thimma Reddy, Landholder and Contractor, Guntakal.
 „ N. Ramasawmy Pillai, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ Parvatta Mullappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ K. Ranga Row, Pleader and Landlord, Bellary.

Bellary District—continued.

- Mr. J. Guffur Sahib, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ Sheik Mahomed Sahib, Contractor, Bellary.
 „ B. Chennappa, Merchant, Bellary.
 „ G. Kristnama Chettiar, Cashkeeper, Madras Bank, Bellary.
 „ C. Annamalai Mudaliar, Cashier, Messrs. A. Sabapathy Mudaliar and Co., Bellary.
 „ C. Hanumantha Ghoud, Landlord and Merchant, Hospett, Bellary.
 „ V. P. Ramachendra Sastry, Schoolmaster, Bellary.
 „ M. Virupatchi Garu, High Priest of the Lingayets, Hospett, Bellary.
 „ Gosi Gangappa, Cloth Merchant, Hospett, Bellary.
 „ Kalahastri Seshagiri Row, Contractor and Merchant, Hospett.
 „ Dody Raghavendra Naick, Sowcar and Merchant, Hospett.
 „ Raj Guru Raghava Char, Jahagirdar, Hospett.
 „ Vijnagaram Kristna Row, Sowcar, Hospett.
 „ Belgaum Subba Sastrulu, Inamdar, Hospett.
 „ D. Gopala Charlu, Pleader, Narayanakerry, Hospett.
 „ Lubbay Abdul Khadir Sahib Bahadur, Merchant, Hospett.

Anantapur District:—

- Mr. J. Srinivasa Row, Rao Sahib, Landholder, Gooty.
 „ R. Seshiah, Rao Sahib, Chairman of Gooty Minor Panchayet, Gooty.
 „ O. Madhana Row, Pleader, Gooty.
 „ M. Nagesa Row, Pleader, Gooty.
 „ P. Kesava Pillai, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Gooty.
 „ C. Chenna Reddi, Mirasidar, Tadpatry Taluq.
 „ P. Venkata Reddi, Mirasidar, Pandurti, Penukonda Taluq.
 „ V. R. Chakravarti Iyengar, Pleader, Penukonda.
 „ N. Chengal Row, Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Tadpatry.
 „ Jutur Naraina Reddy, Mirasidar of Jutur and Reddy of Jutur, Tadpatry.
 „ Chinnapolamada Obi Reddy, Mirasidar of Tadpatry.
 „ P. Papa Sastry Garu, 2nd Grade Pleader, Gooty.
 „ Palumati Seshagiri Row, Pensioned Deputy Tahsildar, Anantapur.
 „ S. Vadajee Row, Rao Sahib, Pleader, Anantapur.
 „ B. Narasimha Chariar, Pensioned Tahsildar, Anantapur.
 „ Charles Bradlaugh, M.P.

Coimbatore District:—

- Mr. N. Anna Iyer, B.A., Mirasidar, Coimbatore.
 „ C. Sadasiva Mudaliar, Rao Sahib, Secretary, Janopakara Bank, Coimbatore.
 „ Kulasakaram Mudaliar, Mirasidar, Coimbatore.
 „ Sambantha Mudaliar, Mirasidar, Coimbatore.
 „ Sooloor Subramania Iyer, Landlord, Coimbatore.
 „ S. P. Narasimhulu Naidu, Editor and Managing Proprietor of "The Crescent," Coimbatore.
 „ Khadir Mohidin Sahib, Mirasidar of Kadathur and Kanyur, Udumalpet.
 „ C. Nageswara Iyer, Mirasidar of Kadathur, and Secretary, A. M. Sabha, Kanyur, Udumalpet.
 „ S. Venkataramana Sastriar, B.A., Proprietor, A. High School, and Examiner, University, Udumalpet.
 „ Pathmanabha Iyer Avergal, Rao Sahib, Chairman of Municipality, and Dist. Board Member, Karur.
 „ V. Dasappa Aiyar Avl., Rao Saheb, Municipal Councillor, District Board Member, and Mirasidar, Erode.
 „ T. S. Balakristna Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Coimbatore.

IV

Coimbatore District—continued.

- Mr. C. M. Padmanabha Chariar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Coimbatore.
 „ K. Narayana Sastry, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Coimbatore.
 „ S. S. Venkataramiah, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, and Mirasidar, Coimbatore.
 „ V. Thiruvenkatasawmy Mudaliar, Abkari Contractor, and Director, Cotton Mills, Coimbatore.
 „ S. Latshminarashimma Iyer, Landlord, Coimbatore.
 „ S. C. Nanjunda Rao, Landlord, Coimbatore.
 „ Khaja Mahomed Sahib, Mirasidar of Karathupaliam, Gobichettipalyam.

Salem District :—

- Mr. Y. Sessa Chellam Aiyar, Secretary, Lord Ripon's Excelsior Literary Institute, Trichengode.

Malabar District :—

- Mr. P. I. Chinnaswamy Pillai, Landed Proprietor Palghaut.
 „ K. Ramunni Ayl., Dist. Court Pleader, Tellicherry.
 „ S. Ananda Narayana Pattar, Public Prosecutor and 1st Grade Pleader, Calicut.
 „ K. R. Ramasawmy Iyer, Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Calicut.
 „ P. Govinda Menon, Landed Proprietor, Calicut.
 „ C. M. Rarichan, Landed Proprietor, Calicut.
 „ C. Kunbi Ramen Menon, B.A., Rao Sahib, Editor, "Kerala Patrika," Calicut.
 „ A. K. T. K. M. Narayana Nambudripad, Secretary, Malabar Spinning and Weaving Company, Calicut.
 „ Kaliyanjee Sunderjee, Sowcar, and Malabar Spinning and Weaving Company, Calicut.
 „ M. A. Subramania Iyer, Rao Sahib, 1st Grade Pleader, Calicut.
 „ K. P. Achutta Menon, Vakil, Dist. Court, Palghaut.
 „ A. N. Ananta Narayana Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Palghaut.
 „ G. K. Chithambara Iyer, Mirasidar, Palghaut.
 „ Kadir Sahib, Merchant, Palghaut.
 „ C. Kannan Nair, Vakil, Munsiff's Court, Palghaut.
 „ K. P. Kannan Unni Nair, Vakil, Munsiff's Court, Palghaut.
 „ V. Krishna Iyer, Vakil, Dist. Court, Palghaut.
 „ U. V. Madhavan Nair, Vakil, Munsiff's Court, Palghaut.
 „ V. Mariappa Konar, Mirasidar, Palghaut.
 „ Padmanabha Ravi Nambidi, Zemindar, Kollengode, near Palghaut.
 „ S. Ramakrishna Iyer, Vakil, Dist. Court, Palghaut.
 „ V. Raman Nair, B.A., Mirasidar, Palghaut.
 „ Ramanni Muppil Nair, Zemindar, Maunarghat, near Palghaut.
 „ Rama Varma Rajah, M.C., Raja of Mangada, Palghaut.
 „ Ryrn Kutti Nair, Kyrat, Mirasidar, Ottapalam, near Palghaut.
 „ K. Sankara Menon, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Calicut.
 „ P. S. Sessa Iyer, B.A., B.L., High Court Vakil, Palghaut.
 „ Syed Mahomed Alibi, Vakil, Munsiff's Court, Palghaut.
 „ P. K. Subramania Iyer, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Palghaut.
 „ C. S. Swaminatha Pattar Karikar, Mirasidar, Palghaut.
 „ S. Viraraghava Iyer, Mirasidar, Palghaut.
 „ Vengu Iyer, Vakil, Dist. Court, Palghaut.
 „ L. Ayyathorai Pattar, Vakil, Dist. Court, Palghaut.
 „ John Leonard Rosario, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tellicherry.
 „ Thomas Richmond, B.A., Pleader, Tellicherry.
 „ Corobi Cannan, District Court Pleader, Tellicherry.
 „ Vengayil K. Raman Nayanar, Landed Proprietor, Tellicherry.

Malabar District—continued.

- Rao Sahib Mangot Gopala Menon, District Court Pleader, Tellicherry.
 Rao Sahib Thirumangalath Canhiraden Narayana K. B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Tellicherry.
 Mr. Kollone Abdul Rahaman, Merchant, Tellicherry.
 „ Manackjee Sorabjee, 2nd Grade Pleader, Tellicherry.
 „ V. Ryrn Nambiar, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Cannanore.
 „ C. Cherukunji Tangal Avergal of Arakol, Cannanore.
 „ P. C. Raman Avergal, 2nd Grade Pleader, Cannanore.

South Canara (Mangalore) :—

- Mr. Mangalore Subraya Sastriar, late Zillah Court Pleader, Mangalore.
 „ Madhappaya, Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ Manjeshwar Rangappaya, Zemindar, Manjeshwar, Mangalore.
 „ Manjeshwar Ramakrishna Row, Zemindar, Manjeshwar, Mangalore.
 „ Buntwal Ganapati Prabhu, Merchant, Buntwal, Mangalore.
 „ Buntwal Narashia Prabhu, Landlord, Buntwal, Mangalore.
 „ Rayomand Sylvester Noronha, Mangalore.
 „ Pandit Paramaswariah, Pleader, District Court, Mangalore.
 „ M. Subba Row, 1st Grade Pleader, Mangalore.
 „ W. C. Kristna Bhat, B.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, Mangalore.
 Rao Bahadur N. Tiva Row, 1st Grade Pleader, Mangalore.
 Mr. S. F. Brito, 1st Grade Pleader, Mangalore.
 „ Nayampalli Subba Row, Vakil, Mangalore.
 „ Tellicherry Bhawani Row, Vakil, Mangalore.
 „ F. Mascouranhus, Vakil, Mangalore.
 „ J. D'Souza, B.A., Vakil, Mangalore.
 „ B. A. Saldanha, Merchant and Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ C. S. Brito, Merchant and Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ B. A. Brito, Merchant and Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ J. N. Coelho, Merchant, Mangalore.
 „ G. Vas, Merchant, Mangalore.
 „ Narasaya Shanabogee, Merchant and Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ Valli Hassan Abba Sahib, Merchant and Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ Subbraya Sastri.
 „ H. Madhappaya Udayar, Landlord, Mangalore.
 „ Mayashwar Rangappaya, Mangalore.
 „ Ramakistna Row, Mangalore.
 „ Bantwal Ganapathy Prabhu, Mangalore.
 „ Narasim Prabhu, Mangalore.

Bangalore Cantonment :—

- Mr. B. Kistnasingh, Rao Bahadur, Municipal Chairman, Bangalore Cantonment.
 Rao Bahadur A. C. Sabapathy Mudaliar, late Councilor to H. H. the Maharaja of Mysore, Bangalore Cantonment.
 Mr. Meer Mahomed Ally Sahib, Bangalore Cantonment.

Secunderabad :—

- Mr. Moulvie Syed Ibrahim Khan, High Court Vakil, Hyderabad, Deccan.
 „ Syed Mahomed, Presdt., Anjuman Islam, Secunderabad.
 „ Mirza Nisar Ali Beye, Landed Proprietor, Secunderabad.
 „ Hajee Sujan Lal, Merchant, Secunderabad.
 „ Hajee Shaik Adum, Merchant, Secunderabad.
 „ Shaik Surmah, Merchant, Secunderabad.
 „ A. Ramanja Mudaliar, Zemindar and Hindu Community, Secunderabad.

Secunderabad—*continued.*

- Mr. B. Kistna Iyengar, Solicitor of the Madras High Court, and Pleader, British and Nizam's High Court, Secunderabad.
 " Dindigul Kistannah, Banker, Secunderabad.
 " Chargonda Rangiah, Sowcar, Secunderabad.
 " Muthiala Ramannah, Sowcar, Secunderabad.
 " Kavasha Edulji, Pleader and Secretary, Theosophical Society, Secunderabad.
 " Gunga Bishan, Merchant, Secunderabad.
 " P. Ramachandra Pillay, Public Prosecutor, Secunderabad.



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 Dt. 7/11/77

