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**Regional Security and Peacekeeping in Africa: A Case Study of
ECOWAS, SADC and AU**

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Regional Security and Peacekeeping in Africa: A Case Study of ECOWAS, SADC and AU¹

Abstract

Regional Organisations (ROs) help to measure the level of formal engagement within geopolitical entities beyond the borders of a single nation-state. Though it is the states that voluntarily cooperate to enter into formal arrangements, ROs take up a life of their own over time, becoming autonomous actors in global governance. ROs in the post cold war era have come to play an important role in giving effect to the regionalism of global security. For instance, though peacekeeping was started by the United Nations as an innovative alternative to collective security, Regional Organisations also contributed to peacekeeping. In Africa, a region of high political instability and conflict, sub-regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have undertaken peace-operations since the 1990s. At the regional level, while the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was initially hesitant to manage peace and security staying true to the principle on non-interference with sovereignty of states, its successor, the African Union (AU) tried to reinvent itself by becoming more proactive in launching peace operations. This has had the effect of giving meaning to the slogan “African Solutions to African Problems”. Seeing the United Nations (UN) as a symbol of universalism—the international organisation charged with the responsibility of maintaining international order of peace—this paper examines whether or not the regionalism of peace and security by ROs in Africa have come to challenge the authority of UN. For this purpose, it looks at the specific peacekeeping experiences of: ECOWAS Operation Liberty in Nigeria, SADC operations in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho, AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). It is concluded that ROs and the UN have complemented more than really competed with each other in managing issues of African security and that states remain important players in this phenomenon.

Keywords: Regional Organisations, Peacekeeping, ECOWAS, SADC, AU, UN

¹ This paper is a revised version of a presentation, made by the author in a conference ‘Regionalism and Globalization: Complementarities and Contestations’, held on 14-15 December, 2017 at NMML

Introduction

Peacekeeping as an innovative tool in the maintenance of international peace and security hasn't remained the sole prerogative of the United Nations. In recent times, regional organisations (ROs) have also practiced not just peacekeeping but also peace enforcement. In the case of Africa, the most prevalent site of cases of political instability and conflict, sub-regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) have undertaken peace-operations since the 1990s. At the regional level, while Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was hesitant to manage peace and security relying heavily on the principle on non-interference with sovereignty of states, the African Union (AU) has tried to reinvent itself by becoming more proactive in launching peace operations and giving effect to the slogan "African Solutions to African Problems".

Regionalism has been seen as a project adopted by states to tackle the negative impact of globalisation and free market capitalism (Gamble and Payne). There has been a debate as to whether regionalism complements the process of globalisation by adding one more layer to the framework of multilateral governance or does it impede the process by causing more fragmentation in the world. This debate has not only occurred in the context of World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the various Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that sprung up in the 1990s most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but also extends to the domain of peace and security. This is what this paper seeks to study. It examines as to whether or not the regionalism of peace and security by ROs in Africa have come to challenge the authority of the UN, the global institution charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.

UN, as a universal organisation, composed of 193 sovereign states has been an important actor in the framework of global governance. In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that envisaged that "The United Nations is uniquely suited to assume normative leadership for globalization with a human face. It can do so by promoting a broader vision of human development."(UNGA 1999).

Soon after the end of the cold war, there has been an increase in UN Peace operations tackling intra-state conflict situations driven by ethnic conflicts especially in Africa (see Table 1). Like the UN, African ROs have also been involved in conflict situations in Africa. Some of the peace operations that have been initiated by these ROs are:

- 1) by AU in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004), Comoros Island (2006, 2008), Somalia (2007);
- 2) by SADC in Lesotho(1998), DRC (1998) and;
- 3) by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990), Cote d Ivoire (2002), Guinea Bissau (1998), Sierra Leone(1997).

Table 1: Intrastate UN Peacekeeping in 1990s

<i>Location</i>	<i>Operation</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991–
Angola	UNAVEMII	1991–95
	UNAVEM III	1995–97
	MONUA	1997–99
El Salvador	ONUSAL	1991–95
Cambodia	UNAMIC	1991–92
	UNTAC	1992–93
Somalia	UNOSOM I	1992–93
	UNOSOM II	1993–95
Croatia	UNPROFOR	1992–95
	UNTAES	1996–98
	UNMOP	1996–
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1992–94
Guatemala	MINUGUA	1997
Haiti	UNMIH	1993–96
	UNSMIH	1996–97
	UNTMIH	1997
	MIPONUH	1997–
Liberia	UNOMIL	1993–97
Georgia	UNOMIG	1993–
Rwanda	UNAMIR	1993–96
Tajikistan	UNMOT	1994–2000
Bosnia- Herzegovina	UNPROFOR	1992–95
	UNMIBH	1995–
	SUPGROUP	1998–
Central African Republic	MINURCA	1998–2000
Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL	1998–99
	UNAMSIL	1999–
Serbia/Kosovo	UNMIK	1999–
East Timor	UNTAET	1999–
Congo	MONUC	1999–

Source: (Murthy 2001: 213)

Against this empirical background, it is important to examine what kind of relationship has developed between these African ROs and the UN in matters of peace

and security as they operate in the same region? Is the relationship conflictual or complementary? This paper makes an attempt to explore these aspects by adopting a case study approach. It looks at specific case studies of ECOWAS Operation Liberty in Nigeria, SADC operations in DRC and Lesotho, AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

This paper is divided in the following way. It begins by giving a brief overview of the concept of 'regions' and 'regionalism' and how they took root in Africa. It then shifts attention to the peacekeeping experiences of ROs in Africa by examining the above mentioned cases in detail. Finally, it concludes by reflecting on the nature of relations between ROs and the UN that have developed in the area of peace and security in the region of Africa.

Regions and Regionalism

A region has been defined in several ways. For Joseph Nye, an international region is 'a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence'(Nye 1968: vii). Borrowing from Anderson's idea of nations as imagined communities, constructivist scholars like Smouts see regions also as an 'imagined community'(Smouts 1998). Like nations, regions too have a common regional identity, pushed by actors, mostly the states. This identity is influenced by various factors such as common history, common culture, commonly perceived threats from outside or any other acceptable common criteria that provides a basis for creating a region. But when do we know a region has been created by states? It can be seen through the prism of regionalism. 'Regionalism' entails creating institutions like in the form of ROs that help to sustain regional cooperation between states. ROs as formal organisations with a formal structure like headquarters, rules, charter etc. show the level of formal regionalism in any region of the world. A RO is most often a state driven project from above, creating a regionalist order, limited though not always to a particular geographical area.²

Although Regions try to mimic the nation in forging a regional identity, they don't mimic the state in its functions. ROs govern 'liberally', 'at a distance' and 'not

²For example, while on one hand, the African Union(AU) comprises of states bound by a geographical unit that is the African continent, on the other hand, the membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), isn't restricted to a geographical space wherein the states find common identity through the religion of Islam.

directly', as they are created when states voluntarily choose to cooperate with each other but ensure that they don't give up their sovereignty (Larner and Walter 2002). A regional organisation lacks the 'Weberian monopoly of the use of force' that states enjoy. In this respect, regionalism is a specific layer in multilateral governance. ROs can be seen as expressions of what Deutsch called a 'Pluralistic Security Community'. According to Deutsch, security communities that aim to generate peace within its members can either be amalgamated (where states unite politically like the United States of America) or pluralistic (where states retain their sovereignty) (Deutsch et al 1957). Once ROs are created they assume the role of new actors to influence the development of the very pluralistic security community that created them in the first place by promoting values of trust, a shared identity, norms of self-restraint like mediation and peaceful settlement of disputes and a common fate like a common currency (Adler and Barnett 2000: 42).

The African Case of Regionalisms

ROs differ from each other as "different historical structures which exist within each region" (Gamble and Payne 2003: 53). History has had an important role to play in Africa in bringing about regionalism or more appropriately regionalisms. While prima facie it may look that the common history of European colonialism of Africa helped to forge a Pan-African identity on the continent, the reality however, is more nuanced.

Although the idea of Pan Africanism existed culturally even prior to the decolonisation wave that swept Africa in the late 1950s, like the 'Back to Africa' movement, it was Ghana (the first country to gain independence in the continent) that provided the necessary leadership through Kwame Nkrumah, who pushed for the political integration of decolonised Africa. Nkrumah called for a Pan Africa to replace a Eurafrika by appealing that "we are Africans first and last, and as Africans our best interests can only be served by uniting within an African Community"(Nkrumah 1970: v, 217). But the colonial identities didn't just disappear with a call for Pan Africanism. Africa saw rather the wave of competing regionalisms (Franke 2007). A spilt occurred between two groups of states. The Casablanca group upheld the principles of Pan-Africanism led by Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Sekou Toure (Guinea) and Modibo Keita (Mali) who ambitiously called for a United States of

Africa that united culturally, economically and politically. Particularly, it opposed any patronising relations of France with its former colonies. In sharp contrast to this Casablanca group, there was the Monrovia group that included the Brazzaville group of moderate Francophone states such as Ivory Coast, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Mauritania besides Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia and Liberia. The Monrovia group upheld the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and didn't think that engagement with the West for development would lead to neo-colonialism.

The result of this divide was the formation of different ROs. While the Casablanca group formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (later renamed as the Union of African States (UAS), the Monrovia group created organisations with French names like the Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique(OAMCE), the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), the Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense (UAMD).

Finally, a compromise was reached between the two groups and the Organisation for African Unity was created in 1963. What was problematic, however, was that the creation of OAU didn't result in reversing the faulty colonial cartography of the continent. Colonial powers at the Berlin conference of 1844-45 drew straight line borders on the map of Africa in which the Africans has no say. No sensitivity was shown to the composition of various ethnic groups and they were left divided. These inherited colonial borders were institutionalised by the OAU in its charter. Unfortunately, it is this arbitrary colonial cartography that has "served as the geopolitical foundation for inter-ethnic conflict over much of the continent" (Amadife and Warhola 1993: 540)

Competing regionalisms have been present in the sub-regions of Africa as well. For instance, even though ECOWAS as a RO in the West African region sought to unite the anglophone and francophone states, France sponsored other ROs like the *Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO) and the *Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UMOA) (Franke 2007). This divide can be seen to impact the peace operation of ECOWAS as discussed below.

Although the institutional logo of AU (the successor of OAU) symbolized that the African continent was one unit without its colonial straight line boundaries, different regionalisms are prevalent in Africa. Apart from the continental AU, different cardinal

sub-regional groupings continue to exist. Currently, AU recognises eight such groups. These are: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).


Regionalisation of Peace and Security

ROs have increasingly performed the functions of managing peace and security issues. This phenomenon has been seen as the ‘regionalisation’ of peace and security. As Fawcett remarks, the performance of regionalism with respect to providing security, “has increasingly come to be measured with reference to the ability of regional groups to act as security providers inside and outside their respective areas, to contribute to what has been called an ‘evolving architecture of regionalization’”(Fawcett 2004:434).

Providing security is linked to peace operations. There exists however no agreed definition of a peace operation. The UN defines five peace and security activities namely, conflict prevention (preventing disputes from turning into conflicts), peacemaking (using diplomacy to ease hostility), peacekeeping (using military, police, and civilians to lay the basis for durable peace), peace enforcement (use of military measures to execute the decision of the UN SC, the principal organ charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security) and peacebuilding (measures to reduce relapses of conflicts) (DPKO 2007: 10-11). However, often states employ the term “peacekeeping” to justify a military activity (Finnemore 2003). This is because peacekeeping was an innovation of the UN to achieve its goal of maintaining ‘International Peace and Security’. Although it was never originally envisaged in the UN Charter, it came into being because of the failure of Collective Security System due to the deadlock in the UNSC during the cold war. Peacekeeping was born into what Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General called as “Chapter VI and a Half” of the UN Charter i.e. a halfway house between simple pacific settlement of disputes and peace enforcement actions of UNSC.

Over a period of time, the practice of peacekeeping has evolved into three generations. The first generation is called the traditional peacekeeping that predominantly happened during the cold war era in interstate conflicts wherein peacekeepers were sent to mainly monitor a ceasefire agreement with the consent of host state, by being lightly armed, were supposed to maintain neutrality and use force only in self-defense. The second generation of peacekeeping engaged in more multidimensional activities like that of peace-building like monitoring elections and other socio-economic reconstruction activities. The third generation of peacekeeping moved into the realm of peace-enforcement when operations were authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially in intrastate conflict areas that lacked a comprehensive peace agreement (Doyle and Sambanis 2007). The second and third generation peacekeeping has been called as ‘Multifunctional’ peacekeeping that has been prevalent in intrastate conflicts in the post-cold war era (Diehl 2008).


ROs have engaged in peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement to further regional peace and security. Peace operations cannot be seen as the sole prerogative of the UN. As figure 1 shows that about 65 peace operations were conducted in the period from 1946 till 2016 by various regional organisations. These were the OAU (Organisation for African Unity), AU (African Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), EU (European Union), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), CEN-SAD (the Community of Sahel and Saharan States) etc.

Figure 1: Number of Regional Peace Operations 1946-2016

Source: (Williams 2017: 126)

Although during the creation of the UN, there were discussions about the role that regional councils could play in providing security, a globalist view was accepted instead and the UNSC attained the primacy in managing international peace and security (Bellamy et al 2010: 303). Nevertheless, the UN charter did create space for ROs if they acted in the spirit of upholding the principles of the UN. However, there is also a normative view linked to the regionalization of peace operations, according to which, regions are better suited and should be responsible for the peace and security of their own regions (Goulding 2002: 217). It is in this respect, that the interaction between UN and ROs in Africa becomes important. Consider the following facts. Recently, a study by SIPRI noted that there is an African dynamic clearly in peace operations wherein 75 per cent of all peace operation personnel are deployed in Africa (SIPRI 2017a: 1). Furthermore, in 2017, the top peace operations, having more than 10,000 personnel, were all hosted in Africa among which was also the AU Mission in Somalia as well as the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Sudan (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Top Multilateral Peace Operations with more than 10,000 personnel as in May 2017



Source: (SIPRI 2017b)

With such recent trends highlighted, the following sections discuss in detail, with the help of case studies, the practice of regional peacekeeping in Africa.

Case Study 1: ECOWAS and Operation Liberty in Liberia

ECOWAS as a regional bloc of 15 West African States³ was formed in 1975 on the basis of Treaty of Lagos concluded on May 28, 1975. The aims of the community were confined to bringing about economic cooperation, by removing custom duties and administrative and quantitative restrictions between member states so as to proceed towards the idea of creating a customs union. That ECOWAS would intervene to manage peace and conflict in member states was nowhere conceived in this founding treaty. The addition of security dimension came about gradually in steps. From the Protocol on Non-Aggression of 22 April 1978, that first stressed on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, to the Mutual Assistance on Defence, signed on 29 May 1981 that called for establishment of a collective self-defence agreement in the case of external aggression, it was finally with the revised Treaty of ECOWAS of

³ECOWAS founding members were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

1993 that provided the legal basis for ECOWAS to manage conflict in West Africa. Under Chapter X titled, “Co-operation in Political, Judicial and Legal Affairs, Regional Security and Immigration”, Article 58(2) on Regional Security of the revised treaty, “commits member states to co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” (ECOWAS 1993: 36).

However, the interesting fact is, before this revised treaty came into the picture, ECOWAS had already launched its Operation Liberty (three years in advance) in 1990 to quell the civil war that began in Liberia in December 1989. The trouble was, Charles Taylor, a Liberian exile launched an armed rebellion against the incumbent regime of Samuel Doe. From the beginning, however, not all member states of ECOWAS were unanimously in favour of this intervention in Liberia. The baggage of colonial history was apparent, when on one hand, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the West African Francophone states supported the rebellion by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), while on the other hand, the Anglophone state, Nigeria, supported Samuel Doe's regime. ECOWAS as a united regional bloc of West African states was a myth than a reality.

It was under Nigerian pressure that ECOWAS dispatched the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It was the Nigerian military commander organized a special meeting as ECOWAS chairman in Banjul in May 1990. However, the dispatched ECOMOG troops couldn't act as a peacekeeping force—sticking to the traditional principles of using force in self-defense and also being neutral because the armed group of NPFL not only rejected the ECOWAS Peace Plan but also opposed the deployment of ECOMOG. Consequentially, Operation Liberty was in intent not a peacekeeping operation but a peace enforcement operation picking the side of Samuel Doe's government against Charles Taylor's NPFL.

The troop's contributions to ECOMOG didn't reflect the full membership of ECOWAS but was heavily “Nigerianised” in colour. Mostly Anglophone countries, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and only small Francophone states Guinea and Gambia contributed troops to ECOMOG. Nigeria's troop contributions were dominant—62 per cent in 1991/92 which increased to 86 per cent in 1993/94 and only slightly

dropped to 78 per cent in 1997 (Coleman 2007: 82). Francophone states like Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Mali and Niger chose to remain away from ECOMOG for the most duration of the mission and it was only towards the end in 1997, when Charles Taylor's prospects of becoming the new president of Liberia brightened, when more members joined ECOMOG.


Nigeria for the most part used ECOWAS as a tool to support its ally, Samuel Doe's regime by launching a peace operation that looked "legitimate". Samuel Doe had asked for aid from Nigeria and not ECOWAS. It was Nigeria that took up Doe's case at the regional level. Mostly parroting Doe's voice, Nigeria tried to justify the need for intervention in Liberia so as to prevent the grave consequences of Liberian civil warlike the rise in refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, which could put the peace and security of the West African Community in peril. Nigeria also reasoned, as a justification for intervention that protecting the lives of Nigerians living in Liberia was a national priority.

However, the Nigerian move has also been seen as an attempt to divert international attention away from the "socio-economic problems and political abuses' at home (Adibe 1997:473). With this, the dictatorship regime of Nigeria saw the intervention as an opportunity to demonstrate 'regional leadership' of West Africa. This Nigerian move can be interpreted as what Soderbaum calls as 'sovereign boosting governance'—one of the forms of regional governance "whereby political leaders and regimes are using regional governance to promote rather than to reduce absolute state sovereignty and its legitimacy" (Soderbaum 2004: 429). For one thing the Nigeria led ECOMOG was criticised as it became a means to promote the idea of "Pax Nigeria" by targeting NPFL and in the process targeting civilian habitation (even hospitals) thereby violating International Humanitarian Law (Human Rights Watch: 1993).

Also, Operation Liberty, though launched under the auspices of ECOWAS lacked "international legitimacy" as UN Security Council didn't authorise ECOMOG initially to undertake peacekeeping. This is a clear violation of Art 53(1) of the UN Charter that reads "...no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council". It took two years for UN to 'retrospectively' bless the mission by adopting

resolution 788 of 19 November 1992 *recalling* Chapter VIII. The Resolution not only imposed an arms embargo on Liberia (under Chapter VII), but also “*commended* ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security, and stability in Liberia” (UNSC 1992:3,2). However, it is doubtful if ECOWAS was actually authorised by UNSC. As one scholar notes it is “open to question whether the vague language used in the UNSC resolutions would amount to an *ex post facto authorization* of military enforcement action” (Wet 2014). UNSC in fact recognised the efforts of ECOWAS in peacekeeping when it launched its own mission in Liberia (UNMIL) later in 2003. Interestingly, it was again Nigeria that provided the maximum number of troops for this mission (See figure 3).

Figure 3: Top Troop Contributing Countries to UNMIL in October 2003



Source: (United Nations Peacekeeping 2003)

The above case clearly shows no conflicting relationship between ECOWAS and the UN.

Case Study 2: SADC operations in Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho

Southern African Development Community (SADC) that came into being on 17 Aug 1992 had a very interesting past. SADC came as a successor to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that comprised of majority ruled states such as Southern Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe which aimed to integrate, from 1980, the economies of these countries so as to decrease their economic dependence on South Africa. But with the end of the Apartheid regime in S.Africa, SADCC lost the rationale for its creation. SADC was then created to recognize and incorporate the new democratic state of S.Africa into Southern Africa. The SADC Treaty, however,

clearly lay out that SADC was never meant to be a purely economic organisation. Under Article 5(c) of the Treaty, it was laid out that one of the objectives of SADC was to “promote and defend peace and security”.

But how SADC would operate to meet this objective became mired in the leadership struggle that started between the old member, Zimbabwe and the new member, S.Africa. In 1998, two major military “interventions” were taken by these rival states. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa claimed that their interventions were done under the SADC auspices. On one hand, Zimbabwe, along with Angola and Namibia sent troops to DRC to support Laurent Desire Kabila’s regime from the invasions of Rwanda and Uganda under the code name of Operation Sovereign Legitimacy. On the other hand, in the same year, South Africa along with Botswana sent troops to Lesotho to support the incumbent, PM Pakalitha Mosisili, to counter the civil unrest. The key point however, is that a divide occurred between the members of SADC. Three SADC countries sent troops to DRC while two other SADC members sent troops to Lesotho. SADC, to be seen as a *unified* sub-regional organisation in managing peace and security remained a dream, rather than a reality.

SADC remained a weak actor institutionally to manage peace and security. Although SADC created the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996, it was unclear whether this Organ could function autonomously and define the direction for maintenance of regional peace and security or was it subordinate to the other SADC institution, the Summit of Heads of State or Government which according to the Article 10(2) of the SADC Treaty was responsible for overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC. This confusion became apparent when Zimbabwe favoured the autonomy of the Organ in taking final decisions on the matter of peace and security, while in contrast, S. Africa wanted that the Organ remained subordinate to the Summit. These differences played out in the 1997 SADC Summit in Malawi where the Summit failed to adopt the ‘protocol on politics’, defence and security that could have given clarity on the institutional and legal basis of the Organ. This protocol was only adopted later in 2001 but by that time the Operation Sovereign Legitimacy and Operation Boleas had already been launched.

The two interventions must be studied together if SADC’s role as a “peacekeeper” is to be evaluated. In the case of DRC, Zimbabwe claimed the intervention to be a

SADC intervention necessary for regional stability, even when other member states of SADC, South Africa preferred a peaceful resolution to the dispute and opposed this move. So, dealing with the crisis situation in DRC, was never met with a collective effort of all SADC countries. But surprisingly, rather than DRC remaining a “deviance” from SADC ideals, the selective intervention by some member countries became rather a norm. The double-standards of S.Africa were exposed soon when it along with Botswana intervened in Lesotho in a bid to create a stable atmosphere for peaceful negotiations to take place. The cause of instability in Lesotho was that the election results of 1998 parliamentary election that led to the victory of Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was opposed by dissatisfied opposition parties like the Basotho National Party (BNP) who alleged electoral fraud. Moreover, even the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) refused to support the new government. So, in this case, it can look ‘natural’ that South Africa sent its defence forces to stop anarchy spreading from especially a country that engulfs (as Lesotho is a tiny landlocked country within South Africa) and prevent a possible coup.

However, it cannot be really said that Zimbabwe and South Africa acted altruistically to promote regional stability under the rubric of SADC. For instance, in a report of Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth, of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was noted that Zimbabwe military had commercial interests by developing an elite network with Congolese government had “transferred ownership of at least US\$ 5 billion of assets from the State mining sector to private companies” (PoE 2002:7). Even in the case of Lesotho, South Africa’s motivations can be linked had its own national interest of protecting its assets, especially the Katse Dam a part of the highlands water project in Lesotho, to which one scholar remarks that the intervention, was a ‘resource war’ and not a ‘SADC peace mission’ in true sense (Likoti 2007).

One thing that can be seen from these two case studies is that SADC couldn’t act as an autonomous actor taking all member states on board in deciding how to deal with situations of regional stability. The actions were taken by Zimbabwe and South Africa also never received a mandate from the UNSC. Whether, “the intervention was required for regime protection or political or material gains, the organization was used/abused by its members.” (Schoeman and Miller 2009: 178). In this case, UNSC

didn't authorise the actions of the two major players Zimbabwe and South Africa, but it neither condemned it.

The African Union and Peace Operations

AU since its birth in 2002, tried to be radically different from its predecessor, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) especially in the field of protecting human rights of African peoples. OAU that was formed in 1963 was a regional initiative of African nations built on the ideology of Pan-Africanism, but was heavily dictated by the bad memories of colonialism. Consequently, OAU was rooted in the Westphalian notions of protecting state-sovereignty and recognizing the existing colonial boundaries of newly decolonised nations. Non-interference in the affairs of member states and giving due respect to the territorial integrity and political independence of each state became the normative foundation of OAU. AU tried to bring about a change in this normative thinking that was reflected in its founding charter.

The impetus for this change came from the horrifying episode of Rwanda genocide wherein OAU was seen as a 'weak' actor dealing with the problem of human rights violations. This 'weakness' was related to the principle of 'non-interference' on which OAU was based, set the background for reforming the OAU in the 1990s. The result was that AU became the first regional organisation that sought to operationalise an innovative *African Responsibility to Protect (R2P)* at a regional level. This was also before the World Summit of 2005 where the international community accepted the idea of Responsibility to Protect.

Two principles on which the AU came to be based became important. Article 4(h) of the constitutive act of AU clearly stated the principle, "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"(AU 2000: 7) and also, article 4(j) opened the possibility of "the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;"(AU 2000:7). This *normative shift* can be seen as the explanation for AU's activist role in launching peace operations on the Continent compared to its predecessor, OAU. However, as it will become clear from the case studies, this wasn't the case.

Apart from the normative shift, there was also an institutional shift when AU replaced OAU. A thick alphabet soup of institutions was to be found in the machinery of African Peace and Security Architecture to enable effective and systematic peacekeeping. APSA consists of a Peace and Security Council, modelled on the lines of UN Security Council except that no state has a veto and is hence, more democratic and representative. Ten seats in the PSC are for two-year terms and five for three-year terms. It is the main political body responsible for the maintenance of African peace and security. Other pillars of this system include a Panel of the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Peace Fund (PF) and the African Standby Force (ASF). The African Standby Force is an innovative way through which AU tries to deepen its ties with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The idea is that an African rapid reaction force should be operational and ready as a standby force that can be deployed anywhere on the continent as and when a crisis situation occurs. The force is divided into, five regions—North, South, East, West and Central, and more or less resembles the membership of already existing Regional Economic Communities on the continent. The ASF, which is the most critical pillar, has still not been operationalised even though the deadline was 2010. This also shows that just like the UN that has been dependent on the political will of member states and still has no standby force, the same challenges are faced at the regional level.

Nevertheless, AU has sent peace missions to Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM), Central African Republic (FOMUC), Comoros (AMISEC), to name a few. Studying all these cases is beyond the scope of this paper. Only two case studies—AU's first mission in Burundi launched in 2003 and AU's mission in Sudan (Darfur) (AMIS), that later formed into the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—have been chosen.

Case Study 3: *The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)*

AMIB was the first peace operation launched by AU in 2003. Its role in bringing about some level of peace to Burundi cannot be seen without paying special reference to the single-most critical role played by South Africa. The cause of instability in Burundi goes back to the events of 1993 when Burundi experienced a coup. The elected president, Melchior Ndadaye was killed, causing tensions between the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu population. The result was a genocide. A report of the UN

Secretary-General submitted to UNSC noted in 2003 that since 1993, the hostilities have claimed between 250,000 and 300,000 lives, mostly civilians (UNSC 2003: 10). UN's role was quite minimal, just sending some civilian observers that couldn't really help in addressing the deteriorating situation in Burundi.

Nelson Mandela, the president of South Africa played a significant role in facilitating the negotiations at Arusha that went on for more than two years. The 'Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi' that came into being on 28 August 2000, was based on the principles of "justice, reconciliation, fundamental rights and freedoms, national development and the organisation of the country's political institutions based on power sharing between Hutu and Tutsis" (International Crisis Group 2016). However, the agreement was defective. Though it claimed to be inclusive as it called for greater power-sharing between the government and various political parties, it left out important rebel groups, from the negotiations (International Crisis Group 2000). Furthermore, it didn't include a ceasefire agreement, a plan for transition and the reform of the Army (ibid.). The Accord couldn't lead Burundi on the path of peace.

It was then that South Africa sent troops in 2001 as part of Very Important Person protection operation named as South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) to safeguard a handful of Hutu politicians (mainly members of the Front for Democracy in Burundi) who had returned from exile. Although the force was intended to be multinational with troops coming from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, the force remained 'South African'. A ceasefire agreement was then signed in December 2002 between Burundi's Transitional government and the most notable rebel group of Pierre Nkurunziza's Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). This ceasefire was now to be monitored by an African Mission under the command of AU. However, it is important to note that this peacekeeping force named as AMIB by the AU never received any authorisation by the UNSC.

Also, the hope that more troops of different member states of AU would join in the AU mission turned out to be false. SAPSD was integrated as an advance party into the newly created AU Mission while South Africa contributed most troops to the mission: South Africa contributed 1,508 troops, followed by 866 troops from Ethiopia and 228 from Mozambique (UNSG 2003:7). Also, South African Deputy President Jacob

Zuma alleged that Tanzania and Uganda were supporting the rebel groups especially CNDD-FDD and opposed these countries joining as troop-contributing countries. South Africa henceforth, dictated what form and direction the AMIB could actually take.

AMIB however, couldn't maintain its neutrality—the first condition that must be fulfilled by a peacekeeper. As AMIB targeted and killed troops of CNDD-FDD, it became a party to the conflict. Consequently, CNDD-FDD accused AMIB of complicity with Burundian Army while another rebel group FNL alleged that South Africa the major provider of troops to AMIB had clear economic and strategic designs (Human Rights Watch 2003:10). While it is easier to understand why South Africa intervened in Lesotho under SADC, it is however difficult to understand prima-facie why South Africa chose Burundi. One explanation could be that Burundi provided an opportunity from a moral standpoint i.e. to bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the African continent as it moved towards a 'fledgling democracy' and also from the material interests that was closely linked to South Africa's support for the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was to serve as the vehicle for collectively addressing the continent's lack of development through the promotion of political governance, regional integration and economic and corporate investment (ACCORD 2007:17)

AMIB, working under such a suspicious environment was not able to fulfil its ambitious task of Demobilising, Disarming and Reintegrating (DDR) the Rebel groups. AMIB also faced significant financial constraints. As late as 2003, out of the US\$120 million required to fund the AMIB's operations for a year, only US\$ 20 million had been made available (African Research Bulletin 2003:15532B). AMIB consequently couldn't finish the work of bringing about peace and it had to be replaced by the UN peace operation ONUB that was deployed on 21, May 2004 and continued till 2006.


Interestingly, it was South Africa that pushed for the re-hitting of the African mission into a UN mission. As the then Deputy South African President Jacob Zuma in a statement to the UNSC clearly stated:

We believe processes should now be put in place to look into how the UN can become actively and directly involved in the Burundi peace process....It is our well-considered view that the conditions are now conducive for the UN to express its support and solidarity through taking over the African Mission in Burundi, re-hat the existing military contingent and deploy a UN peacekeeping operation.

—Zuma 2003


It was this statement that UNSC took note of while authorizing ONUB as evident in the perambulatory paragraph from the UNSC resolution (United Nations 2004: 3). South Africa served as the backbone of the UN mission as well. It remained the topmost troop contributor during the mission (See figures 4 and 5 that show the top troop-contributing countries at the beginning and at the end of the mission). Furthermore, the then major general Mbyiselo Mgwebi was the force commander throughout this mission who was also from South Africa.

Figure 4: Top Troop Contributing Countries for ONUB in June 2004



Source: (United Nations Peacekeeping 2004).

Figure 5: Top Troop Contributing Countries for ONUB in November 2006



Source: (United Nations Peacekeeping 2006).

Therefore, although the AMIB, launched by the AU in Burundi, never received any authorisation by the UNSC, the fact that it was taken over by a UN mission smoothly, and the way South Africa played a role in both the missions, in a way shows complementarities between the AU and the UN.

Case Study 4: *AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (2007-present)*

In 2003 the crisis in Darfur region on the border of eastern Chad and western Sudan was the result of violent conflicts between several groups, the Sudanese government and a pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed; the two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004 to deal with the conflict. AU initially succeeded in its peacemaking role. Under the former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006 in Abuja between the Sudanese government and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi.

However, peace remained elusive and humanitarian situation precarious as fighting continued between various armed insurgent groups that continued to proliferate. AMIS proved weak in curbing the civilian violence and subsequently, a need was felt to strengthen it. In its 46th meeting AU Peace and Security Council in its communiqué adopted on 10 March 2006, decided in principle that the transition must be made from AMIS to a UN operation in Darfur and demanded that

the Government of the Sudan refrains from conducting hostile military flights in and over the Darfur region, expeditiously implement its stated commitment to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias, and identify and declare those militias over whom it has influence and ensure that these militias refrain from all attacks, harassment and intimidation (AU PSC 2006:2-3).

Nevertheless, the catch was that in the same communiqué in para 6, it was stressed that the transition from AMIS to a UN operation in Darfur should be informed by “the preparedness of the Government of Sudan *to accept* the deployment of a UN operation in Darfur” (AU PSC 2006:4). This meant that AU gave importance to the “consent” of the host government even when it recognised the host government was responsible for human rights violations in its own territory. While taking note of this

communiqué, UNSC adopted Resolution 1706 in 2006. While commending the efforts of AMIS, UNSC through this Resolution also sought to deploy a UN Peace operation under Chapter VII of UN Charter in Darfur taking over from AMIS so as to successfully implement the Darfur Peace Agreement “*using all necessary means*” to protect civilian lives from the threat of physical violence (UNSC 2006: 6)

However, any talk of converting the AMIS into a more robust UN peace operation was strongly resisted by Sudan. The Sudanese government even remarked categorically that any blue helmets on Sudanese soil would be equivalent to the recolonisation of Sudan! The UNSC Resolution 1706 couldn't be implemented as a result. Sudan only agreed to the UN mission if and only if the ‘African’ nature of the peace operation would remain in place. Consequently, AU-UN Hybrid Mission, UNAMID was authorised under Chapter VII of UNSC by its Resolution 1769. The Hybrid mission meant that the command and control were to be shared by the UN and the AU. But even in the leadership as in the cases highlighted above, the dominance of Nigeria and South Africa can be clearly seen. In 2016, Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi of Nigeria, the Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), was also entrusted with responsibilities including those of African Union-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator. Before M. Uhomoibhi, the Joint Special Representative was Abiodun Oluremi Bashua, again of Nigeria. Also, currently, Deputy Joint Special Representative for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Jeremiah Nyamane Kingsley Mamabolo is from South Africa.

Nevertheless, the Hybrid mission at least in one respect seeks to concretize and give practical expression to the ‘partnership’ that can be built between UN and regional arrangements. UNAMID attempts to fulfil the vision of former UNSG Boutros Boutros Ghali who called for the need for greater synergies to be built between the UN and regional arrangements in tackling conflicts in his Agenda for Peace Report in 1992. The Report had noted that there cannot exist any one formula of formal partnership and specific division of labour between the UN and regional arrangements as no two regions are the same. However, it is important that UN engages more with regional arrangements as this cooperation decentralisation and delegation would lead to a greater sense of consensus and democratisation in international affairs (UNSG 1992:64). However, it is not to be forgotten that it wasn't AU that had demanded an

equal footing in terms of decision making with the universal organisation UN. Rather the Hybrid mission owed its creation to the obstructionist role played by Sudan and the weaknesses of AMIS.

In terms of conceptualising this hybrid relationship, it can be seen that both UN and AU are seeking to bolster their institutional legitimacy in conducting peace operations especially at a time NATO has also conducted many peace operations without UNSC authorisation. As an analysis has been made by scholars, that UNAMID can be conceived a form of ‘hybrid paternalism’ that “in which the AU is dependent on the UN for resources and support, while the UN needs the AU to maintain legitimacy for its works on the African continent.” (Tieku and Hakak 2014: 150).

Nevertheless, this case of the hybrid mission clearly highlights the increasing formal synergies being developed between the UN and the AU in the domain of peacekeeping.

Conclusion

Regional arrangements in Africa whether at a sub-regional level like ECOWAS and SADC or at the continent level in the form of AU, have come to play an increasing role in managing conflicts in Africa that have spurred especially in the post-cold war era. These regional arrangements have complemented the UN.

In none of the cases examined above, was there any trace of conflict found between the ROs and the UN. It is true that the requirements of the UN Charter were not strictly followed and ROs didn’t always act in accordance with Article 53 of the UNSC charter, taking peace enforcement actions without authorisation from UNSC. But still the relationship between the UN and ROs wasn’t uneasy. UNSC in fact recognised the efforts of ECOWAS in peacekeeping in the case of Liberia. In the case of SADC Operations, UNSC didn’t authorise the actions of the two major players Zimbabwe and South Africa, but it neither condemned it. Similarly, AMIB launched by the AU in Burundi never received any authorisation by the UNSC but was taken over by a UN mission smoothly. This shows complementarities between the AU and the UN. And finally, there has been an increase in the level of formal relationship between the UN and AU evident from the case of hybrid mission in Sudan.

This paper has also highlighted that in any organisation whether the UN or the ROs in Africa, states do play an important role. The case studies showed how South Africa, in the case of Burundi and Nigeria, in the case of Liberia tend to take on key roles by contributing the largest number of troops and spearhead not just the regional missions but also when these are transformed into UN missions. In addition to this, though AU has tried to institutionalise the norm of an African R2P, the RO still hasn't been able to a supranational authority over the states. The sovereignty and the consent of the host state for any peacekeeping to take place remains vital as was seen in the case of Darfur. Finally, though there has been a trend of regionalisation of peace operations and complementarity exists between ROs and the UN, the fact cannot be ignored that, states remain key actors as peacekeeping providers in directing the initiation, composition, scope and direction of peace operations. In the end, peace operations are what states make of it.

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