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Refugees and Migrants in South Asia: Nature and implications*

Partha S. Ghosh**

I
Introduction

The Footloose Humans

The process of migration has been so widespread in man's historical experience that there is hardly anybody in the world who would know where his forefathers lived a thousand years ago. In 900 CE Berlin did not have a single German, Budapest a single Hungarian, Moscow a single Russian, Madrid a single Spanish and Ankara a single Turk. Istanbul's population consisted mostly of slaves and mercenaries with a sprinkling of Turks. There were several large-scale migratory processes. For example, following the rise of Islam the Arabs overran much of northern Africa, southern Europe and western Asia. By early 8th Century they had moved as far as the Indus valley in the east and southern France in the west, where the tide was turned in 732 by the victory of the Franks at Poitiers where is now located one of the biggest centres of migration studies in Europe called Migrinter. In the 13th Century the Mongol tribes of Chenghis Khan moved as far as Hungary and Bohemia. The massive slaughter accompanying these movements made Eastern Europe empty only to be filled by new migrants from the west later. The Russians were forced further north, from the region round Kiev to Muscovy, in the upper Volga basin, thereby displacing the Finns. In the 14th

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Century the Ottoman Turks began to drift from Asia Minor. In 1453 Constantinople fell to them. Their drive was stopped at the gates of Vienna in 1529. The Ottoman conquest lay across traditional trade routes from Europe to India. A westward passage to India was searched for and serendipitously America was discovered. This process also triggered the Renaissance as the Byzantine scholars moved westward.

> While religious devotion inspired trade, religion also emerged as a major obstruction to trade after the fall of Constantinople to Islam in 1453. The Ottoman Empire was a barrier, and the Atlantic Ocean was increasingly seen as a way to get around it. Merchants and financiers from Venice, Genoa, Florence, and Livorno were ready to back adventurers who would find another way to Asia for silk, spice and diamonds. The city-states would also provide funds to sea captains like Christopher Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, and John and Sebastian Cabot to apply the renewed interest in geography and search for new routes (Chanda 2007: 158-59).

Even before the British ruled India Indian sailors had travelled over the Indian Ocean in West, South and Southeast Asia. They journeyed from the coasts including Gujarat, Malabar, Coromandel, Orissa and Bengal. Because of these marine activities many Indian communities including the Gujaratis, Chulias, Maapilas, and Chettiyars made their presence felt in several parts of Asia. In the late 18th Century, with the entry of the British, the nature of these migrations changed. The commercial interests of the rulers started taking precedence.

In the post Second World War phase which triggered decolonization we come across another kind of migration—from the erstwhile colonies to their erstwhile colonial rulers' countries. Most of these movements were to the UK and France because they were the colonial giants. According to the 2001 UK Census, there were approximately 2,331,423 British Asians, constituting

4.0% of the population of the UK. Those from South Asia were 1,053,411 in number (1.8% of the population) almost equally divided between Hindus and Muslims. They included also expelled British nationals of Indian origin from some African countries like Ghana and Uganda.

Nayan Chanda in his book (2007) mentions about four agents that contributed to the process, namely, traders, preachers, adventurers and warriors. He has as well added to the list—scientific progress. Yet another agent is economic compulsion—of the 2,000,000 Europeans who entered the United States in just five years, between 1849 and 1854, about 80% were from Ireland and Germany. The potato famine in Ireland in 1846 precipitated this mass emigration. The emigrants to the United States who numbered 20,000 in 1843 were as many as 220,000 in 1851. The movement out of Germany was also due largely to the economic pressure in the countryside and not so much to the political turmoil of 1848. Thus a combination of economic hardships and technical progress (in the form of free trade, a transformation of agriculture and revolution in transport) led to the first great movement of population from Europe to the United States. In the 1880s more than 1,250,000 from Germany and 500,000 from Scandinavia crossed the Atlantic Ocean. It was in that decade that the agrarian economy of Europe felt the shattering boomerang effect of technical progress in US agriculture and the revolution in ocean and rail transport. As a result, in 1887, for example, on the wheat farms of the north-western United States with the wages of permanent employees at $25 per month and board the production cost of wheat was 40 cents per bushel while in Rhenish Prussia the cost of production was 80 cents per bushel though the wages to be paid there was just $6 per month (Wells 1889). To the various causes of migration one could as well add the natural phenomena. For example, the massive change in the course of the Ganga river between the 13th and 17th Centuries and the process of deforestation that accompanied it led to the peopling of East Bengal. Before that the region was a dense forest. Now East Bengal, that is Bangladesh, is one of the most densely populated countries in the world (Eaton 1994, Ghosh 2011).

II
South Asian Experience

Mandate and Non-Mandate Refugees

There are two kinds of refugees in South Asia, the Mandate Refugees and the Non-Mandate Refugees. Mandate Refugees are those who are looked after by the UNHCR while the Non-Mandate Refugees are looked after by the respective host governments. In India the Mandate Refugees are those who have arrived from Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and Myanmar. In 2010, there were 9,068 Afghan refugees registered with the UNHCR of which 2,134 had applied for asylum.The Afghan refugee flow, however, was massive to Pakistan, which has been discussed separately below. Refugees in India from Iran, Sudan, Somalia and Iraq all put together were 1,083 in 2010. Although Pakistan's Afghan refugees should fall in the category of Mandate refugees yet considering their massive influence on Pakistan's and regional politics and considering the fact that Afghanistan is a South Asian country we have discussed it in the context of Non-Mandate refugees.

Burmese Mandate Refugees in India: By the end of 1980s a democracy movement had been unleashed in Burma under the leadership of Aung Sang Suu Kyi, daughter of Burma's great independence hero Marshal Aung Sang. The state repression followed resulting either in the formation of rebel armies like the Karen National Union (KNU) or in escapes to India and Thailand which were considered safe places. Several thousands of democracy activists arrived in India where they were welcome. There were allegations from the Myanmar government that India was not only supporting Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) it was even funding the government-in-exile called the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). According to the Indian government and UNHCR reports, between 1988 and 2001, 6324 Burmese refugees had entered India of which 1,245 were granted UNHCR refugee status. India's pro-democracy policy, however, had started

changing towards the end of 1990s because of two reasons, one, China's close proximity to the Burmese military rulers, and two, Burma's providing shelters to several insurgent groups operating in India's north-east (Bhaumik 2003: 196-204). As of 2010 there were 8541 Burmese political refugees of which 4,484 had sought asylum (Zutshi *et al* 2011: 55-58).

Migrants and Refugees after Decolonization

South Asia as a region that constitutes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka has witnessed massive inter-state migrations and refugee movements as no other region of the world has. In the last six decades about 50 million people have been involved in the process. It is not easy to put them into categories. From a strict methodological standpoint, based on theories of nation building, all human traffic in South Asia may be put in two or three categories. For example, the Hindu/Sikh-Muslim migrations after the Partition of India, the Bengali refugee influx into India in the wake of the Bangladesh liberation war, or the Sri Lanka Tamil refugee arrivals in India in the 1980s onwards can all be considered in terms of the failure of nation building. However, it could be argued that the role of the imperial British masters was central to the causality of Hindu/Sikh-Muslim migrations which was not the case in respect of either Bangladeshi or Sri Lanka Tamil refugees. Moreover, while in the post-Partition years the Hindu refugees from Pakistan indirectly became the vehicles through which the Hindu-chauvinistic politics of India was played, in the case of Bangladeshi refugees both Hindu nationalists and their enemies in India had closed ranks. The fact that the majority of the refugees were Muslim mattered little for either group.

To resolve such complexities we have chosen to divide these population movements into seven categories keeping in view their causes and also their consequences on domestic politics and national security. The categories are not exclusive and overlapping has been allowed. These categories are as follows:

- Partition related displacements,
- Failure in nation-building,
- Inter-ethnic conflict,
- Open or virtually open borders,
- War related migrations,
- Developmental and environmental refugees,
- Extra-regional military interventions.

Partition Related Displacements

The Pre-Partition Riots: The Partition of India brought in its train untold misery to both India and Pakistan from which they are yet to recover even though they have fought three and a half wars and lost thousands of lives. In the Partition related riots about two million people perished, tens of thousands of women raped and ravaged, and about 15 million displaced. Although India had witnessed many communal riots in the past but the catalyst in this context was Muslim League's 16 August Direct Action Day resulting in The Great Calcutta Killings of 16-19 August 1946, which was just a year ahead of the Partition. S.P.G. Taylor, the Inspector General of Police of Bengal had the following to report:

> The situation was seriously aggravated by the action of the Chief Minister of the Provincial Government [Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy], who personally organized and addressed a mass meeting of his Muslim followers, several thousands in number in Calcutta. In a highly inflammatory speech he impressed upon his audience that they must oppose to the utmost limit any plan to allow the Hindu community to assume control.... [His] attitude to rioting was reprehensible to a degree. At the height of the disturbances he drove round Calcutta with the local army commander to assess the situation. The commander said: 'This is all extraordinary; in the Army Hindus and Mohammedans live and work very happily together.' Then the Chief Minister replied: 'We shall soon put an end to all that' (Taylor 2003: 247-48).

Another English official maintained that the 1946 Calcutta riot was a 'new order in communal rioting', describing it as a 'cross between the worst of London air raids and the Great Plague' (Talbot and Singh 2009: 69). The exact number of casualty is not known. Depending upon one's political persuasion, that is, between the Congress and the Muslim League, it ranged from 5,000 to 50,000, respectively. Viceroy Lord Wavell's guess was that it was between 5,000 and 10,000 (Papiya Ghosh 2007: 2-3). According to a Bangladeshi scholar about 5,000 Muslims and Hindus lost their lives in the riots and about 25,000 were injured. Among the dead majority belonged to the Muslim community and most of them were the labourers working in the Khidhirpur Dock area. Most of these labourers belonged to Noakhali and Tripura (Anisuzzaman 2011: 43-44). The massacre of Noakhali Muslims in Khidirpur was avenged in October 1946 when anti-Hindu riots broke out in the districts of Noakhali and Tippera in East Bengal in which the Hindu minority in 350 villages had to suffer massive violence. The cycle of riots did not halt there. Noakhali was soon avenged in Bihar. In many districts, from Saran to Patna, and in Gaya and Munger 10 to 20 thousand people lost their lives. Ever since the British had arrived in India these riots were the worst. The Bihar riots were soon followed by those in Garhmukteshwar in the Meerut district of western UP engineered by well organized Hindu militants. That riots serve significant political purpose was amply clear from the way Muslim League and the local Congress organizations responded to the situation. While visiting the Muslim refugee camps in Bihar Jinnah greeted the inmates for their sacrifice which he declared had 'certainly brought the goal of Pakistan nearer and shown our readiness to make any sacrifice for its attainment'. In similar vein the then Congress government of Bihar and its landed aristocracy took advantage of the Noakhali riots to fan the violence. On the one hand the Bihar government called a Noakhali Protest day to 'remember' the Hindu victims while on the other the local zamindars encouraged its impoverished ryots to loot Muslim properties so as to divert their wrath aimed at them. In the case of Garhmukteshwar the former Indian National Army (INA)'s Major General Shah Nawaz Khan said: 'Had the police acted more vigorously and promptly, much

of the destruction of life and property could have been prevented (Talbot and Singh 2009: 70-74).

All these riots resulted in displacement and migrations. Around 50,000 Hindu victims of the Noakhali riots were temporarily sheltered in relief camps before they were transferred to Guwahati in Assam. Similarly, many Muslim victims seeing the general atmosphere decided to escape to Muslim majority future provinces of Pakistan. By March 1947 there were 1,000 Bihari refugees in the Sind province and by April 1947 some 60,000 similar kind of refugees in West Bengal camps left for East Bengal. Many of the latter went to West Pakistan after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. In September 1947 the Sind government allocated 10,000 acres of land to set up a Bihari colony in Golimar, Karachi (Talbot and Singh 2009: 70-73). But compared to the Punjab violence and the resultant displacements all these pre-independence riots pale to insignificance. To understand the magnitude of the problem it is important to refer to the demarcation of the borders between India and Pakistan that the Radcliffe Award sanctified.

The Radcliffe Award: On 22 March 1947 Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived in India to become the British government's last Viceroy to India. It was soon clear to him that Partition was the only option as all his efforts to resurrect the Cabinet Mission proposal failed. The Partition idea indeed was not imposed by him on 'unsuspecting Indian leaders' nor was it 'a "parting gift" of the outgoing imperial masters: it was self-consciously willed by the All-India Congress and Muslim League leaders and, above all, reflected their fears and mistrusts, as well as hopes, that a "right-sized" state would deliver to them the power to construct a new political, economic and social order in a free subcontinent'(Talbot and Singh 2009: 41). Even M.K. Gandhi seemed to have been overtaken by events. The overall inter-communal distrust had reached such nadir that even for him the situation was irretrievable making him take no steps such as fasting or making efforts to convince the Congress to rescind the decision (Mahajan 2012: 243-55). From mid-April 1947 the

partition plan was underway and on 3 June it was announced in a series of radio broadcasts though Jinnah was not very happy as it involved the partition of Punjab and Bengal; he wanted both of them in full. Later the Indian Independence Bill was drafted for the transfer of power on 14/15 August 1947. Interestingly the date chosen was not 26 January 1948, which the Congress-minded Indians had celebrated every year since 1930 as Independence Day. What was so special about 15 August 1947 that Mountbatten could not wait for another five months to have the independence on 26 January 1948? The date, 15 August was the second anniversary of the Japanese surrender to the Allied Forces in the Second Wold War. According to Ramchandra Guha, 'so freedom finally came on a day that resonated with imperial pride rather than nationalist sentiment' (Guha 2007: 4-5).

The task of partitioning Punjab and Bengal was entrusted to a British lawyer named Sir Cyril Radcliffe who arrived in India on 8 July 1947. His name was suggested by Jinnah. He had no prior knowledge of India nor had any experience of border making. This was considered to be an advantage by all parties concerned for it would make him impartial. Radcliffe had barely five weeks to accomplish his job of drawing the lines in both east and west with the help of some outdated maps and undependable demographic data. He was instructed to demarcate the international boundaries on the basis of 'contiguous majority areas' and also by taking into account 'other factors'. But neither these factors, nor the unit of the area to be divided was clarified: whether it was the district, or smaller sub-units like the *tehsil*, *zail* or village, where the populations of Hindus and Muslims were to be taken into account (Khilnani 2004: 200-201). No wonder that the intelligent man that he was he realized the mess his Award would result in. A day before India became independent he wrote to his stepson:

> I thought you would like to get a letter from India with a crown on the envelope. After tomorrow evening nobody will ever again be allowed to use such stationery and after 150 years British rule will be over

> in India – Down comes the Union Jack on Friday morning and up goes – for the moment I rather forget what, but it has a spinning wheel or a spider's web in the middle. I am going to see Mountbatten sworn as the first Governor-General of the Indian Union at the Viceroy's House in the morning and then I station myself firmly on the Delhi airport until an aeroplane from England comes along. Nobody in India will love me for the award about the Punjab and Bengal and there will be roughly 80 million people with a grievance who will begin looking for me. I do not want them to find me. I have worked and travelled and sweated – oh I have sweated the whole time (quoted by Khilnani 2004: 201).

Radcliffe, however, cannot be entirely faulted for his deed for he was ignorant of the Indian realities and that is the reason that he was chosen for the job. But how could such tall leaders like Nehru, Jinnah or Mountbatten be so myopic and not anticipate that the Partition would result in the massacre and displacement of millions of people who would become refugees if they survived? So much so that neither Nehru nor Jinnah had even insisted upon seeing the report of the Radcliffe Boundary Commission before the day of independence.

But whether or not Radcliffe was responsible, or why was he chosen, may be matters of academic interest; for those who really suffered, particularly in eastern India, because of the impossibility of demarcating the undemarcatable, were not so charitable to him. If popular jokes say a ton about an existing reality here is one prevalent on the India-Bangladesh border. Urvasi Butalia narrates it from her experiences there:

> In Berubari village in India, Jagadish babu, walk me through the BSF checkpost to one edge of the village. 'Look there,' he says, pointing to one side, 'that is Bangladesh, and where we are, that's India.' We move a little further and stand by a tree at one edge of a small,

winding road. 'This tree is in India,' says Jadadish babu, 'and the one across the road, the banana tree, is in Bangladesh.' We get into a car and drive down the small road. Some distance away, a thin cycle path cuts across the road—you can barely see it in the dust. 'That,' says Jagadish babu, 'is the boundary that demarcates Bangladesh and India.' He laughs and tells me a tale that the villagers of Berubari enjoy telling. 'You see how this border curls and winds,' he says? 'Which person in his sane mind would draw a boundary like that? You know that Radcliffe? What did he know about anything? He was so confused by what he had to do that he decided, forget it. I'll just get drunk! The bastard drank all night, and then in the morning he woke up and picked up is pen, and naturally he couldn't draw a straight line! So he went this way and that—and botched the whole thing up. An of course we have to live with the consequences!' (Butalia 2003: 117-18).

The Punjab Riots: From the beginning of 1947 the communal situation in Punjab was getting violent because of the murky political developments there. Ishtiaq Ahmed's detailed district-wise description of the events in the state during 1947 in his book (2011) tells the story of how communal temper was getting built up which was inevitably preparing the ground for the communal carnage that would soon be witnessed during and after the Partition. There was a near total genocide of Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab and that of the Muslims in East Punjab. They resulted in millions belonging to these communities to cross over to the newly created countries where their co-religionists were in majority. The communal riots and exodus of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims was so massive that the newly formed state machineries were overwhelmed. In any case, as noted above, their leaders had hardly anticipated the magnitude of this chaotic situation. However, to stem the anticipated tide, on 17 July 1947 the Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) was formed which became operational on 1 August. But it was soon realised that this 15,000 strong unit was hardly adequate to meet the challenge it had to face. Initially,

the districts that were considered disturbed were Sialkot, Gujranwalla, Shiekhpura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and Ferozepur to which other districts were to be added later. There were allegations against its cadres of being communally minded. Moreover, the PBF had no jurisdiction over the Sikh princely states of East Punjab where Muslims were being massacred. After independence the Punjab Boundary Force was disbanded. The newly created Indian and Pakistani governments decided to manage the riots and the resultant refugee problem through the coordinated efforts of their respective armies, which too, in the given circumstances were hardly of any efficacy (Ahmed 2011: 320-22, 398).

The unprecedented communal riots in Punjab and the massive migrations of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs resulted in the total breakdown of societal harmony though there were stray Good Samaritan experiences across the communities. For the Sikhs it was their second migration. Earlier, taking advantage of the canal land rehabilitation schemes in West Punjab scores of Sikhs had migrated from East Punjab to West Punjab. Following the Partition the Sikh refugees were mostly resettled in Delhi and Kurukshetra (now in Haryana, then in Punjab). The Hindu refugees in general were mostly resettled in Delhi and its vicinities while the Hindu Sindhis in Mumbai. So far as the Punjabi Muslim refugees were concerned they were mostly resettled in Punjab while those from north India in general, in Sind, particularly in Karachi. It is estimated that about thirteen million people were involved in this two-way traffic during the first few months before and after the Partition. During the fifties, another four million each of Hindus/Sikhs and Muslims migrated to their forced destinations. Though an exact estimate of the refugee inflow during these years is difficult to draw, the above figures should be more or less accurate (Spate 1957: 119, Davis 1949: 254-64, Prasad 2009: 559).

The Bengal Scene: Between India and East Pakistan the volume of human flow was not as massive if compared to the

western part of India and it was, unlike the latter, not concentrated within the span of a few months. Moreover, unlike Punjab, Bengal had a tradition of Hindu-Muslim riots in the twentieth century (Das 1990, Batabyal 2005). Indeed the communal temper deteriorated systematically in the wake of Partition which the riots of Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar and Garhmukteshwar in UP, as we have noted above, aggravated beyond redemption. The continued communal tensions routinely led to cross-border refugee movements for years to come. So far as the migration of Hindu refugees from East Bengal to India was concerned the three Indian states that mattered most were West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. By the end of May 1948 more than one million Hindus had left East Bengal for India of which about 35 per cent were from urban areas and the remaining from the villages. During the police action in Hyderabad in September 1948 (discussed below) communal tensions once again flared up in East Bengal leading to another spate of Hindu refugee movements. As the communal situation continued to deteriorate in East Bengal even poor farmers, otherwise reluctant to leave their homesteads, felt the heat and, by early 1950, massively migrated to West Bengal.

Tripura's case was most interesting because the migrations changed the democratic balance of the state totally in favour of the Bengali settlers at the cost of the trbials. At the end of the nineteenth century the tribals constituted 64 per cent of the population. But from the beginning of the twentieth century Bengali migrations of both Muslims and Hindus started tilting the balance in favour of the Bengalis who by 1940s accounted for almost 40 per cent of the population. The post-Partition migrations led to more Hindu arrivals and simultaneous departures of Muslims in droves. Within a few decades the tribal population was reduced to 31.5 per cent and the Muslim population to a mere 5 per (Sen 2003: 123-25).

The flow of East Bengali Hindus to India continued well into the sixties, which was particularly triggered by the 1964 anti-Hindu riots in East Pakistan. According to the Indian Commission of Jurists' report of 1965, an estimated 5.5 million refugees had

moved into India by then (309-12, also Bhattacharya 1978: 19-20). A micro study done by an American sociologist of a Hindu-Muslim riot in an East Pakistani village in the fifties has shown that even after riots subsided and normalcy returned, there was a tendency amongst the minorities (meaning Hindus) to feel insecure and look for a safer abode which was India (Roy 1996: 112-16, see also Chakrabarty 1996: 2143-52). Altogether about 18 million people migrated from or to India and Pakistan during the first two decades of independence.

It may be noted that one significant pattern of this refugee movement was that though originally a large number came to settle in Calcutta and the adjacent town of Howrah, gradually they moved away to peripheral small towns and villages as was revealed in the censuses of 1951 and 1961. The 1951 census counted 686,000 and 94,000 East Pakistani refugees in Calcutta and Howrah respectively. In 1961 the numbers had declined to 528,000 and 80,000 respectively, while the adjoining districts of 24 Parganas and Hoogly registered a significant increase in the refugee population. In the urban 24 Parganas there were 366,000 refugees in 1951 which became 490,000 in 1961. In the rural areas, the number increased from 225,000 to 297,000 during the corresponding decade. Hoogly showed an increase from 72,000 in 1951 to 131,000 in 1961. This pattern could be attributed to the desire of the refugees to preserve a semblance of their former life style. The rural base of the political Left of West Bengal was partly on account of this process of migration (Asok Mitra 1975).

This trickle process of migrations in the east, unlike the one in the west, made things more difficult for the Bengali refugees compared to their Punjabi counterparts. Neither could there be an exchange of populations and properties, nor could the state response be more effective. Syama Prasad Mookerjee and K.C. Niyogee, ministers from West Bengal in the Union Cabinet, were of the view that had the central government not intervened through the expedience of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of April 1950 both the exchanges of populations and properties would have taken place automatically. Already, the statement of the Union

Minister for Refugees Rehabilitation, Mohan Lal Saxena, on 2 March 1950, in a meeting at the Writers' Building (the seat of West Bengal government) had irked many West Bengal politicians. Saxena's proposal was to distinguish between the pre- and post-1950 refugees. The pre-1950 refugees were entitled both to relief and rehabilitation, post-1950 refugees to relief only, not rehabilitation. Saxena's argument was that once the communal hostilities would subside the refugees would return to their places of origin. The ground realities were so different that such hopes were not entertained by any in West Bengal. Against this background the pious commitments contained in the Nehru-Liaquat pact of safeguarding the lives and properties of the respective minorities in India and Pakistan looked hollow. While the Bengali Muslim evacuees from West Bengal returned to their native places, there was hardly any reverse migration of Hindus from West Bengal to East Bengal (Basu Ray Chaudhury and Dey 2009: 9). Moreover, the Muslims in India could bank upon the provisions of the Indian Constitution promulgated on 26 January 1950 but there were no corresponding guarantees in the Pakistan's Objectives Resolution. The relevant provisions in the latter were at best vague and contradictory. Syama Prasad Mookerjee unequivocally opposed the pact on the floor of the parliament on 19 April 1950 in the following words (quoted from the *Parliament Debates* by Mandal 2011: 164):

> First, we had two such agreements since Partition for solving the Bengal problem and they were violated by Pakistan without any remedy open to us. Any agreement which has no sanction will not offer any solution. Second, the crux of the problem is Pakistan's concept of an Islamic State and the ultra-communal administration based on it. The agreement sidetracks this cardinal issue and we are today exactly where we were previous to the agreement. Third, India and Pakistan are made to appear equally guilty, while Pakistan was clearly the aggressor. The agreement provides that no propaganda will be permitted against the territorial integrity of the two countries and there

> will be no incitement to war between them. This almost sounds farcical so long as Pakistan troops occupy a portion of our territory of Kashmir and warlike preparations on its part are in active operation. Fourth, events have proved that Hindus cannot live in East Bengal on the assurances of security given by Pakistan. We should accept this as a basic proposition. The present agreement on the other hand calls upon minorities to look upon the Pakistan government for their safety and honour which is adding insult to injury and is contrary to assurances given by us previously. Fifth, there is neither [a] proposal to compensate those who have suffered nor will the guilty be ever punished, because no one will dare given evidence before a Pakistan Court. This is in accordance with bitter experience in the past. Sixth, Hindus will continue to come away in large numbers and those who have come will not be prepared to go back. On the other hand Muslims who had gone away will now return and in our determination to implement the agreement Muslims will not leave India. Our economy will thus be shattered and possible conflict within our country will be greater.

It was one of the constant refrains of West Bengal that in dealing with the refugee issue the central government was behaving like a step mother compared to what it did in Delhi and Punjab. Many of these criticisms were not unfounded but cannot be elaborated here because of paucity of space. It needs detailed treatment and should wait for another occasion.

The Mohajirin of Pakistan: Large number of Muslims from East Punjab, UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and other parts of India migrated to West Pakistan in the wake of Partition. Barring the east Punjabi Muslims the remaining who went to Pakistan came to be collectively called as Mohajirin though the inclusion of Bihari Muslims amongst them caused some consternation among the dominant UP-origin Muslims at some later stage. The East Punjabi Muslims were all settled in Punjab and the latter

saw to it that other Muslims did not generally resettle there (Bose 2004: 144). Of the total number of refugees in West Punjab 97.5 per cent (71.2 per cent of the total number of refugees in Pakistan) came from East Punjab, including some from Rajasthan states and Jammu and Kashmir. Only 2 per cent came from UP (Waseem 1994: 103-6). Until 1950, on an average 4,000 UP Muslims left for Pakistan everyday to settle mostly in Sind. The latter had prepared the ground for their reception. Karachi became their coveted destination which at that time was sparsely populated. By the end of 1951, roughly 6,597,000 Indian Muslim refugees had moved to West Pakistan, and 794,127 to East Pakistan. Of the 464,000 strong UP Muslim migrants, 60 per cent went to Sind (Papiya Ghosh 2007: 11-12). Compared to UP the number of refugees from central and eastern regions of India was less though proportionately more professionals were in that lot. Indeed the government servants from Delhi, UP and Bihar formed the core. Delhi police suffered from a severe personnel shortage because of 'mass desertion' (Hasan 1997b: 50). In the next section we will discuss the impact of these different patterns of migrations on the politics of Punjab and Sind, the two important provinces of West Pakistan.

Partition and the Bihari Muslims: During 1947-48 about 96 per cent of Muslim migrants from Assam, Bihar, and West Bengal, collectively known as Bihari Muslims in Pakistan/Bangladesh politics, had gone to East Bengal; only about 3 per cent went to Karachi. According to the 1951 census of Pakistan, 66.69 per cent of the refugees in East Pakistan belonged to West Bengal, 14.50 per cent to Bihar, 11.84 per cent to Assam and 6.79 per cent to other parts of India. In the pre-Partition communal riots in Calcutta and Bihar Muslims were largely on the receiving end. A large number of refugee camps were set up for the riot victims in Bihar and West Bengal. Against the general atmosphere of fear several factors contributed to the flight of Bihari Muslims to East Pakistan, one being its proximity. The other factors were: frequent searches of Muslim homes by the police, acute food shortage in the state, and the Muslim bureaucratic elite's lack of trust in the system. Reportedly, by July 1947, 90 per cent of the Muslim

employees in central government departments in Bihar had expressed their desire to leave for Pakistan. This included all the Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers serving in Bihar, almost all postal and military accounts functionaries, about 2,000 telegraphists and ticket collectors in the East Indian Railway in the Danapur division, as well as majority of drivers and fitters (Papiya Ghosh 2007: 12-13, see also Jha and Jha 2012: 124-5).

The Indian Muslim refugees, however, soon realised that in the Indian subcontinent provincial identities had a much greater appeal than the supra religious identity of Islam. Both in East Bengal and Sind they had to face the ire of the locals in some form or the other. Jinnah considered it a 'curse' that Indian Muslims thought of being Sindhi, Punjabi, Pathan and Delhi Muslims. In a speech in Dhaka in March 1948 he ranted against the 'poison of provincialism' and reminded his audience that 1,300 years ago they had been taught that all Muslims were one (Papiya Ghosh 2007: 20). The fact was that many Muslims who decided to move to Pakistan had no real idea what it meant for them. According to Mushirul Hasan 'the fact is that millions were unwittingly caught up in the cross-fire of religious hatred and were indeed hapless victims of a triangular gameplan worked out by the British, the Congress and the League. They were indifferent to the colonial as well as the League's definition of a "community" or a "nation"... They had no sense of the newly demarcated frontiers, little knowledge of how Mountbatten's Plan or the Radcliffe Award would change their destinies and tear them apart from their families, friends and neighbours' (*Sunday Times of India*, 13 August 1995).

Migrations from Hyderabad: From South India also a good number of Muslims from the erstwhile princely state of Hyderabad migrated to Pakistan. From the day of India's independence on 15 August 1947 till 13 September 1948, the day when the armed forces of India moved into the state 'in response to the call of the people', large number of Muslims from both urban and rural areas of India had migrated to Hyderabad. India's armed intervention to integrate the state into the Dominion of

India against the wishes of its Nizam, Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, who wanted to remain independent, deteriorated the communal situation in the state very rapidly. Fearing that India might force the state to accede to the Dominion of India a private militia called Razakars was organized by Qasim Rizvi who wanted the Nizam first to resist the Indian prodding and then to join the Dominion of Pakistan. Razakars unleashed a reign of terror against the Hindus, particularly in the Telengana region which had been experiencing a Leftist movement. The Indian state had a dual challenge, one, the spectre of Hyderabad joining Pakistan, and two, the rise of a Leftist insurgency. The result was the 'Police Action' codenamed 'Operation Polo', which was actually an army intervention. What followed was large scale killing of Muslims and the loot of their properties in which along with some rightist Hindu groups even many army personnel participated as was revealed by the Sundarlal Report.[1]

These anti-Muslim riots made many Muslims from Hyderabad leave for Pakistan. Ever since the revolt of 1857 there was a constant flow of Muslims from other parts of India to Nizam's Hyderabad. After 1947 the phenomenon had picked up momentum as the new migrants considered Hyderabad as yet another choice besides Pakistan. It is difficult to exactly figure out how many such Muslims of Hyderabad left for Pakistan as many went back to their original homes in other parts of India. According to historian Mushirul Hasan:

> In Hyderabad, Muslims constituted 10 per cent of the population before 1947-48. Muslim government servants held, as in UP, a much higher percentage of posts. But their fortunes dwindled following Hyderabad's merger with the Indian Union. Urdu ceased to be the official language. The abolition of

[1] Sundaral Report has not been released yet for which there is a demand. See Swaminathan A. Aiyar, 'Declassify Report on the 1948 Hyderabad Massacre,' *Sunday Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 November 2012. Some excerpts from the report are available in *Frontline* (Chennai), 18(5), 3-16 March 2001.

jagirdari affected over 11 per cent of the Muslim population, three-quarters of whom inhabited about a dozen of urban centres. Smaller *jagirdars*, in particular, faced a bleak future due to retrenchment in government departments, recession in industry after 1951, and a sharp fall in agricultural prices. The old nobles and the absentee landowners started selling their remaining lands and spacious houses to make ends meet. The dissolution of Princely States impoverished a large percentage, if not the majority, of the upper classes and the bourgeoisie as well as a large number of peasants, artisans and retainers who lost the patronage networks. Nearly half the population of Hyderabad depended on the Nizam for their livelihood, and thus with sources of patronage rapidly drying up this section was worse off (Hasan 1997b: 51-52).

Failure in Nation-Building

Unlike the European experience state formation has preceded nation formation in the decolonised developing world. This has resulted in all sorts of inter-communal and inter-ethnic tensions of which South Asia has a good share. These tensions have often led to violent conflicts resulting in state repression or the vice versa, which then have resulted in movements of people across the borders into the neighbouring states. In this section we will discuss six such cases, namely, the East Pakistan refugees in India following the failure of Pakistan to contain political disaffection in its eastern wing, the Lhotsampa refugees (Nepali origin people of south Bhutan) in Nepal, the disgruntled Bhutan political refugees in Nepal, the Indian repatriates from Myanmar, the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh and the Chin Burmese refugees in Mizoram in India.

East Pakistani/Bangladeshi Refugees: The exodus of millions of East Pakistani Bengali refugees to India during the Bangladesh crisis of 1970-71 falls into this category. The creation of Pakistan in 1947 on religious lines could not address the

problem of nation-building beyond the Islamic labeling. The denial of democratic rights to the East Pakistan-based Awami League to form the government following the general election of 1970 in which the party got a clear majority sharpened the already existing political divide between the East and West wings of Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan claiming a distinctive linguistic-cultural identity of their own around which developed the phenomenon of Bengali nationalism, came into conflict with West Pakistan, or more precisely, with the Punjabis, politically the most dominant community. The Bangladesh liberation movement invited an unprecedented repression from the Pakistani military junta led by General Yahya Khan causing a massive exodus of East Pakistanis to India. About 10,000,000 refugees arrived in India.

The creation of Bangladesh, however, did not solve the problem of outmigration. In the beginning it was felt that the thrust of the strategy would be progressive enough to accommodate the interests of average Bangladeshis including those belonging to the minority ethnic and religious groups. But it did not happen that way. Neither the Bihari Muslims, nor the Chakmas, nor the Hindus could completely identify themselves with the new ruling ethos. The 1972 constitution had made democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism the four pillars to build the Bangladeshi nationalism upon, which had instilled confidence amongst all the minority sections of the country. But even before the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in August 1975 it became clear that communal politics had not outlived its utility. The Vested Property Act of early years of Pakistan, which was reinforced in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan war of 1965 through the promulgation of Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order of 1965, was not only not withdrawn after the creation of Bangladesh, it was given a new lease of life through the passage of Bangladesh Vesting of Property and Assets Order, 1972 (Order 29 of 1972). The provisions of the order and their prejudiced implementation seriously disadvantaged the minority communities, particularly Hindus, but also Christians. They increasingly found themselves

in an insecure situation. This resulted in their constant but clandestine migration to India. During the period 1974-81 the extent of missing Hindu population was estimated around 1,220,000 and about 1,730,000 during the inter-census period of 1981-91. On the basis of this it was calculated that about 475 Hindus disappeared every day from the soil of Bangladesh between 1974 and 1996 (Mukherji 1996). The same happened to the Christians as well although they were very small in number, not even one per cent of the country's population. Constituting a better-educated lot, they mostly migrated to Kolkata (Timm 2002: 53-69).

Lhotsampas of Southern Bhutan: Bhutan has two major ethnic groups—Drukpas and Lhotshampas. Drukpas are further subdivided into Ngalongs and Sarchops. Drukpas are ethnic Bhutanese occupying northern and central regions, Ngalongs in the northern districts and Sarchops in the central districts. Political power is historically in the hands of the Ngalongs. The Lhotshampas who are of Nepali ethnic origin live mostly in the southern districts. In early 1980s, Bhutan followed a policy of inter-ethnic assimilation. The National Council for Social and Cultural Promotion which was established in 1980 tried to ensure that Drukpa and Lhotshampa children studied together in schools and there were inter-ethnic marriages for which even cash incentives were provided. But these policies were soon supplanted by a majoritarian approach when in 1985 or 1986 the National Council for Social and Cultural Promotion was replaced by the Special Commission for Cultural Affairs. It not only made the citizenship laws stricter but it also tried to streamline the Bhutanese people on the lines of Drupka cultural norms. Bhutan's new cultural policy that was enshrined in Driglam Namzha lay at the heart of the country's distinctive national identity. All Lhotshampas were made to wear the traditional Bhutanese dress, Gho and Kira, in all public places and Dzongkha language was made compulsory for all. In 1999 a 260-page bilingual (Dzongkha/English) manual of Driglam Namzha enumerated in detail the prescribed cultural norms (Hutt 2003: 145-67).

The deterioration of Drukpa-Lhotshampa relations had been on the cards from the early 1980s. There were complex reasons for this which I have discussed elsewhere (Ghosh 1998: 213-25, also Hutt 2003: 160-230). As a result of this discord Nepalis were forced by circumstances to leave Bhutan and take shelter in Nepal. The first group of Nepali refugees to arrive in Nepal was towards the end of 1990 and during the next few years there was a constant flow. Soon the UNHCR was involved in the refugee care. By 1995, according to the UNHCR and the Government of Nepal, there were about 90,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, particularly in Jhapa and Morang districts, besides there were about 15,000 who did not stay in the camps. In India they were about 20,000, scattered in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim and West Bengal. Of this number, 7,000 in the Bomdila region of Arunachal Pradesh were at one point of time under threat of deportation because of the anti-foreigner campaign launched by the All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (*Times of India,* 12 February 1996). According to the Brussels based *Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT)* of 7 March 2008, in June 2007 there were 106,690 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal sheltered in seven camps.

Bhutanese Political Refugees: The absence of democracy in Bhutan till recently had made many Bhutanese belonging to the Drukpa community leave the country and seek refuge in Nepal and India. These exiles mostly belonged to the disadvantaged Sarchops. My conversations in Kathmandu in late November 1996 with an active member of the Druk National Congress, and the editor of the Kathmandu-based Dzongkha publication called *Lhoyikhuju*, had revealed that the party operated from Kathmandu and fought for the democratic rights of the Bhutanese people. The organisation claimed to have 32 active workers in Nepal besides 977 'registered' members in Bhutan. Incidentally the activist also revealed that his publication *Lhoyikhuju* was printed by the Indian embassy in Kathmandu, a fact which could not be authenticated.

Indian Repatriates from Myanmar: In Myanmar, the strategy of nation-building through ethno-centric drive aimed at indegenising the society caused exodus of large number of ethnic

Indians to India in the forties through sixties. Before 1937 when Myanmar was part of the British Indian Empire, there were about 900,000 Indians in the country holding important commercial and professional positions. After Myanmar's independence in January 1948, the new government made the Burmese language the official language making many Indians return to India. The citizenship rules were made stricter and of the 150,000 applications for citizenship only 28,683 were granted between 1949 and 1961. In 1949-50 the number of returnees to India was 21,198. In 1962 when the military government of General Ne Win nationalised trade, industry, banking and commerce the Indian community was badly affected as majority of them were gainfully employed in these sectors. The result was that during the sixties there was an exodus of Indians. By 1966, 154,000 Indians returned to India. The process continued and by the 1980s about 250,000 Indians left Burma. Since about 90 per cent of the Indian returnees consisted of Tamil Chettiyars they either continued their business and trading interests from Moreh, the border town of Manipur that touched Burma, or got rehabilitation in Tamil Nadu. The latter rehabilitated 144,445 refugees from Burma till March 2001 (Bhaumik 2003: 189-92, Weiner 1993: 1738).

Rohingya Refugees: In the seventies, vestiges of the same parochial strategy followed by Myanmar led to the flight of Arakanese (mostly Muslims) to Bangladesh. The 1963-64 Census had revealed that the Arakanese (Arakan is now called Rakhine) Muslims had spread to the Yangon (Rangoon) and Delta areas. This alarmed the Bhama Buddhist authorities. To arrest the trend the Ne Win government prohibited the movement of Muslims beyond the Akyab district towards the east. The policy, however, failed. It not only impoverished the region badly, giving rise to youth unrest and insurgencies, it could not prevent the Muslims from settling in the area. The 1974 census revealed the hard reality of Muslims having spread to the eastern border and commercially important areas such as Mandalay, Pegu, Prome, Moulmein and Bassein (Maung 1989: 61-62). The military rulers of Myanmar took away the citizenship rights of the Rohingyas on the ground that they were economic refugees who had migrated to their

country during the British rule. A policy of state repression followed. Still, they did not lead to large-scale migrations as it happened later. From 1977 the process started and about 2,60,000 such refugees arrived in Bangladesh culminating in 1984 when the exodus became massive. However, by the expedience of a tripartite arrangement between Bangladesh, Myanmar and the UNHCR many of them were repatriated to Myanmar. But the situation once again worsened in 1992 leading to another exodus of about 250,000 refugees though by June 1996, 200,000 of them were repatriated. The refugee movement, however, continued with varying degree of intensity (Bhattacharya 1995: 69, Murshid 2012: 106).

Chin-Burmese Refugees: Besides political refugees there has been a flow of refugees from among the Chin tribesmen of Myanmar who number between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000. Partly on account of the repressive policies followed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and partly for economic reasons many such tribesmen have left Myanmar and settled in Mizoram. Among these refugees there are also some Nagas who have taken shelter in Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland. Ever since the tri-junction of India-Myanmar-Bangladesh became an integrated economic corridor, the migration and settlement of the Chin-Burmese people in India has been a continuous phenomenon. By 1996 there were 40,000 Chin-Burmese in India. In the beginning the Chins were welcome in Mizoram as the Mizos considered the Chins as their ethnic cousins and who also provided cheap labour to them. But the situation started changing and Mizo political and student groups unleashed 'Quit Mizoram' campaign against the Chins. Also, since the Chins got entangled in the insurgency situation in the region they often found themselves sandwiched between the Indian and Myanmarese security forces (Manchanda 1997: 204, Bhaumik 2003: 205-7).

Inter-Ethnic Conflict

Sinhala-Tamil Conflict: Almost all South Asian conflicts have ethnic connection. But the most prominent of all is the Sinhala-

Tamil ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka because unlike in other cases the Tamil demand for a separate state has been the most strident. The first flow of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees to India in the eighties was directly linked to this conflict. The anti-Tamil riots that rocked Colombo in July 1983 forced about 30,000 Sri Lanka Tamils to take refuge in neighbouring Tamil Nadu in India. The flow continued with varying degrees of intensity and by May 1985 the figure touched 100,000. Many of these refugees settled permanently in India. According to one estimate, in 1990 approximately 120,000 Sri Lanka Tamils were living in refugee camps while about 80,000 were living outside the camps (Bastiampillai 1996: 195). It has been the global experience that wherever the refugees have a choice to avoid the state-sponsored refugee benefits they do so by using their social contacts because freedom of movement and freedom to select jobs of their choice is important which the camp life restricts (Hovil 2007: 599-620).

Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 the Sri Lanka Tamils in India became suspect in the eyes of the Government of India. The AIADMK Government in Tamil Nadu responded favourably to the Centre by withdrawing all facilities of higher education for them and by monitoring the movements of the internees of the refugee camps more stringently. Even the non-camp refugees were asked to register themselves with the police immediately. By July 1991, more than 26,000 such persons had been registered. Soon afterwards police began to apprehend those who had not registered resulting in 1800 arrests under the Foreigners' Act (Suryanarayan 1996: 221-22). The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, J. Jayalalitha demanded immediate action: 'I appeal, rather demand, that the Centre should take immediate action so that all Sri Lankan Tamils could be sent back.... It should take place immediately' (Suryanarayan 2003: 328).

Soon a plan of repatriation was drawn and between 21 January 1992 and 20 March 1995 arrangements were made to repatriate 54,188 people. To counter the criticism that the government was forcing the Sri Lanka Tamils to leave, the UNHCR was permitted to have a token presence in Tamil Nadu to oversee the repatriation.

Following the defeat of the LTTE in Jaffna and Killinochchi in November 1995, the repatriation was halted, which once again resulted in refugee influx into India. Between 31 July 1996 and 10 October 1996, about 13,000 Sri Lanka Tamil refugees reportedly arrived in Rameswaram, on the coast of Tamil Nadu (*The Hindu*, 6 October 1996). In 1997 there were 1,64,000 Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in India. Besides India, there were several destinations, particularly in the West, for the Tamil refugees, namely, Canada (1,25,000), USA (15,000), UK (35,000), Holland (15,000), Germany (60,000), France (40,000), Switzerland (36,000), Australia (8,000), Denmark (8,000), Norway and Sweden (6,000), New Zealand (1,000), Belgium (1,000), Austria (3,000), Finland (200), Russia (5,000), Botswana (2,000), Indonesia (3,000), Ukraine (1,000), Thailand (5,000), Vietnam (1,000), Rumania (750), Mexico (300), Peru (300), Chile (200), Bulgaria (800), and Cambodia (500). The pain of the scattered existence of the Tamil refugees was poignantly expressed in the following poem of V.I.S. Jayapalan, a Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate poet (quoted by Suryanarayan 2003: 321-22):

My son is in Jaffna
Wife in Colombo
Father in the Wanni
Mother, old and sick in Tamil Nadu,
Relatives in Frankfurt
A sister in France
And I,
Like a camel that has strayed in Alaska
Am stuck in Oslo
And our families
Cotton pillows
To be
Torn and scattered by the
Monkey fate?

There are four categories of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu—(i) Refugees in the camps, (ii) Recognized refugees outside the camps, (iii) Sri Lankan nationals, and (iv) Tamil

militants detained in special camps. In 2002, the 111 refugee camps in Tamil Nadu sheltered 63,941 refugees belonging to 16,955 families. Of the total 39 per cent belonged to the first category, 12 per cent to the second category, 48 per cent to the third category and 1 per cent to the fourth category (Suryanarayan 2003: 332. 351). According to a recent report there are now 113 camps that shelter 80,000 Tamil refugees (Priyamvatha 2013: 20).

Open and Virtually Open Borders

In this category fall those cross-national migrations, which are caused largely by open or semi-open international borders. While the Indo-Nepal border is officially open, the borders between India and Bangladesh, between India and Bhutan and between India and Myanmar are also virtually open. Even portions of India-Pakistan border in Rajasthan and Gujarat are more or less open.

India-Nepal: The open border between India and Nepal has resulted in Nepalese and Indian migrations to India and Nepal respectively. The Nepalese have migrated largely to the north-eastern states of India and the northern districts of West Bengal and Uttarakhand. The Nepali migration to the north-east started with the Moamoriya Peasant Rebellion in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the Burmese invasion in the first quarter of the 19th Century (Thapa 1995: 80-92). The Indian census reports show that the Nepal-born population in India increased significantly after 1951. According to the 1971 census there were 1.3 million Nepal-born Nepalis living in India. Migrant organisations such as the Emigrant Nepali Association claimed that this figure rose to about 3,000,000. Most people, however, tend to confuse Nepal-born Nepalis in India with India-born Nepalis, a distinction which is politically crucial. Because of this confusion popular press have tendency to speculate about their numbers which may range from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 (Ghosh 2004: 26-27).

Like the Nepalis in India, the Indian population in the Terai region of Nepal has also been growing. While part of the growth in the Terai is attributable to the migration of people from the hill regions it has also been caused by the Indian migrations. In 1952-54, the demographic growth rate of the Terai was 2.4 per cent. During 1971-81, it rose to 4.11 per cent. The growth in the corresponding period in other regions was considerably less. In the Mountain and Hill region a rate of increase of only 1.42 per cent was registered in 1952/54-61. It rose to 1.65 per cent in the period 1971-81. In extreme cases, the district of Kanchanpur in the Terai, registered an annual growth of 9.39 per cent while the district of Humla in the Mountain and Hill region registered a minus growth of 2.72 per cent (Shrestha and Rayappa 1992: 296). According to the 1991 census of Nepal, there were 439,488 foreign-born people in Nepal of which India accounted for 418,982. Contemporary Nepalese press reports suggested that on account of the ineptitude of the Nepalese government thousands of Indians from neighbouring districts of Katihar, Arariya and Supoul in Bihar were constructing houses on public land in Biratnagar and Morang in Nepal. According to Biratnagar municipality there were 10,000 such migrants in 1994 and by 1999 the number rose to 15,000. Many of these people had even obtained Nepalese citizenship with the help of local politicians.

India-Bangladesh: Like the Indo-Nepal open border, the border between Bangladesh and India is virtually open. This has resulted in a large-scale movement of Bangladeshis into India. Due to the hurried job of partitioning India that Cyril Radcliffe performed and on account of the inherent difficulty of trying to demarcate areas in mixed Hindu-Muslim localities which exist almost along the entire border, the international boundary hardly gives the impression of being one. Economic and social interactions across the border are as common now in most places as they were before the Partition. The 1981 census revealed that in the eight border districts of West Bengal the population grew at over 30 per cent between 1971 and 1981 whereas the remaining districts reported growth rates below 20 per cent. An extreme case was of a town in northern West Bengal where the population

leaped from 10,000 to 150,000 (Biswas 1982, other district-wise details are in Samaddar 1995: 17-19).

Besides, there are those Bangladeshis who enter India with forged travel documents or even with valid ones but do not return to their country after the expiration of their validity. A decade ago it was revealed by the West Bengal government that at least 400,000 passport holders from Bangladesh had entered West Bengal during the previous ten years but had disappeared into the Indian community without any trace. In a status report on illegal immigration filed in January 1999 in the Supreme Court, in response to a petition, the Government of West Bengal admitted that 1,240,000 Bangladeshis who entered the state with travel documents had melted into the local population while 570,000 had been pushed back into Bangladesh between 1972 and 1998. The document said that till 1997 the intercepted infiltrators were summarily pushed back but after 1997 this practice was discontinued (Ghosh 2004: 30).

India-Pakistan: Another category of clandestine migrants is that of Pakistanis and Indians who cross the borders of Rajasthan and Gujarat in India and of Punjab and Sind in Pakistan. This border is 512 km long in Gujarat and 1335 km in Rajasthan. People living in these bordering areas often have kinship ties across the border. Smuggling is a way of life here and trafficking in drugs and arms, particularly after the intensification of the Punjab crisis in India and the Mohajirin crisis in Pakistan in the 1980s, has been a problem causing serious concern to Indian and Pakistani authorities.

In India, many villages bordering the districts of Barmer, Bikaner, Ganganagar, and Jaisalmer of Rajasthan have registered a much higher rate of growth than other villages. For example, between 1971 and 1981, the population of Bandha village went up from 172 to 5,888, of Muhar village from 9 to 247, of Kuldar from 32 to 240, of Modana from 422 to 1,198, of Mota Kilon-ki-Dhani from 48 to 540 and of Madasar from 445 to 1,171 (*India Today*, 15 September 1985: 53). While part of this growth can be

attributed to the construction of the Rajasthan Canal (Indira Gandhi Nahar), which attracted people from other districts, part of it is also due to migrations from Pakistan, leading to a rise in the number of Muslim-dominated villages along the border (Verghese 1994: 67-73). In this connection it may be noted that in the wake of the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars many Indian Muslims crossed over to Pakistan and settled there. They, however, managed to continue as Indian citizens, thanks to local district politics. These people had the unique status of holding a dual citizenship of both India and Pakistan and continued to cross the border with relative ease. According to the Government of India, 11,000 Pakistanis were found overstaying in India in 1996 (*Times of India*, 7 May 1996). 1991 Census revealed a higher rate of growth of Muslim population in these districts compared to the overall rate of growth of Muslim population in the state.

The growth of Muslim population in the border districts of Rajasthan and Punjab could be attributed to both Pakistan and Bangladesh governance situation. Demographer Ashish Bose who analysed the 1981 Census data wrote:

> The abnormally high rate of growth of the Muslim population in Punjab and Rajasthan calls for investigation. Internal migration alone cannot explain this phenomenon. There is unmistakable evidence from the census data that there must have been considerable illegal migration from Pakistan in these border states and also in big cities like Delhi and Bombay. Curiously enough, in Haryana the Hindu population increased by 28.9 per cent while the Muslim population increased by very much the same rate (29.0 per cent), unlike in Punjab. The growth rates of Muslims in Bihar and West Bengal are also high. Illegal migration from Bangladesh is a demographic reality (Bose 1988: 367).

Indian Migrations: So far as the migration of Indians into neighbouring Bangladesh and Pakistan is concerned, it is much smaller in scale. Except in the aftermath of the Partition when

many Urdu-speaking Muslims from Bihar and UP left for Pakistan there has been no evidence of migration into Bangladesh. However, taking advantage of the porous border, there has been a constant flow of Muslims from India, again mostly from Bihar and UP, to Pakistan some of whom must logically be the so-called 'Biharis' of Bangladesh. A 1995 police survey revealed that there were one million undocumented Bangladeshis in Karachi. Most of the migrant workers in Pakistan arrived after the creation of Bangladesh and are treated as illegal immigrants. Their status is determined by the Foreigners Act of 1946 (Ahmed 1997: 347).

Due to the politically sensitive nature of the matter on account of its fall-out on the Sindhi-Mohajirin relations, the subject has not received the amount of scholarly attention in Pakistan it deserves yet most Pakistanis this author has interacted with are aware of the phenomenon. According to one estimate the number of such illegal immigrants had touched two million during the sixties and seventies. Later, Pakistan decided to fence its entire border with India to prevent the alleged 'illegal immigration' and 'infiltration' from India. India has already fenced its borders in several sectors. It is quite likely that the Pakistani decision to fence the border was politically motivated. It was an attempt to both show the government's resolve to see the Mohajirin problem in the light of unauthorised Indian immigration to Pakistan as well as to counter the Indian charge of Pakistani infiltration. It may be noted that when Pakistan mentions the border between India and Pakistan it excludes the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir which it prefers to call as 'working border'. Earlier, it had strongly objected to India's proposal to fence this border to check the illegal traffic in men and arms.

India-Bhutan: In a limited sense the border between India and Bhutan is also open. The commercial capital of Bhutan, Phuntsholing, which houses the headquarters of the Bank of Bhutan and the Royal Insurance Corporation, is almost totally in the hands of Indian businessmen. Even the entry of Indians to this town in the district of Chukha is free. The immigration check-post is situated only at the northern edge of the town, so only

those seeking to enter into Bhutan beyond Phuntsholing are required to obtain the necessary permit.

India-Myanmar: A virtually open border exists between India (in Mizoram) and Myanmar. Eastern Mizoram adjoins Myanmar and the western part touches Bangladesh. As a result there are infiltrations into the state from both Bangladesh and Myanmar, more so from the latter. Many Myanmarese nationals routinely come to the Chhimtuipui district in southern Mizoram as daily wage labourers or for shopping and medical treatment. The Chins who live across the border in Myanmar are ethnically Mizo. As such there is no suspicion attached to them when they come into Mizoram. In the Saiha sub-division of the district, villages nearest to the border are Vawanberk, Saichang-Kawn and Lungpher, which are motorable and just a kilometer away from the border. On the Myanmar side, it will take three or four days of walking to reach the nearest motorable road. Naturally, they prefer to come to India for shopping, particularly during Christmas, and other amenities such as medical attention.

It is difficult to say how many of these people from Myanmar prefer to stay back in Mizoram as temporary or permanent residents. The 1991 census showed that Chhimtuipui district registered a much higher decadal growth than other districts, such as, Aizawl and Lunglei. While the latter registered a percentage increase of 40.38 and 28.79 respectively, Chhimtuipui registered 50.37 per cent growth. A similar situation existed with respect to the Chakmas of Bangladesh who drifted into parts of Lunglei district. In the Chowngte sub-division of the district there was a Chakma Autonomous District Council and one of the three police stations was called Chowngte (C)—C standing for Chakma. It may be noted that the Lunglei district recorded a slightly higher growth rate for Buddhists in the 1991 census (29.39 per cent) compared to the overall growth rate of 28.79 per cent. It should be pointed out that Chakmas were generally Buddhists (based on author's visit to these areas in mid-1990s).

War-Related Migration

In the early sixties, particularly in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, there were demands to deport the so-called 'Pakistani infiltrators,' as apart from refugees, from Assam. Armed with the Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan (PIP) scheme the Government of Assam deported 192,079 Muslims to East Pakistan between 1961 and 1969. This had a traumatic effect on Assam's Muslim peasantry, which had migrated from East Bengal, and not East Pakistan, much before the Partition, and actually had Asamiyaized. After independence they had identified themselves with the Asamiya nationality.

There was some migration of Hindus from Pakistan to India in the Rajasthan and Gujarat sectors during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Among these Hindus there were about 44,000 Sindhis (Zutshi *et al* 2011: 65). Since they successfully integrated into the already existing Sindhi community (originally refugees) in India and were soon to become economically successful they did not draw the attention of either the state or of scholars. Following the 1972 Simla agreement when the Indian troops were withdrawn from areas occupied by them across the Rajasthan border Hindus living in those areas migrated to India along with the withdrawing Indian troops. They feared that once Pakistan's authority was restored in the area they would be subjected to persecution and violence. At least 100,000 such people belonging mainly to three communities, namely, Sodha Rajputs, Bhil tribals and Meghawat dalits, came to India. During the 1965 war exactly the opposite had happened but on a lesser scale. At that time a few colonies of Muslims in Rajasthan had crossed over to the other side of the border with similar fears. Prior to the 1971 war it was quite common for the Hindu communities living in border areas in Pakistan to have their social contacts across the border in India. Even bridal processions (*barat*) used to be taken across the border and in such ceremonies the local government officers belonging to both countries also participated. The practice continued even after 1971 but on a much lesser scale. But the Punjab crisis put an end to the system as borders came to be strictly guarded.

Developmental and Environmental Refugees

Environmental refugees, according to Eassan Hinnawi who coined the word in a report prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1985, are 'those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption, natural and/or triggered by people that jeopardize the existence and/or seriously affect the quality of their life.' On the basis of this definition one may identify three categories of refugees as environmental refugees, namely, (a) those displaced temporarily because of an environmental stress such as an earthquake or a cyclone and who will return to their habitat once conditions normalise; (b) those who have been permanently displaced because of a permanent change caused to their habitat such as the establishment of dams and associated man-made lakes; and (c) those who migrate permanently or temporarily in quest of better life as their original habitat no longer meets their basic needs. Since we are concerned primarily with somewhat more permanent migrations, only the last two categories are relevant for us.

Bangladeshi Developmental Refugees: In this category one may include the migration of Chakmas and other tribals of Bangladesh into parts of India's north-east and that of poor Bangladeshis, particularly from the Khulna and Rajshahi divisions, into several parts of India. The construction of Karnafuli (Kaptai) hydroelectric project in 1962 submerged 54,000 acres of settled and cultivable land that affected about 100,000 people. About 90 per cent of them were Chakmas. Besides, state-sponsored schemes meant to settle people from the plains in the traditional 'homelands' of the Chakmas also made the Chakamas alien in their own habitat. All this led to disaffection, civil strife, militancy, and eventually, state repression resulting in the flight of the tribals to neighbouring India for safety. By August 1987, there were about 33,000 such refugees spread over several camps in India's north-east. This excludes those Chakmas who took shelter in Arunachal Pradesh.

The migrations from the Khulna and Rajshahi divisions into India have largely been attributed to the construction of the Farakka barrage in India on the Ganga near the India-Bangladesh border. It led to the impoverishment of people in these divisions. Khulna was traditionally a high growth division but during the past few decades it registered a drastic fall which is claimed to be on account of the Farakka dam's negative impact on its agriculture. The exact number of out-migrants from these divisions to India cannot be established but it would not be too much of an exaggeration to put the figure at two million or so.

Climate Refugees: South Asia may face the problem of climate refugees too due to global warming. There are two vulnerable spots in this regard, one, the Sundarbans region bordering India and Bangladesh, and two, Maldives. One-third of the Sundarbans is in India and two-thirds in Bangladesh. Global warming has already started causing the rise in the water level of this world's largest group of river delta islands and mangrove forests. During the last three decades about 80 sq km of the Sundarbans have disappeared under the sea. While the annual global average of sea level rise is 2 mm in the Sundarbans it is as much as 3.14 cm (Editorial in *EPW*, 6 June 2009: 7). So far the resultant displacement of people has been intra-state but given the relative better situation in India and the history of migrations from Bangladesh to India it is possible to speculate that a section of these displaced people would eventually end up in India (Ghosh 2011).

The Maldivian situation is even more alarming for global warming has the potential to completely obliterate the country from the map of the world. The country which consists of about 1200 coral islands of which only 200 are inhabited is on an average only 1.5 metres above the sea level. There have been reports in the Indian press that well-to-do Maldivians are investing in real estate in Kerala to make them their future homes if such a crisis befalls them. President Mohammad Nasheed even toyed with the idea to divert a portion of the country's huge tourist revenue into a fund that would be utilized to buy lands in climate-change-friendly countries (Editorial in *EPW*, 6 June 2009: 7).

Extra-Regional Military Interventions

There are three cases that fall in this category: one, the Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, two, the deportation and displacement of Chinese settled for generations in Kolkata and Assam in the wake of the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, and the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and India following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

Tibetan Refugees: Tibetan refugees started arriving in India in 1950 when the People's Republic of China asserted its sovereignty over Tibet. It was, however, only in 1959 that large number of Tibetans began to flee to India and Nepal in the wake of the Chinese military action on the plateau. The reports of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), published in 1959 and 1966, documented several cases of religious persecution, torture, forced sterilisation, destruction of families, and so on, perpetrated by the Chinese authorities, which occasioned the forced migration. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of such refugees, still, by 1966, about 80,000 to 90,000 Tibetans had taken refuge in India. The flow continued and in 1998, 2300 Tibetans, mostly monks and nuns, poured into India following reports of a Chinese crackdown. Besides India, about 30 thousand Tibetan refugees took shelter in Nepal. After initial settlement of these refugees in Assam (at Missamari) and West Bengal (at Buxa in Cooch Behar), and later in various other parts of India such as Orissa and Karnataka, the Indian government found a more permanent place for a large section of them in Dharmashala in Himachal Pradesh. By 2010, there were about 1,000,000 Tibetans in India (Zutshi *et al* 2011: 59).

Evictions of Chinese in India: It was as early as in 1780s that the first group of about a hundred Chinese had arrived in Kolkata to do business. Kolkata those days provided enormous opportunities. Later, from the 1830s onwards, the British started bringing Chinese workers for their fledgling tea plantations in upper Assam. The difficult local conditions such as natural

calamities and famines also encouraged many Chinese to migrate to India in search of better life. These Chinese soon excelled themselves in such professions as leather processing and shoe making, carpentry and shop keeping. Yet another significant enterprise was the restaurant business. The popularity of Chinese food in India may be traced to this early Chinese hotel ventures. Some Chinese were engaged in the clandestine trade of opium and charas. The flow of Chinese continued which picked up during the Second World War when many Chinese fled to India as refugees fearing the Communist takeover of China (Mazumdar and Tankha 2010).

In the 1950s as the relations between India and China deteriorated after the initial bonhomie of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) Chinese started becoming suspect in Indian eyes, particularly after the flight of Dalai Lama to India. Many Chinese were accused of anti-Indian activities and were placed under surveillance. Towards the end of 1959 the Foreigners' Act was amended requiring the Chinese to obtain 'residential permits' and register at the local police stations. Those who failed to do so were designated as people without any nationality and were allowed to stay in India only for three months. By 1961 about 200 Kolkata-based Chinese that included principals and teachers of Chinese schools, editors and distributors of *Chinese Review*, the managers and other officers of the Bank of China, businessmen and others were deported. The bank accounts of many Chinese were frozen and many shops belonging to the community were subjected to mob fury. After India's war with China in 1962 the situation worsened. Under the Defence of India Act of 1962 the Indian agencies first imprisoned and then deported thousands of Chinese settled in Kolkata, Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Jamshedpur, Mumbai and certain towns of the North East more or less on the pattern of what had happened to the Japanese in America in the aftermath of the massacre of the US air base by the Japanese bombers in 1941 at the Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. In her Sahitya Akademi Award winning historical novel *Makam* (meaning Golden Horse in Chinese) its authoress Rita Chowdhury, who also teaches Political

Science at Guwahati's Cotton College, has narrated the plight of the Chinese in Assam who were rounded up and taken to the Deoli internment camp in Rajasthan where they languished for years before they were deported to China. 'We were not Chinese spies. Why were we deported,' they ask. They still remember India as their 'Janam Jaga' (motherland) (Mazumdar and Tankha 2010, Xing 2009-10: 399-407, *The Hindu*, 8 November 2010).

Afghan Refugees: The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 resulted in a huge inflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Although many Afghans had come to Pakistan as refugees even before the Soviet intervention (by Hafizullah Amin's time, from 14 September to 27 December 1979, some 400,000 Afghan refugees had reached Pakistan), the intervention increased the flow, which reached up to 10,000-15,000 people per month. By the time the Geneva Accords were signed in 1988, the number of Afghan refugees had crossed 3,500,000. During 1991-94, 1,757,402 refugees were repatriated as against 126,026 new arrivals. Of the registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan about 67 per cent were in the NWFP, about 28 per cent in Baluchistan and the rest scattered all over. Some of the Afghan refugees also came to India. According to the World Refugee Survey 1996 published by the United States Committee for Refugees, India hosted 19,758 Afghan refugees.

By late 1990s, many refugees had started to return. Given the unpredictable politics of Afghanistan it was, however, not certain that the process would continue. By the beginning of 1997, 2,600,000 Afghan refugees had returned from Pakistan, 1,900,000 of them with repatriation assistance from UNHCR. Another 1,300,000 had returned from Iran, taking the total number of Afghan refugees who went home to around 3,900,000—the largest repatriation of a single refugee group since UNHCR came into existence, and one of the largest ever (Malha 1997: 9).

The situation, however, changed after 9/11 which resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime. Once again an exodus was unleashed because the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan

which was never enforceable became even more porous leading to uninterrupted cross-border movements. The US-led bombing campaign that started in October 2001 not only resulted in thousands of Pathans taking refuge in Pakistan in a fresh wave but also affected the process of UNHCR-sponsored repatriation drive. For several ethnic and political reasons the Pathan, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara refugees sheltered in Pakistani and Irani camps refused to go back. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century it was a difficult task for both the Pakistan government and the UNHCR to manage the Afghan refugee problem as all policies seemed to fail to repatriate them. Many of them went back to Afghanistan only to come back again as the situation there was not conducive for peaceful existence and also to take advantage of the financial incentive provided by the UNHCR for their return (Ghufran 2011: 948-53). It is likely that the situation would become even more complicated once the American troops withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014.

III
The Political Dynmics

Wherever there are people there is politics. Migrants of course supply the added fodder. Since 'demography is destiny', as Augustus Comte reminds us, politics and migration go hand in hand. As soon as the initial sympathy for migrants dies down in the host society, nativist suspicions about their continued presence come to the fore. Concerns such as pressures on civic amenities, resource shortages and the rise in the crime graph tend to enter popular imagination. The experience of later Jewish immigrants in Israel, later European settlers in America, as well as the Chinese and Japanese immigrants there in nineteenth and twentieth centuries tells the same story. In Mumbai, the Shiv Sena's opposition, first to Tamil settlers and later to illegal Bangladeshis, or Maharashtra Navnirman Sena's current tirade against migrants from Bihar and UP, are some recent expressions of the same anxiety. Theoretically, the political connection of the phenomena of refugees and migrants is well recognised. Since South Asia is poor and populous while at the same time democratic and pluralistic this dimension becomes all the more pronounced.

Relevance for Indian Polity

The Refugee Factor and Hindu Nationalism: The unprecedented Hindu-Muslim riots that broke out in the wake of Partition resulted in massive migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. The presence of these refugees presented a serious challenge to the fledging Indian democracy. Still it succeeded to make India a secular state. The credit largely goes to the Constituent Assembly though it was not democratically elected. There were Muslims in the assembly but there was no organized effort to get the community represented. Hindu communal groups were not there though many Congress leaders were staunchly Hindu-minded. In short, this 300+ assembly was 'remarkably unrepresentative' and, interestingly, there was no popular pressure either to initiate universal adult suffrage. Yet, a constitutional secular democracy based on adult franchise was introduced, a job virtually done by only about two dozen lawyers (Khilnani 2004: 34).

But, all said, against the background of the unprecedented violence to which the Hindu and Sikh refugees were subjected to, the political task was herculean. The Hindu nationalistic politics of India which had a long history got a huge boost from these refugee arrivals which it could not have expected otherwise. Even numerically it was helpful for the Hindu right. According to the first census held in 1951 Hindus accounted for 84.98 per cent of India's population compared to Muslims who accounted for one-tenth of the total (Jha and Jha 2012: 21). The birth of the Hindu chauvinistic Bharatiya Jana Sangh (forerunner of the present BJP) in 1951 was directly attributable to these factors. The linkages of Jana Sangh with the Hindu nationalistic Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) are well documented (Graham 1990, Ghosh 1999). The founder of the Jana Sangh, Syama Prasad Mookerji, constantly emphasised the refugee factor as one of the most important compulsions behind the launching of his new party. No wonder that the initial base of the party came from these refugee settlements, particularly in Delhi and its neighbourhood. The Congress did not feel the Jana

Sangh heat much because many Congress leaders themselves were communally oriented and at the local level they could convince the refugee electorates that since political power belonged to them they could serve their interests better in terms of refugee relief and rehabilitation. There was probably an additional factor as well that contributed to the rise of Hindu right on the one hand and the relative decline of Muslim political power. Following the abolition of zamindari in 1951, against the background of Partition, resulted in two different rural-urban migratory patterns in respect of the two communities. Muslim landlords by and large did not migrate to urban areas but their Hindu counterparts did, in search of new economic activities. This was noticed in Kanpur, Gorakhpur and Lucknow. Notably, 'Muslim immigration was a mere 16.28 per cent between 1947-55 from rural areas as compared to 68 per cent among upper and intermediate Hindu castes' (Hasan 1997a: 52).

The communal temper that was created did not escape the Sikh community either. Together with the Hindus a large number of Sikhs too had arrived as refugees. While the Sikh ethnic identity remained as before, the Punjabi Hindu ethnic identity underwent a change. The latter now tended to identify themselves more closely with Hindi language as opposed to the Sikhs who continued to emphasise their mother tongue, Punjabi, and its script Gurumukhi. It may be noted that in 1951 Census had recognized Punjabi only as a dialect, not as a language. The origin of the militant Sikh separatism that rocked Indian politics in late 1970s and early 1980s can be, to some extent, traced to this element of communalisation of Sikh mind after Partition. The Hindu-Sikh differences that surfaced over the question of language during the 1951 census were largely created by the conflicting approaches of these communities to the issue. In that census most of the Hindu Punjabis recorded Hindi as their mother tongue as opposed to the Sikhs for whom it was Punjabi. The bifurcation of the state of Punjab and the creation of Haryana in 1966 was an inevitable consequence of this ethnic dichotomy (Rai 1965: 198-205).

Bengali Refugees and Leftism in Bengal: Unlike the Punjab experience, in West Bengal where the refugees from East Pakistan were generally concentrated, the impact did not lead to the growth of Hindu nationalism. It contributed, rather, to the strengthening of the left-oriented politics of the state. There were three reasons for this. One, unlike Delhi, Calcutta was not the seat of central power. The issues of Bengali displaced people, therefore, were not under the scanner of the central government which had all the money to distribute. Though B.C. Roy, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, had the sympathetic ears of Pandit Nehru the physical distance handicap between Delhi and West Bengal could not be overcome. Two, unlike Delhi and its vicinities, a sparsely populated area with vast lands available at the disposal of the government, Calcutta was a densely populated city with limited available land to create adequate rehabilitation facilities for the refugees. The latter, therefore, had to forcibly occupy private lands, lawns, gardens and uninhabited houses in total disregard of legal norms. This created animosities between the affected locals and the refugees. In this connection it may also be noted that while on the western sector there was a virtual exchange of population and properties in the eastern sector the inflow into India was much more than the outflow. According to Meher Chand Mahajan, the Minister of Rehabilitation of the Government of India, an inflow of 4,900,000 from West Pakistan to India was matched by an outflow of 5,5000,000 from East Punjab and its adjoining states to West Pakistan (Ghosh and Dutta 2003: 221). The situation in West Bengal was, therefore, conducive for Left oriented forces to garner more support from these newly arrived people from East Bengal. Thirdly, the migrations from East Bengal to West Bengal were not a new phenomenon altogether. The *bhadralok* Bengalis (educated middle class, which also meant the caste Hindus) of East Bengal had a tradition of coming to Kolkata for education, jobs and other social relationships. Unlike Dhaka, which had a rural character with it population having rural connections, Kolkata was urbanized and secular. As a result, the composite group of *bhadralok* Hindu Bengalis did not have to face an altogether new situation. Almost all Hindu government servants in East Bengal had opted for India. In any case because

of their financial background and social networking, in short, social capital, they did not depend on the government support for resettlement. This was not the case with the lower caste Bengali Hindu refugees who flooded West Bengal during the subsequent years. Generally the *bhadralok* Bengalis did not have much truck with these refugees. Rather, many of the *bhadralok* East Bengali Hindus were landlords who had more contacts with their Muslim tillers and artisans. Their politics did not have much to do with that of the lower classes for which it was a question of basic survival. Neither Hindu nationalism nor leftism, therefore, had any particular appeal for this class. It was part of the mainstream Congress politics of West Bengal.

To understand why West Bengal became one of the centres of Communist politics in independent India and how was the phenomenon connected to the issue of East Bengali refugees in Kolkata and its vicinities the second point mentioned above will have to be revisited. The essential question was relief and rehabilitation for the refugees which inevitably brought the West Bengal government, meaning the Congress party, and the West Bengal unit of the Communist Party of India (CPI) to confront each other for their respective political spaces. In this the government had the inherent handicap. It had both to ask for funds from the central government as well as to provide the same funds to the refugees. It was difficult because there was always a resource crunch since the central assistance was far from sufficient. Congress's disadvantage was CPI's advantage. More the Congress failed greater support was built up for the CPI. This was noticed in the rehabilitation policies and their failures during the 1950s (Mandal 2011: 193-203).

It was, however, not easy for the CPI to build its constituency amongst the refugees. The refugee politics of West Bengal had two segments, one, of those who forcibly occupied lands and established squatter colonies, and two, of those who were kept in refugee colonies with no commitment from the state for their rehabilitation in West Bengal. Not satisfied with the government relief and rehabilitation schemes refugees had started taking law

in their own hands by forcibly occupying central government, state government and private lands to resettle themselves. These squatter colonies came to be popularly known as *jabor-dakhol* (might is right—forcibly occupied) colonies and soon Kolkata and the neighbouring districts came to be dotted with them. CPI was not particularly advantaged to strengthen its mass base amongst these squatter refugees for whom the issue was government recognition of these colonies. For them the Congress government was more relevant, a situation one notices now in the politics of recognition of unauthorised colonies in Delhi. The problem of colony refugees was different. One, their number was continuously swelling making any systematic relief scheme difficult to implement, and two, the proposed rehabilitation of many of them in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in the Dandakaranya forests in Madhya Pradesh was not to their liking. In the beginning it was the concern of all political parties like the Congress, CPI, Forward Bloc and others to think of the welfare of the refugees which was reflected in the multi-party membership of the *Nikhil Banga Bastuhara Karmaparishad* (NBBK—All Bengal Refugee Council of Action, or ABRCA) but as the squatter movements increasingly became violent leading to state's armed response CPI found the situation conducive to enlist greater support for the party amongst the disgruntled refugees for whom violation of law proved more helpful than otherwise. It was still not an easy task for the CPI. The refugees were ambivalent; they were not sure what would benefit them, their identification with the Congress or that with the CPI (Mandal 2011: 203-7). In respect of the colony refugees the CPI was full-throated in its identification with their opposition to be settled outside Bengal.

What really helped the CPI to extend its base amongst the underprivileged in general, which included the refugees, was the difficult economic situation of West Bengal during the first few years of India's independence. All social indicators—purchasing power, law and order, public health and human rights in the name of security—marked dismal decline. Against this background the banning of the West Bengal unit of CPI on 25 March 1948 by the

West Bengal government, against the wishes of Nehru, was politically unwise. It only helped the latter to expand its mass base among the refugees and urban poor which was already there among the poorer sections in the rural areas (Bandyopadhyay 2006). In respect of particularly the refugees the Communists fully supported their squatter movements and, more specifically, their reluctance to be moved out of West Bengal (Kudaisya 1996: 31-32). One of the studies that has analysed this linkage has the following to say (Zagoria 1969: 115, quoted by Kudaisya 1996: 32) :

> In the urban areas of West Bengal, Communist strength [did] not appear to be based on any particular caste and community. Rather, one of the main bases seem[ed] to be the several million 'declassed' Hindu refugees who fled their homes in East Bengal after partition. These refugees constitute[d] about one-fourth of the West Bengal population and a substantial portion of the Calcutta population. They apparently voted for the Communists overwhelmingly. Here, it would seem, is a classic example of uprooted and declassed individuals supporting an extremist party in accordance with the model put forth by the proponents of the concept of mass society.

The political orientation of the migrants from West and East Pakistan represented a split political identity that was partly seethed in historical experience and partly in day-to-day existential problems. For example, the Bengali Hindu refugees might have contributed to the expansion of the base of the Left parties for tactical reasons but the memories of violence perpetrated against them had lingered in their minds and given the chance they could have probably provided the votes for the Hindu-oriented parties. But for historical reasons neither the Hindu Mahasabha nor the RSS and the BJS/BJP could sufficiently exploit the situation, unlike what happened Delhi and Punjab. But if the story of a small settlement of Bengali refugees in the district of Bijnor in UP is any indication it tends to support the conjecture

that given the political climate the Bengali refugees could have become a base of Hindu nationalistic politics. The Bengali Hindu refugees in Bijnor are now staunch supporters of BJP and have developed their political equations with the local Jats so as to pose a political challenge to the local Muslims (*The Hindu,* 1 March 2012).

The Caste Factor: We have noted in the previous section that there was a dichotomy between the *bhadralok* approach to the refugee issue and that of the lower castes. In the politics of West Bengal, in respect of refugee relief, this came to the fore as the Namasudras (an 'untouchable' caste), who formed a sizeable section of the refugees, did not toe the line of the CPI and rather sided with the Congress administration of B.C. Roy. But over the question of sending the refugees to Dandakaranya they opposed even the Roy Government (Chakrabarti 1990: 171-74, 208). In the Hindu politics of East Bengal prior to Partition the cleavage between caste Hindus and lower castes was so pronounced that the latter had shown little interest in leaving their homes and migrate to India. The Muslim League had fully realized the situation and tried to placate them. It may be underlined that when the Pakistan Constituent Assembly was inaugurated on 26 July 1947 it elected the Namasudra leader Jogendra Nath Mandal as the acting president of the assembly. In his presidential speech Mandal profusely appreciated the role of the Muslim League in creating Pakistan which was meant to safeguard the interests of all the minorities of India. He was sure that the new nation would 'never lack in the quality of doing not only justice and fairness but acts of generosity towards the people of minority communities inhabiting Pakistan, and that is my greatest satisfaction' (SARRC 2006: 30). The anti-Hindu riots of 1950 in East Pakistan completely changed the situation as the lower caste Hindus too were massively targeted resulting in their exodus to India. One may surmise whether this initial Scheduled Caste support for the Muslim League had come in the way of their making their presence felt in West Bengal politics in later years. The *bhadralok* dominance of West Bengal politics has continued unabated while the rest of India has witnessed the rise of dalit and OBC politics in massive proportions (Lama-Rewal 2009: 361-92).

In the context of Hindu migrations from Pakistan to the bordering villages of Rajasthan too we have evidence of caste dynamics playing its role. The Hindu migrations have intensified the caste conflicts in these villages particularly between the Rajputs and the dalits. So long as these communities lived in Pakistan they both suffered from a minority complex and therefore lived a subdued life. But after coming to India that complex was no longer there and this factor coupled with the democratic competitiveness of the Indian society led to the sharpening of caste cleavages. One dalit has put it in precise terms: 'Soon after we came to India the upper castes began learning the behaviour of their local brethren. Freedom is greater here—and so is untouchability. In Pakistan, there was much *begar* (forced labour) on the fields of the dominant Muslim landlords. There was plenty of caste among Muslims, too. There, the Rajputs were just happy that it was us, not them, being dragged into *begar*. Here, they tried doing the same thing to us. But we don't want to exchange one *rathori* (feudal overlordship) for another. So we resisted. This side, things are better, freedom-wise. That side, things were nicer caste-wise. All of us, from all groups, prefer being in India. But over here, we have learned of the Rajputs' strength' (Sainath 1999).

Politics of Delhi's Urban Planning: We have discussed above how due to the massive and uncontrollable refugee influx in Calcutta illegal settlements had come up which came to be known as *jabor dakhol* colonies. The experience of Delhi was different because on the one hand the city offered vast spaces under government control which could be allotted to the refugees and on the other these refugees had arrived within the span of a few months making the state respond in a more organized way unlike Calcutta where the refugee flow had continued for several years in relatively smaller numbers each time. The city of Delhi had seen the outmigration of hundreds of thousands of its traditional Muslim residents and the arrival of millions of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab. The challenge for the Indian government was to rehabilitate the refugees and not to worry about the town's history and traditional landscape.

As a result

> Delhi was primarily viewed as a site from where national reconstruction and planning could be designed. The new rulers invested in a technocratic modernism for the city, to be produced and managed by experts and scientists. For a capital city there was little time for experiments or utopias. It was not without consequence that Nehru invested in Corbusier's Chandigarh as the dream city of nationalism free from the anxieties of managing traditional detritus.... Le Corbusier had once asked the question 'Architecture or Revolution' (Sundaram 2010: 17-18).

On visiting the Chandigarh site in 1949 Nehru exclaimed with excitement: 'The site chosen is free from the existing encumbrances of old town and traditions. Let it be the first large expression of our creative genius flowering on our newly earned freedom' (Sundaram 2010: 30).

Under the leadership of Meher Chand Khanna, the Minister of Rehabilitation, massive construction works started to both shelter the refugees as well as to provide them with some economic opportunities. Sixty three markets were set up first temporarily but many of them soon became permanent. It was an era of 'chaotic expansion' because besides quick decisions on the government's part unauthorized constructions became unavoidable. Ever since 1930s several efforts had been made to improve Delhi's urban space leading eventually to the institution of the Delhi Municipal Organization Enquiry Committee (DMOEC) in 1946. But the Partition completely overwhelmed the Committee as it lost all its Muslim members and the 'old elite coalition' collapsed. The G.D. Birla Enquiry Committee which had been set up in 1950 to look into the functioning of the Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT), to which the DMOEC was answerable, submitted its report in 1951. The Birla Committee recommended private participation in housing and changes in the rent control regulations. More importantly, the 'report provided clear clues to the emerging elite consensus on the city's urban design:

centralization, an acknowledgement of "social justice" and a "master-plan." There were also traces of classic colonial and bourgeois fears of urban collapse and decay caused by the "blight" of slums. These were now transposed to the postcolonial burden of governance, confronted by claustrophobic urban space' (Sundaram 2010: 33-34, 92-93).

Bangladeshi Migrants and the Assam Politics: In the wake of the Bangladesh liberation war millions of Bangladeshis took refuge in India, particularly in West Bengal and Assam. Not all of them returned to Bangladesh after its liberation. On the contrary, there was a constant inflow of Bangladeshis throughout the seventies largely on account of the deteriorating economic situation in Bangladesh. In Assam the magnitude of the flow came to sharp focus when the Indian Election Commission released the electoral lists for the state in 1979 on the eve of the 1980 parliamentary election (Weiner 1990: 157-58). The All Assam Students Union (AASU), which had already launched an agitation in 1978 against unauthorised Bangladeshi settlers, intensified its stir. Eventually, in August 1985, an accord was signed between the agitationists and the Government of India which was called the Assam Accord. According to it a formula was worked out to evict unauthorised foreigners. Since the AASU demand that all 'foreigners' who had arrived in India after 1951 should be evicted was considered impractical it was decided that 25 March 1971 would be the cut-off date. All those who had arrived after that date would be repatriated. With regard to those who came between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 it was provided that they would continue to stay in India but would become full citizens with voting rights only after ten years. Because identifying illegal migrants was almost impossible, it was evident from the beginning that the accord was doomed to failure. Even after a decade there was little evidence of illegal foreigners being actually identified and repatriated (*Muslim India*, September 1994: 406). Lately, Bodo-Muslim conflicts have become endemic resulting in thousands of deaths and displacements, mostly of the Bengali-speaking Muslims. Though the Nellie massacre of 1983, in which 3,000 Muslims lost their lives, has not been repeated in that scale yet many smaller Nellies have taken place. The Bodo

argument is the same as that of the Assam agitationists: Bangladeshi immigrants would outnumber the Bodos in the Bodoland Territorial Council (for details, Mahanta 2013).

Bangladeshis and Delhi Politics: The origin of Bangladeshis in Delhi can be traced to the early 1970s when among the millions who had come to India some remained even after the creation of Bangladesh. As the political situation in Bangladesh deteriorated during the early years of Mujibur Rehman's rule (1971-75, in August 1975 he with the entire family staying with him were assassinated) these non-returnees had even less incentive to go back to their country. Many of them started migrating to Delhi from West Bengal, Assam and other parts of the North East as Delhi provided better economic opportunities. The flow continued as the city registered high economic growth compared to many other parts of India and certainly more than West Bengal, Assam and North East, and certainly also more than Bangladesh. The phrase 'demographic invasion' from Bangladesh started appealing to the people.

The number of Bangladeshis in Delhi, however, remained an enigma. The government is reluctant to share its speculations with the public leave alone provide hard statistics. Even NGO studies discuss everything else but shy away from talking about their numbers. Probably, since these studies mostly deal either with humanitarian or sociological issues the numbers do not really matter to them as much as they do for political studies. Even humanitarian and social research is extremely difficult because of fear on the part of the respondents to open up to the interviewer (Ramachandran 2004). The problem is that often Bengali speaking Muslims from West Bengal and other parts of India get mixed up with the Bangladeshis thereby inflating their numbers in popular imagination. It is commonly believed that there are about 300,000 Bangladeshis in Delhi. They live in slums and shanty towns located in such areas as Govindpuri, Nizamuddin, Yamuna Pushta, Madanpur Khadar, Okhla, New Seemapuri, Sawada-Gvevda resettlement colony, Meethapur, Chakkarpur (Gurgaon-Delhi NCR), Nathupur (Gurgaon-Delhi NCR) and many other slum

clusters that have come up around middle class localities which depend on domestic maids and cooks supplied by these migrants. Bangladeshis generally eke out their livelihood through small jobs like rickshaw pullers, domestic help, rag-pickers, and casual daily wage earners.

The question of infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals into Delhi has been used by different political parties for their own interests. In the 1980s Congress and Janata Dal vied with each other for their votes, particularly in the East Delhi parliamentary constituency. Later, the BJP used the issue in conjunction with the bogey of rising Muslim population which the 1991 census had revealed. The party argued that while this growth was attributable to the Muslim disregard for family planning measures it was also due to their unabated infiltration. As Delhi sends seven MPs to India's parliament and 70 MLAs to the state assembly both Congress and BJP consider the electoral contest there seriously. Even the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) has emerged as a force but it still has a long way to go. Historically Congress was the dominant force but since 1989 BJP has emerged as an equal contender. At present all the seven parliamentary seats are held by the Congress (2009 elections) and in the assembly it has 42 seats (2008 elections). But in the last two municipal elections, the latest held in April 2012, BJP defeated the Congress.

With the changing demographic composition of Delhi migrants have started figuring in the politics of the city and as a result each party is trying to vie with the other to identify itself with the interests of some migrant community or the other. It often becomes important to identify with the ethnic markers of the communities concerned. For example, since the people from Bihar and Eastern UP constitute a sizable population in certain constituencies the religious festival of *chhath* has assumed political significance as never before. But in this political tug-of-war the Bangladeshis do not figure much because of their relatively small number as well as precarious existence. They, however, matter in certain specific contexts, namely, localized vote-bank politics, Hindu-Muslim communalism, and internal-

external security dynamics. Had the Delhi-based Bangladeshis been mostly Hindus probably these dynamics would have played out differently. There is no scholarly study on the theme of late. The two published in 1995 still remain the best on the subject though they were based on a micro study (Lin and Paul 1995 and Paul and Lin 1995) and both publications essentially discussed the same thing. Their data are outdated yet they give us a good idea about how to understand and study the politics of Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi.

In the 1970s when Indian politics witnessed the Sanjay Gandhi (Indira Gandhi's younger son) phenomenon with its unprecedented activism exerted for making Indians go for sterilization so as to control the population growth of India Bangladeshis became the softest targets in Delhi though Muslims in general had been similarly targeted. But unlike other Muslims who protested against the drive on religious grounds Bangladeshis could not do so as their very stay in Delhi was questionable because most of them had no legal papers. Rather the incentive that the Delhi administration offered to these unauthorized migrants, ostensibly under political pressure, was attractive enough to agree to sterilization. Tiny plots of land were offered which not only provided shelters to them but also legitimized their stay in a significant way. These one-time land allotments to the original Bangladeshi immigrants having 'refugee status' became the basis of subsequent authorized concrete houses in such places as New Seemapuri (Paul and Lin 1995: 471). In due course these people either entrenched their stay in Delhi by acquiring such legitimizing documents as ration cards and voter's cards or sold off their plots at a much higher price to resettle in the Terai region of UP (now in Uttarakhand) and Cooch Behar (West Bengal) to become agriculturists which was their original occupation. All this was achieved largely through the good offices of Abdullah Bukhari, the Imam of Jama Masjid and one of the influential leaders of India's vast Muslim population (Paul and Lin 1995: 472-73). As voters Bangladeshis became an important political community which the Congress leader H.K.L. Bhagat did not fail to make full use of in his East Delhi constituency where the

Bangladeshis were in maximum numbers. Bhagat expanded his support base by enrolling more and more Bangladeshis as voters resulting in greater confidence amongst these people. By 1990 there were three Islamic schools in Seemapuri where one of the teachers was a legal Bangladeshi with valid papers. The pupils there learnt Bengali, Arabic and Urdu (Lin and Paul 1995: 13).

The Communal Dimension: Bangladeshis, however, had to pay a political price for their voting rights. Soon they got entangled into the communal politics of the city which was a microcosm of north Indian politics. The decade of 1980s saw the resurgence of Hindu nationalistic politics which the BJP championed as never before after its creation in 1984 (for details, Ghosh 1999). The political controversy over the issue of Hindu god Ram's birthplace at the Babri Mosque site in Ayodhya (UP) picked up militant proportions culminating in the demolition of the structure on 6 December 1992. The incident changed the texture of Indian politics. Against this background the question of Muslim loyalty to the Indian nation became a poll plank for BJP and in that context the demand for eviction of all Bangladeshis figured at the top of their agenda. To dramatize the demand in Delhi, Madan Lal Khurana, MP and Delhi's BJP leader, marched to the banks of the Yamuna river near Okhla to physically oust the unauthorized Bangladeshi setters. Though his efforts failed because of resistance from concerned individuals yet Khurana earned his political dividends. BJP won the Delhi assembly elections held in November 1993 and Khurana became the Chief Minister (Lin and Paul 1995: 12). He, however, realized before long that administration was a different ball game than street politics. His efforts to drive the 'infiltrators' out from Delhi failed miserably. By mid-1995 keeping an eye on the forthcoming 1996 parliamentary elections Khurana convinced himself that he must go slow on the matter.

Given the texture of Delhi's politics Bangladeshis did not seem to have any option other than supporting the Congress both as voters or otherwise. In the late 1980s they had decided to throw their lot with the Janata Dal which contributed to the defeat of

H.K.L. Bhagat. On coming to power the V.P. Singh-led National Democratic Front (NDF) government, however, did not prove to be of any particular benefit to the Bangladeshis. With the collapse of the V.P. Singh government in 1990 and the subsequent installation of the Congress government under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1991 the policy of Operation Pushback was implemented aimed at evicting all illegal Bangladeshis. Faced with this direct danger Bangladeshis considered it wise to return to the Congress fold, which worked. The Operation Pushback was abruptly suspended ostensibly on the advice of the Delhi unit of the Congress. Bangladeshis realized how important it was to side with the Congress even when the latter was in the opposition. The reason for not going ahead with the Operation Pushback was also that it was logistically impossible to deport the Bangladeshis as Bangladesh was unwilling to accept them. The logic of Bangladesh was simple: How can one say they are Bangladeshis, do they have their Bangladeshi passports with them? Also, there are so many such people in India itself with the same tongue and appearance; how can one distinguish them from these so-called Bangladeshis? There was also another problem. The Government of West Bengal complained that in the name of deporting the Bangladeshis, which invariably failed, the Central Government was actually dumping thousands of these people on its soil complicating its already complex migrant/refugee predicament (Lin and Paul 1995: 18-19).

Deportation Issue in Larger Context: Broadly speaking whether it is the central government or the state government, whether it is the election commission or the courts, all have one identical public posture: The illegal Bangladeshis must not figure in the electoral rolls anywhere in India. But when it comes to the play of politics Muslim Bangladeshi illegal migrants find themselves at greater disadvantage. In the border districts of West Bengal which have a fairly large migrant Bangladeshi population the Hindu migrants defy such election commission mandates openly. When the high profile Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan (1990-96) made the headlines by announcing his no-nonsense approach to prevent all unauthorized persons from

voting, which essentially meant illegal Bangladeshis, a satirical poem published in a popular magazine in the border district town of Malda in West Bengal ridiculed the diktat in the following words:

Flop Master Seshan
Tor tate ki
Ami Jodi Bangladeshi hoi
Bari amar Rajshahite
Indiate roi
Jodio ami chakri kori
Bangladesher daftarete
Nam tulechi Indiate
Sheshan ki ar korbere!!

(How does it matter to you if I am a Bangladeshi, if my house is in Rajshahi and I live in India? Even though I serve in an office in Bangladesh, I have enrolled myself as voter in India and what can Seshan do? [Samaddar 1999: 166]).

There are two ways of looking at the issue. One, it was the avowed policy of the Hindu nationalistic BJP that it had no problem if the illegal Hindu Bangladeshis were granted voting rights but their Muslim counterparts should have no voting rights (*The Hindu*, 4 January 2011). Two, probably there is an element of guilt complex on the part of the Indian state that emanates from the Partition of the country. A majority Hindu state can ill afford a policy that evicts illegal Hindu migrants and throws them back into the same land which they have deserted. It is not they who had asked for the Partition and then if they have chosen to come to India should not the latter be duty bound to give them shelter? Since Delhi Bangladeshis are mostly Muslims the danger of their eviction always hangs over their heads as the Damocles' sword.

Foreigners' Issue in India's National Politics: In the 1996 general election the BJP made the issue of illegal migrants a major political plank and campaigned vigorously in the border towns of West Bengal. The party, which had a low popularity in the state,

knew that it could capitalise upon the issue particularly in the border districts. According to Adhir Chandra Karmakar, the BJP president of the border district of Malda: 'That is expected. Many villagers have lost their cattle to invaders from Bangladesh.' He claimed that the number of voters in Malda district had increased by at least 10 per cent as a result of infiltration from 1991 to 1996.

On BJP's coming to power in March 1998 the issue surfaced at the central political level. A Union Home Ministry report alleged that on account of Bangladeshi infiltration large tracts of sensitive international border between the two countries were occupied by a population whose loyalty to India was suspect. Moreover, the report added that, the infiltration was encouraged by Islamic elements in India. Interestingly, even the J&K Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, who became a supporter of the ruling BJP to ensure his own political survival, also picked up the issue. He maintained that the Bangladeshi infiltrators could cross into Pakistan through the Jammu and Kashmir border as a matter of routine and this had serious potential to destabilise the state. He even warned Bangladesh of political destabilisation on account of this phenomenon.

The Nepali Question: Because of the growing number of Nepalis in India and the fact that the subject is politically sensitive data on their numbers is almost impossible to gather. The policies followed from time to time by India to restrict the flow of Nepali immigration have served as an irritant not only to Indo-Nepal relations but also to the Nepalis settled in India. The questions are intricately linked. In October 1976, in response to a series of demonstrations in Nepal against India's 'annexation' of Sikkim in August 1975, the Indian government imposed the Restricted Area Permit on all foreigners in India that included the Nepalis. The permits were to be effective in parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Considering the fact that India and Nepal had a Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 and were thus obliged to keep their borders open, Nepal greatly resented the decision.

Over the years several state governments of India have taken recourse to this act to restrict the influx of Nepalis to their states to the detriment of local Nepali political interests. The restrictions have caused difficulty not only to prospective Nepali emigrants but also to about 5,000,000 Indian nationals of Nepali ethnic origin in the aforesaid areas who had close relations living in Nepal. The Government of India, however, did not relent. Even the Janata government (1977-80) which was committed to improving the relations with neighbouring countries did not change the decision. In 1980, the government introduced the system of identity cards in the state of Sikkim to control Nepalese emigration into the state and thereby prevent distortions in the electoral rolls, a factor which had rocked the then Assam politics.

The so-called Nepali question in Indian politics is a curious mixture of the politics of Nepali nationals on Indian soil and that of ethnic Nepalis of Indian nationality. The question found its most articulated political expression in the politics of Nar Bahadur Bhandari of Sikkim and that of Subhash Ghising, the leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) of Darjeeling in West Bengal. The GNLF movement had assumed international dimensions when, on 23 December 1986, Ghising wrote a letter to the King of Nepal. Sixteen copies of this letter were forwarded to various governments and international agencies, including the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations, and several South Asian governments. Ghising pleaded for justice for 'the unpardonable historical crimes against humanity or still unresolved question of the very political existence or future status of ... Gorkhas in the Indian Union.' It sought 'fresh new treaties for a permanent political settlement of the ... victimised Gorkhas as per ... the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations' taking into account 'the future status of their ceded land and territories' (text of the letter in *The Hindu*, 24 December 1986). In December 1986, the Nepalis of Assam were aghast at Rajiv Gandhi's statement in Darjeeling that there was no question of granting citizenship rights to Nepalis who had immigrated after 1950. Protesting against this the Assam Gorkha Sammelan and the All Assam Gorkha Students Union argued that it was unethical

to brand one section of immigrants like the Bangladeshis, as citizens and the others as not (Baral 1990: 55).

Sri Lanka Tamil Issue in Indian Politics: Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in India pose a challenge to Indian politics which is unique compared to other similar issues, namely, the Bangladeshi or Nepali nationals in India or Hindu refugees in the aftermath of the Partition. The number of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees was never large yet they disproportionately influenced the politics of Tamil Nadu which sheltered them. On account of the ethnic nature of Tamil Nadu politics the Tamils responded to the refugee issue emotionally and, therefore, politically. As one commentator has put it: 'The Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu are like Siamese twins: what afflicts one will affect the other. The narrow and shallow Palk Straits today constitutes the maritime boundary. But the fact is that the Palk Straits historically was a bridge through which people, religion, ideas and commodities flowed freely from one area to the other. It is extremely difficult to cut this umbilical cord.' The question assumed relevance for national politics particularly because the state had a history of separatism during the early 1960s. Both the contenders for power in Tamil Nadu—the Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)—relied heavily on their capacity to project themselves as champions of the Tamil cause. The Congress party ruling at the centre, kept shifting its alliance between the two, depending upon the prevailing political exigencies. As it happens in this kind of a situation the party in the opposition has the added compulsion to assume an ultra-chauvinistic stance to which the ruling party is forced to respond in almost equal terms.

The intermeshing of Sri Lanka Tamil politics with that of Tamil Nadu and then with that of India at the national level found its most dramatic expression in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi during the parliamentary elections of 1991. The assassination, masterminded by the suicide squad of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), took place in Tamil Nadu bringing the ruling DMK government under severe political pressure from its rival,

the AIADMK. The latter routed the DMK in the assembly elections that took place barely six months later, in January 1992. At present the Sri Lanka Tamil factor is once again in focus over the issue of human rights violations during the last phase of Sri Lanka's anti-LTTE war in 2009.

Mizoram's Chakma Problem: The people of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly its students associations, which matter the most in state politics, are always up in arms whenever the question of inclusion of the Chakmas in the electoral rolls arise. As a result both the Government of India and the Election Commission, in spite of their best efforts, find themselves helpless to conduct the polls in the Chakma inhabited areas. In respect of their citizenship Section 6A of the 1986 amendment to the Citizenship Act of 1955 is of little help as it was Assam-specific which the Supreme Court verdict in the case State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma had underlined. It was held that the said clause was not applicable because the Chakmas 'had stayed in Assam for a short period in 1964 and had strayed away therefrom in the area now within the State of Arunachal Pradesh' (Roy 2010: 123).

After having failed to invoke Section 6A of the 1986 amendment the Chakmas took recourse to Section 5(1)(a) of the 1955 Citizenship Act that provided for citizenship by registration. They also petitioned the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) for its support which took the matter to the Supreme Court. In its appeal the NHRC, besides the citizenship issue, also raised the human rights concerns. The Supreme Court upheld the rights of the Chakmas to seek Indian citizenship by registration and instructed the Arunachal government to forward all such requests to the central government for necessary action. It held: 'While the application of any individual Chakma was of being considered, the state government could not evict or remove the concerned person from his occupation/habitat on the ground that he was not a citizen of India' (Roy 2010: 131). It is argued that if the Assam and Arunachal Pradesh situations are compared one would notice the nuanced approaches of the Indian state to the issue of citizenship in these two cases. In Assam 'the

articulation of citizenship as a domain of differentiated universalism … remained elusive', while for Chakmas 'it was only as undifferentiated citizens that the markers of a "migrant/ refugee" status and the luminal state of being a "no-where-people" could be erased' (Roy 2010: 132).

In 1997 the government of Mizoram prepared a note to show that the Chakma population was growing at a much faster rate than the overall rate of population growth in the state. It pointed out that during the period 1951-1961 the decadal growth of the Chakma population in the state was 67 per cent. Infiltration from Bangladesh, however, remained unabated. In 1995, when the Chakmas of Mizoram submitted a petition to the Rajya Sabha claiming that there were 80,000 indigenous Chakmas in Mizoram and that they were being discriminated against by the Mizoram government both politically and economically the Rajya Sabha Committee on Petitions recommended as follows:

1. In the case of Chittagong Hill Tracts, which is the homeland of the Chakmas, a historical injustice has been done and as such the Chakmas are to be treated differently from other refugees with sympathy and on a humanitarian basis.
2. The Chakma Autonomous District Council may be expanded.
3. The Autonomous District Council, after expansion, may be put under the direct control of the Centre till the living conditions of the Chakmas come on par with other inhabitants of the State.
4. The Chakma Autonomous District Council should be allocated more development funds.
5. Chakma refugees who came to Mizoram prior to 25 March 1971 may be granted citizenship.
6. Chakmas who are born in India should be granted citizenship.
7. The Chakmas who are granted Indian citizenship should be declared as belonging to the Scheduled Tribes.
8. Regarding Chakma refugees who came to the State after

> 25 March 1971, negotiation may be held between Government of India and Government of Bangladesh on the lines of the Indira-Mujib Accord.

All the major political parties of Mizoram, including the then ruling Congress Party, the opposition MNF and MPC, reacted strongly against the recommendations of the committee. They issued statements in the press pledging their lasting opposition to the recommendations. The Young Mizo Association (YMA), which wields considerable influence on Mizo social and political life, decided to take up the 'foreigners issue' most seriously in its meetings. The MNF (N) resolved that any proposal to set-up a separate administrative unit for the Chakmas in Mizoram would be strongly opposed. It sent a telegram to the Union Home Minister in this regard.

The Government of Mizoram continued to insist that the Chakma problem in Mizoram was of the illegal infiltration by foreigners and not one of refugees as was the case in the neighbouring states, mainly Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura. It was a pity that the Rajya Sabha Committee on Petitions considered only the arguments of the Chakmas. It was argued that with all the political parties and major NGOs and student bodies opposing the move, the Chakma issue should be handled with care in order to avoid communal tensions and major law and order problem in the state. It was the constant refrain of the Mizoram government that the actual number of bonafide Chakmas was much less than claimed by the Chakmas. To increase their bargaining strength, they were including infiltrators as well as lawful citizens of India in their numbers, it was argued (Author's discussions with Mizoram government officials in November 1997).

During the 2004 parliamentary elections the Chakma issue figured prominently in the campaign as my discussions with Gegong Apang, the then Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, indicated (12 April 2004). The students' associations were directly involved in violent acts against the Chakma-Hajong communities and other refugees. Some of them even served eviction notices to 'illegal migrants' from Bangladesh.

Relevance for Pakistan Politics

Refugees and Pakistan's Ethno-Religious Nationalism: The large-scale migration of Muslims from India to Pakistan significantly influenced the politics of Pakistan. In pre-Bangladesh Pakistan these Mohajirin (which also included the East Punjabis) constituted about 10 per cent (20 per cent after the secession of Bangladesh) of the country's population. The circumstances under which Pakistan was created and the texture of pre-Partition Muslim politics that existed in India had earned for the Mohajirin a unique status and purpose which is otherwise denied to any immigrant community the only notable exception being that of the immigrant Jews in Israel. The Mohajirin figured prominently in the Muslim League which had spearheaded the Pakistan movement. In 1946-47, 10 out of 23 members of the party's Working Committee belonged to the future provinces of Pakistan, but in December 1947, when the council of the All India Muslim League met in Karachi, 160 out of 300 of its members were Mohajirin (Waseem 1994: 102). Comprising relatively better educated people, members of the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Army and important business communities, these Mohajirin constituted a political force to reckon with. About three-quarters of the so-called 'twenty-two families,' which once controlled Pakistan economy, were from these groups. About 60 per cent of the officialdom belonged to this 10 per cent minority (Vakil 1950, Wright 1975: 189-205, Waseem 1994: 109). An early 1960s survey showed that 34.5 per cent of the public servants belonged to the refugee communities and of the 3121 of them 1764 belonged to UP, Delhi and West Punjab. Although the Urdu-speaking refugees constituted only 3 per cent of the total refugee population they captured about one-fifth of all seats in the Central Superior Services (CSS) examination (Waseem 1994: 109).

Besides, as the Mohajirin came mostly from urban centres of India they contributed to the rapid urbanisation of Pakistan, which was one of the fastest then in the developing world. Because of this factor their influence in Pakistan politics became all the more visible (Burki 1973: 148-67). This point, however, has been

marginally contested by Waseem who argues that 'the refugees were far from a monolithic group. Instead, both their disparate origins in various regions of India and then the pattern of their dispersion over whole of Pakistan make them highly differentiated group. A large majority among them came from East Punjab who thus shared their political experience with those from West Punjab'. Waseem, however, agrees that since the refugees settled mostly in urban centres they dictated the way Pakistan's politics should move. 'By 1951, Karachi, Hyderabad, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sargodha and Sukhar already had refugee majorities, while in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan and Sahiwal refugees accounted for more than 40% of the population. These urban refugees emerged as the support base for the refugee leadership of Muslim League, especially in the non-electoral context of Pakistan's politics.' This 'non-electoral' politics is important to note because on the one hand it gave the Muslim League a handle to work as a pressure group without popular accountability and then on the other prevented local groups from emerging as political actors (Waseem 1994: 103, 108).

The Mohajirin, who had left their original homes in India in search of security and a better future in Pakistan, had naturally a larger stake in the viability and visibility of the state. This explains their insistence on strengthening the forces that were supposed to help build Pakistan's unity, namely, Islam, Urdu, and a strong central government. The Muslim League, both on account of its Mohajir leadership as well as the large following that it had in the community, represented these theories of nation-building. Another party which also strongly represented these ideas was the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, a party having a large following among the Mohajirin. With the relative decline of the Muslim League it was this party which attracted the disillusioned Muslim Leaguers the most. Jamaat-i-Islami was originally opposed to the idea of division of India on religious grounds like some of the *ulema* (theologians), but once Pakistan was created it accepted the reality and moved its headquarters from India to Pakistan. It became the most vociferous champion of Islam, opposed all modernist ideas of statecraft and supported the Pakistani

establishment in the eastern wing of Pakistan against what they regarded as the Hindu-tainted force of Bengali separatism (Wright 1975: 198).

Impact on Ethnic Politics: The most significant impact the refugee influx in Pakistan, however, was felt in the sharpening of the ethnic divides and the emergence of the Punjabis as the dominant community. There were two patterns in the migration of Indian Muslims. One consisted of the West Punjabis who crossed over to East Punjab without any dislocation in their cultural lives the most important component of which was Punjabi language. They migrated en-masse and by the end of 1948, that is, within a year or so, the process was complete. What was even more important was that there was satisfactory allocation of landed properties to these refugees with proper understanding between the governments of India and Pakistan.

The other group of refugees consisted of Muslims from U.P., Bihar, Rajasthan, Mumbai and other parts of India. Since there was no proper exchange of properties in case of these people and since many of them were professionals, government servants and businessmen they preferred to settle in urban areas, which provided them better opportunities. Their natural choice was, therefore, Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan as well as its commercial and financial hub. These refugees settled in areas that did not speak their languages like Urdu, Gujarati, Marathi or something else. Since most of the refugees spoke Urdu, which became the national language of Pakistan, they developed a sense of superiority vis-à-vis the locals around them. This created an animosity between the Mohajirin and the Sindhis. As the process of this migration was slow but steady, unlike its Punjabi counterpart, it remained a constant source of conflict emanating from the Sindhi anxiety that they were being outnumbered in their own homeland.

The cumulative effect of these two different processes was that on the one hand it created a cleavage between the Mohajirin and the Sindhis and then on the other it made Punjabis the

dominant community, which neither the Mohajirin nor the Sindhis relished. According to Waseem:

> Punjabis in Pakistan have generally developed a strong outward-orientation in terms of identifying themselves with larger entities both present and past. For example, Punjabis have all along felt nostalgic about the Delhi-based Moghul imperium of the past, upheld the cause of Urdu and operated along concentric identities of Punjab, Pakistan and the Muslim world. Other communities of Pakistan, including the Sindhis, Baluchis and ironically, Mohajirin—who largely shared political attitudes of the Punjabis till the emergence of the MQM in 1984—have often challenged the pre-eminent position of Punjab and sought to carve out a political space for themselves through pressure, bargaining and occasionally armed struggle. Out of the land brought under irrigation by the Ghulam Mohammad Barrage, 0.87 million out of 1.48 million acres were allotted to the serving and retired civil and military officers, a vast majority of whom belonged to Punjab. Not surprisingly, the Sindhi nationalists consider the Punjabis as grabbers of vast agricultural lands along river Indus and accuse them of expansionist designs. The MQM leadership also accused Punjab of pursuing plans to turn Karachi into its satellite (Waseem 1999).

Impact on Punjab Politics

As noted in the previous section West Punjab had seen to it that it hosted primarily the refugees from East Punjab. Since it was the most populous state of West Pakistan and since it benefited from the vast lands vacated by the fleeing Hindus and Sikhs the East Punjabi Muslim refugees could be over compensated leading to their prosperity. The substantial increase in the population of Punjab had the inevitable impact on the confidence of Punjabis vis-a-vis other ethnic groups in the politics

of the nation, more particularly in West Pakistan. It sharpened the ethnic divides leading to the emergence of the Punjabis as the most dominant community to the detriment of the interests of refugees from UP and Bihar.

So far as the economic prosperity of the Punjabi refugees was concerned the following figures will speak for themselves. The Muslim refugee lands vacated in East Punjab accounted for 3.4 million hectares, but the Hindu/Sikh lands vacated in West Punjab accounted for 6.6 million hectares, almost double. Moreover, prior to the Partition the Hindu and Sikh communities had a large share in the urban and industrial estates. They owned 80 per cent of the industrial capital and 75 per cent of the urban immovable properties. Allotments of these evacuee properties made the refugees rich overnight. This indeed led to some tensions between the local Punjabis and the refugee Punjabis but in overall terms it helped the Punjabis to become the most powerful community in Pakistan politics (Waseem 1994: 107). The fact that there was no dislocation in the cultural life of the Punjab and the fact that more people now spoke the language vis-a-vis other linguistic groups in West Punjab also helped. On the flip side it brought them in conflict with the Bengali linguistic group which eventually led to the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Impact on Sind Politics

Since there was no proper exchange of properties in the case of refugees from UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, Mumbai and other parts of India and since many of them were professionals, government servants and businessmen they preferred to settle in urban areas, most notably Karachi, the political, commercial and financial capital of Pakistan, they grabbed the administrative apparatus rather easily. This irked the Sindhis of the state most though other communities too were jealous of this rapid growth in Mohajir influence. Before long Karachi became the place of frequent turmoil and inter-ethnic riots. The constant flow of settlers from other parts of Pakistan as well as immigrants from India and Bangladesh not only swelled the city's population it also

exacerbated these conflicts. The growth of Sindhi nationalism can largely be attributed to these migratory processes. The Sindhi nationalists started openly espousing the cause of an independent state. The factors which contributed the most to this separatist outlook were: (a) the separation of Karachi from the province of Sindh in 1948 as the capital of Pakistan, (b) the discriminatory attitude of the Punjabi-Mohajir ruling elite in the distribution of irrigated lands, (c) the marginalisation of Sindhi language and cultural heritage, and (d) the centralisation strategy in favour of the Punjabis enshrined in the One-Unit policy.

An important dimension of Sind politics in the context of the interface of migration and politics in Pakistan is the issue of Biharis in Bangladesh. In 1985, Pakistan's Senate passed a unanimous resolution to speed up the repatriation of Biharis of Bangladesh. Later, this became one of the major points in the PPP-MQM pact, which helped Benazir Bhutto to form her government in November 1988. But reports of the imminent arrival of the first contingent of the Biharis sparked off riots in Karachi in early 1989, which soured PPP-MQM relations. Following the political alliance between Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League and the MQM and Sharif's coming to power, the Bihari question was reopened in 1991. After considerable diplomatic wrangling between Bangladesh and Pakistan an accord was reached in 1992 according to which Pakistan agreed to accept the 'Biharis' as Pakistani citizens. But this could not be implemented due to Sindhi protest. Given the increasing tensions between the Mohajirin and the Pakistani government in later years the Bihari question lingered on.

The issue of repatriation of stranded Biharis in Bangladesh to Pakistan is intricately enmeshed in the politics of Pakistan. One reason that the 1991 census was not held was this veritable mine which could destabilise the ethnic balance between the Sindhis and the Mohajirin in Sind. While the latter were all for the immediate repatriation of the Biharis, the Sindhis were tooth and nail opposed to the idea. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of the Mohajirin, headed by Altaf Hussain, did not forego

any opportunity to refer to the patriotic service rendered by the Biharis during the Bangladesh war and taunted the Pakistani government for its failure to bring them back to Pakistan. In May 1998, he telephonically addressed a large meeting of Biharis in Dhaka and embarrassed the Nawaz Sharif government by mentioning that the Pakistan defence forces would acknowledge the historical fact that the Biharis fought side by side with them in East Pakistan on all fronts and several thousands of them laid down their lives to safeguard the territorial integrity of Pakistan. As opposed to this, the Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party feared that once the Biharis were repatriated they would worsen the unemployment problem in the province. It was not willing to buy the logic that the Biharis would be rehabilitated only in the southern parts of the Punjab province. Interestingly, the party maintained that these Biharis were the butchers of innocent Bengalis and, therefore, should not have any place in Pakistan.

Impact of Afghan Refugees on Pakistan Politics: The arrival of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention of 1979 provided a major advantage to the Zia-ul Haq regime which had already been ensured of American support for its continuation in power through the massive military and economic assistance as a frontline state in America's war in Afghanistan. On the one hand the refugees were potential *muhjahedeen* (freedom fighters) who the Americans needed while on the other their Islamism came handy to Zia for furthering his Islamic cause meant to perpetuate his political dominance. He had reasons, therefore, to welcome the refugees. Zia effectively used both Islam and the traditional code of Pushtunwali to justify his giving refuge to millions of Afghan refugees. In Islamic tradition the migration of Prophet Mohammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE to avoid persecution known as *hijrat* (migration) has a huge respectability and as such the Afghan refugee influx served as a boon to Zia's Islamic diatribe. Since most of the Afghan refugees who crossed the Durand Line were Pushtuns the Pushtun traditions of *melmastia* (hospitality) and *panah* (refuge) came into play to suit the situation well (Ghufran 2011: 948).

Relevance for Bangladesh Politics

The Hindu Question in East Pakistan/Bangladesh: Unlike West Pakistan where the population of the Hindus was reduced to an insignificant number,[2] in East Pakistan, later Bangladesh, it remained quite sizeable though their proportion in the population systematically declined. The existence of these Hindus coupled with the anti-India sentiments among significant political sections in the country has subjected the minority question to all kinds of political manipulation. During the period of Ziaur Rehman the promulgation of Vested and Non-Resident Property (Repeal) Ordinance offered an opportunity to government officials and land grabbers to occupy landed properties of Hindus who had left Bangladesh for India, not always with the intention of not returning. Revenue officials at the district and sub-divisional levels were not only empowered to declare any land held by the Hindus as non-resident property and allot them to Muslim citizens, these officials were even suitably rewarded for their promptness in disposing the cases. The policy continued with some modifications during the regimes of Hossain Mohammad Ershad and Begum Khaleda Zia (Samaddar 1999: 92-93).

The psychological impact of the Vested Property Act on Hindus was devastating. It has been calculated that on an average every day 538 Hindus 'vanished', although there was a downward trend through successive decades (Samaddar 1999: 93). Even the restoration of democracy was no solace. Samaddar's survey amongst the Hindu migrants explodes the myth that democracy promotes inter-communal harmony: 'Hindu migrants … told us repeatedly that their position was better in the Pakistan era than in independent Bangladesh; that even in independent Bangladesh, the Hindus felt more secure under Army rule than under a democratically elected government, for "attitude towards the Hindus and (therefore) India determine the fate of a political party

[2] There has been a constant flow of Hindus from Pakistan who enter into India with valid visas but refuse to return after the expiration of the visas. See a report in the *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 21 April 2013.

during elections"' (Samaddar 1999: 132).[3] The fact of the matter is that no government in Bangladesh has been able to ensure the safety and security of Hindus there. A representative sample of Hindu insecurity is the following statement of a victim of the post-Babri mosque demolition Bangladesh riots:

> I remember that during the Pakistan's regime, the radio used to blare that—'the Hindus are our sacred *amanat*, we have to see to the security of their lives and property.' Broadcasts came not before but only after the mass killings were gone through and the looting of Hindu properties in the Dhaka Narayanganj areas took place during the 1964 communal uprising. It was widely said that it was the Biharis who caused the riot. During the communal attacks of 1990, it was also said that Ershad had instigated it through hired hoodlums. But does the responsibilites of the government end by just bringing such charges in one sentence and doing nothing else to firmly deal with the situation? (Guhathakurta 2002: 80).

The connection between communal politics of Bangladesh and migration of Bangladeshi Hindus to India finds reflection in other spheres of government policies also. There is evidence of officially sanctioned discrimination against Hindus living near the India-Bangladesh borders. They are debarred from applying for bank loans on the ground that they would migrate to India after availing themselves of the loans. While there is some truth in these allegations, the fact is that there are numerous Muslim defaulters too. But seldom any such fear is expressed about these bad loans. In the election of 1996 and thereafter the controversy figured as an electoral issue aimed at maligning the Hindu

[3] This author found similar sentiments expressed by some Muslim leaders of Nepal when the monarchy was ousted by the democratic forces in early twenty-first century. One such leader believed that the Muslim sense of security would be better taken care of in 'Hindu Nepal' rather than in a 'secular Nepal' for it would degenerate eventually into Hindu fundamentalism. See Ghosh 2007: 198-99.

minority (Guhathakurta 2002: 81). Even the Shahbag agitation of early 2013 which represented the secular and democratic ethos of the liberation war of 1971 was branded as anti-Islamic, engineered by pro-India forces. Hindus became victims of violence in several places.

Relevance for Nepal Politics

Nepal's Indian question: India's Nepali question has a mirror image in Nepal's Indian question. In the 1970s and 1980s it was common to highlight the problem arising out of the growing number of Indians in the Terai. The Task Force on Migration, which was set up in 1983 under the auspices of the Nepali National Commission on Population, referred merely to 'some' emigration of Nepalis to India but discussed at length the problem Nepal faced from the rising number of Indians in the Terai (Gurung Report 1983: 13-14, 29). Coupled with the so-called 'India factor' in Nepal's politics the bogey of 'Indian hegemony' came handy to the ruling class of Nepal. Against this background the population growth in the Terai was disproportionately attributed to migrations from India. The setting up of the Task Force and its report reflected this politics. When the issue was debated in the Panchayat (parliament) several members spoke of the danger that 'India's demographic invasion of Nepal' posed to the independence and national integrity of their kingdom. A survey of the Nepal Press Digest during the eighties reveals the importance that this one single issue commanded both at the political as well as at the media level. And since under the Monarchy there was 'little doubt that the political orientation of the Press in Nepal, characterised by the more ostentatious shifts in loyalty, is determined by what the government has up its sleeves' (Baral 1975: 180) this attitude of the Press was indicative of the mood of the ruling elite over the question of Indians in Nepal.

Following the return of democracy to Nepal in 1990 it was feared that the Terai question might be further complicated as any democracy is preoccupied with ethnic issues in its initial stages.

Speaking from the other end of the spectrum the Terai people claimed that they constituted 50 per cent of the population, and, as such, they were under-represented in all socio-political and economic sectors. According to the Terai-based Nepal Sadbhavna Party:

> A conspiracy is being hatched to turn the original Terai people into a minority in the region by urging and encouraging the people from the hills to settle in the Terai. We, therefore, want a legal guarantee that the Gorkhalis will be sent back to their hill regions. The Terai people comprise 50 per cent of the total population of Nepal and their contribution to the country's economy is 60 per cent, but their original social and cultural identity is being undermined. They are not allowed to participate in the official programmes wearing Dhoti and Kurta (Baral 1994: 97).

In the elections of 1991 and 1994 the Nepal Sadbhavna Party, representing the interests of Terai Indians, put up their own candidates. At the national level the party got 4.1 per cent votes in 1991, but in the Terai it fared well. In the 1994 election its performance at the national level went down to 3.5 per cent. One reason for the lacklustre performance of the Sadbhava Party was the change in the social demography of the Terai by the increasing migration of hill people into the area. Of the 18 Terai districts, three had a population dominated by people from the hill regions, Kanchanpur (70.1 per cent), Jhapa (69.6 per cent) and Bawak Oarasu (53.4 per cent). Those districts where they constituted one third to half of the population were Morang, Kailali, Sunsari, Rupandchi, Banke and Bardiya.

Although politically Terai Indians did not have much influence, still, from time to time, Nepal raised the issue of the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship and demanded its abrogation. During the visit of the Nepalese Foreign Minister, Kamal Thapa, to New Delhi in September 1997, Nepal wanted some kind of restriction on the free movement of Indians into

Nepal. Reminded of the fact that the Nepalis had the same freedom in India, their stock reply was that one should not compare a country of one billion with another having a few million. Since the treaty did not provide for any possibility for amendment the only way to modify its clauses was by scrapping the treaty and renegotiating a new one. Thapa said: 'We have proposed the entire treaty to be redrawn keeping the fundamental tenets of friendship. But all the provisions will have to change because it has been 47 years since the treaty was drafted.'

Relevance for Bhutan Politics

Drukpa-Nepali Contestation: In the late 1980s the ethnic dichotomy between the Drukpas and the Lhotsampas reached a flash point when the former alleged that due to illegal immigration from India and Nepal the population of the Lhotsampas had increased disproportionately to their natural growth which threatened the demographic balance of the kingdom. There was indeed an element of truth in Bhutanese government's argument. In the mid-1980s Nepalis were forced out of Manipur, Meghalaya and Nagaland to which New Delhi had not objected. Many of these Nepalis settled in southern Bhutan (Rose 1994: 110-11). Conceiving their nationalism in ethnic terms the government emphasised the cultural nationalism of the Drukpas. Not only were the citizenship laws stringently enforced causing the eviction of thousands of Lhotsampas, the government also insisted upon all nationals to adhere to the national code of conduct—the *Driglam Namzha*—forcing them all to follow a uniform dress and other codes while visiting the Dzongs, monasteries, government offices and official functions. Dzonkha was declared as the official language and the use of Nepali in schools even in the Lhotsampa-majority areas was restricted. All subjects were made to pledge loyalty to the King and the Drukpa political system. These policies were in contrast to the earlier ones that encouraged Drukpa-Lhotsampa cultural integration. The sectarian approach to nation building led to organised Lhotsampa protest, which in due course turned into militancy. State repression followed. The end result was large-scale exodus of Lhotsampa refugees to Nepal and India.

IV
The secutiry Factor

In South Asia there are several cases where one can identify the connection between migration and security. It started with the partition of India and Hindu-Muslim migrations across the borders in large numbers. So far as India was concerned, though the Hindu migrants from Punjab contributed to the rise of the Hindu-oriented Bharatiya Jana Sangh which tended to view India's foreign policy in communal terms, the fact that the party could not make its presence felt electorally that connection remained more academic than real. But in the case of Pakistan the Muslim refugees from India mattered a lot in determining the security posture of the country. It got reflected in Pakistan's foreign policy from the beginning.

***Mohajir Factor in Pakistan's Security Policy*:** Having created Pakistan and then migrating to the new state in massive numbers the Muslim League leadership and its supporters had a political compulsion to safeguard the security interests of their land vis-à-vis India. The government of Pakistan which was controlled by the Mohajirin did not take much time to express their commitment to the cause. Within a few months after Pakistan's creation it entered into an armed conflict with India over Kashmir, a dispute which still remains unresolved. The security policy of Pakistan in the 1950s had one agenda—anti-Indianism. Since this was the time when the Cold War was increasingly getting complicated the Pakistan leadership threw its lot with those of the American bloc and soon became a part of the US-sponsored alliance networks, SEATO and CENTO. The division of the assets of undivided India between India and Pakistan which included the division of the British Indian Army, and the subsequent military takeover of the country in the late 1950s further worsened the India-Pakistan relations. The growing domination of Punjab in the politics of Pakistan which was largely on account of Punjabi migrations from West Punjab that we have discussed in the previous section coupled with the virtual control of Pakistan politics by its Punjabi-dominated army underlines the connection

between Partition migrations and the India-Pakistan conflicts thereafter.

The India-Pakistan relationship became murkier over the years. Mutual allegations of interference in each other's ethnic and sub-national conflicts became routine. Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which brought millions of Afghan refugees to Pakistan and militarized Pakistan politics further, millions of dollars of sophisticated arms were pumped into the south-western region of Asia a sizable portion of which found its way into Kashmir where a 'fifth column' was ever present to raise the banner of revolt against the Indian state. The intensification of the civil war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Geneva Accord (1988); the subsequent withdrawal of the Soviets, and the almost simultaneous rise of insurgency in Kashmir, boosted Pakistani temptation to pay India back in its own coin for its role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. The part played by Pakistan's ISI-trained infiltrators, belonging to the Muslim nations like Afghanistan, added the new dimension of Islamic fundamentalism to Kashmir's politics, hitherto largely unknown to the state's composite Hindu-Muslim culture, the so-called Kashmiriyat.[4]

The danger inherent in the situation was brought into sharp focus in 1995 when the centuries-old shrine of Charar-e-Sharif, revered by both Muslims and Hindus, was burnt in the cross-fire between the militants and the Indian security forces. The crisis in Kashmir is largely linked to the phenomenon of cross-border traffic and the disputed nature of the territory right from independence. Pakistan could never reconcile itself to the accession of Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir to India. It not only tried to wrest the territory from India militarily but also encouraged infiltrations from Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK) to cross over into the Indian part of the state to foment trouble.

[4] Kashmiriyat eludes both a clear definition and connotation. During the past four to five decades it has assumed various meanings depending upon the prevailing political moods in the valley and the way they have been understood by the Indian state. See Tak 2013.

The fall of Kabul to the ISI-trained Taliban militia added a new dimension to the insurgency in Kashmir. It was feared by Indian authorities that, emboldened by their success in Afghanistan, the Taliban might send their mercenary guerrillas to the Kashmir valley to bolster Islamic fundamentalism there. The *Annual Report 1996-97* of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, had reported that in 1996, of the 476 foreign mercenaries arrested or killed in the valley 136 were Afghan nationals. Indian army officers involved in encounters with Afghan mercenaries testified to their brutalities as well as valour.

Kashmir problem cannot be understood without reference to China. At the time of the independence of India and creation of Pakistan, China was not a factor as it was still in the midst of a bloody civil war. Kashmir was purely an India-Pakistan problem as for both the nations it was important for their respective nation-building strategies. But as Cold War engulfed South Asia and India-China relations moved from bonhomie to suspicion to war in the fifties and sixties Kashmir no longer remained an India-Pakistan affair alone and became crucial for the triangular relationship. Pakistan's cession of some parts of POK to China, and later giving autonomy to Gilgit and Baltistan (erstwhile Northern Areas), have virtually put an end to all possibilities of seeing J&K as an undivided state as it existed in 1947. The following passages from the Kashmir Interlocutors' report (Padgaonkar *et al* 2012: 115) are important:

> … from 1980 onwards many outsiders, especially from Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and Panjab, have been encouraged to settle in Gilgit-Baltistan. This has resulted in a change in the demographic balance, leading to sectarian conflict between armed militias, especially in Gilgit. The issue of the future of these settlers and their rights within Gilgit-Baltistan needs to be discussed, as persons from outside Jammu and Kashmir are not regarded as State citizens.
>
> Similarly, while the property of those who fled Jammu and Kashmir during 1948-49 has been protected by the

> State government, no such system exists in AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir], where the property of those who fled to Jammu and Kashmir has been assigned to migrants and/or displaced persons. Thus, while migrants and/or displaced persons from AJK can claim their original properties in Jammu and Kashmir, migrants and/or displaced persons from Jammu and Kashmir cannot claim their original properties in AJK.

Chinese Settlers in India and the Tibetan Refugees: During the 1950s and 1960s, the presence of thousands of Chinese in India, and that of the Tibetans, had allegedly impacted India's security interests. Following the deterioration of India-China relations in the fifties many of the Chinese settled in India were accused of anti-India activities. Because of their political attitudes towards the Chinese Communist Party the members of the Overseas Chinese Workers' Party in Kolkata were put under strict surveillance. Many Chinese were made to leave India (Xing 2009-10: 404-7). The presence of Tibetan refugees in India continues to contribute to Sino-Indian acrimony. Viewing from another angle, host countries sometimes have inherent advantages of not only embarrassing the sending countries to score some brownie points globally but also using a section of the immigrants militarily against the sending country, of course covertly. In the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 when the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) was raised the Tibetan refugees formed the bulk of the recruits (Kharat 2003: 293). India also took advantage of the presence of thousands of these refugees to raise a regiment called the Vikas regiment. This low profile regiment was particularly suited for the defence of Baltistan-Ladakh border. Known in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir as the Lama Fauj (army) its services were of particular value during the Kargil crisis of May-July 1999, from guarding the strategic features such as roads and bridges to being deployed for high altitude warfare (*Outlook*, 28 June 1999: 32).

Sri Lankan Refugees: In the eighties, even before the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, Tamil separatists were supported by India though in this game the LTTE at that time was not particularly

the blue eyed boys of the Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analyses Wing). This was largely unknown and most Indians were critical of the actions of the Sri Lankan government and tended to support the Tamil Nadu opinion in this regard. Following the riots of 1983 when large number of Tamil refugees took shelter in India the latter took full advantage of the presence of these thousands of refugees in Tamil Nadu to impart military training to a section of them to enable them to wage a war against the Sri Lankan state (de Silva 1995: 160-61, and 2012: 30). According to Narayan Swamy who wrote the most knowledgeable book on LTTE:

> The lack of knowledge and reliable information on the covert role of India in Sri Lanka until the 1987 accord was one of the factors which precluded an intelligent analysis of the Indian involvement. Few Indians were aware of the kind of military muscle India was providing to Tamil groups to take on the government of a neighbouring country. Most Indian commentators were taken in by New Delhi's repeated assertions that it was not involved in the arming and training of the Tamils.... It would be pertinent for Indians today to look back and see how the average Sri Lankan must have felt over the brazen patronage extended to people dubbed 'terrorists' by Colombo. Tamil groups based in Tamil Nadu openly claimed credit for attacks on government/military targets in Sri Lanka—without inviting any criticism from the Indian government. Imagine the Punjab and Sind legislature in Pakistan announcing monetary aid to Kashmiri/Khalistani militants. Yet this is precisely what the Tamil Nadu legislature did in 1987 (Narayan Swamy 2008: 31-32).

That some of these trained refugee militants eventually became an albatross around India's neck which the latter found difficult to throw off underscores the security dimensions of the refugee problem. It may be noted that six of the Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, namely, Robert

Pyas, Jayakumar, Shanthi (Jayakumar's wife), Vijayan, Selva Lakshmi (Vijayan's wife) and Bhaskaran (Vijayan's father-in-law), were registered refugees staying in Chennai refugee camps.

Here the role played by M.G. Ramachandran, the film star turned charismatic Tamil politician who ruled Tamil Nadu as its Chief Minister for three times from 1977 to 1987, is of relevance. MGR, as he was popularly known, was born on a Sri Lanka tea plantation near Kandy. He was always a champion of Tamil plantation workers' cause which evolved into his general campaign for the Sri Lanka Tamil demands including a separate state for them. Though he was never consistent about his commitment to one faction or the other at a later stage he became a staunch supporter of the LTTE. When the anti-Tamil riots broke out in July 1983 resulting in a large refugee influx in Tamil Nadu all Tamil political parties vied with one another to show its pro-Sri Lanka Tamil commitment. MGR declared a week-long mourning in the state and issued a call for a statewide strike on 2 August 1983. The strike was supported by all political parties and by the Centre as well, a clear indication of how the Indira Gandhi government considered it wise to go along the Tamil mainstream opinion. It was the first time in independent India's history that the Central government officially participated in a strike called by a state government. All central government offices and undertakings were closed and train services to and from the state were suspended for the day (Ghosh 1989: 171). Whatever might have been his mass politics MGR and the Government of India were on the same wavelength insofar as India's Sri Lanka policy was concerned. Rajiv Gandhi government had to depend on him to see the India-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 sail through. Kingsley de Silva and Howard Wriggins, the biographers of J.R. Jayewardene, wrote that MGR 'was always willing to change his policies on Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka to suit the needs of New Delhi. Thus, although he was a supporter of the LTTE, he backed the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, and his support had been essential to Rajiv Gandhi in containing opposition within Tamil Nadu to the IPKF's campaigns against the LTTE in Jaffna and Eastern Province of Sri Lanka' (de Silva and Wriggins 1994: 668).

The refugee arrivals in India following the LTTE defeat in Jaffna in 1995 caused concern to India's security establishment. Both India and Sri Lanka had agreed that quite often these movements were LTTE-sponsored. It was feared that since Canada, Cambodia and UK had become cold towards the LTTE following the Switzerland anti-terrorism conference of 1995 they had little option other than garnering support from Tamil Nadu. The Tigers had other compulsions too. So long as they were running a 'liberated zone' in Jaffna with all the paraphernalia of a government they had no reason to encourage the people to leave. But as they had to retreat to the Vanni jungles after the Sri Lankan troops recaptured Jaffna, the Tigers had no use for the people. As a result they did not mind if the people left for India in droves.

Bangladeshi Refugees: In the context of reunification of Germany Myron Weiner had said that it was migration and not invasion that destroyed the German state (1992–93: 91). One may use the same phrase to explain the creation of Bangladesh. The India-Pakistan war of 1971 that resulted in the defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan was directly linked to the unprecedented refugee arrivals from East Pakistan into bordering Indian states, more specifically West Bengal. It happens that when the sending country is a weaker neighbour compared to the host country and it is in inimical terms with the latter the sending country is at a serious risk. The presence of millions of East Pakistani refugees on Indian soil not only helped India to launch an international campaign against the military rulers of Pakistan but also to gather enough moral justification to use force to make it bend. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi drew maximum diplomatic mileage by using the Bengali refugee issue. She emphasized that as a poor country like India it was not possible to cope with the situation any more. During her visit to the United States she underlined that at a time when India had attained food security and things had started looking up the huge human tragedy at the India-East Pakistan border that was thrust upon her country strained the national resources to such an extent that it would threaten the country's 'hard earned stability'. In her characteristic eloquence she asked her American audience:

> Can you think of the entire population of Michigan State suddenly converging on to New York State? Imagine the strain on space, on the administration, on services such as health and communications, on resources such as food and money, and this not in condition of affluence, but in a country already battling with problems of poverty and population.... Our administration, already strained to meet the rising demands of our vast population, is stretched to the limit in looking after nine million refugees, all citizens of another country. Food stocks built against drought are being used up. Limited resources scraped together for sorely needed development works are being depleted (quoted by Khondker 1995: 181).

Although Indira Gandhi's US sojourn did not impress the Nixon Administration to change its pro-Pakistan stance it could certainly earn public sympathy for the cause of East Pakistan Bengalis. A huge public opinion support was built up against the Pakistani atrocities and in favour of the Bengali uprising. It was the time when America was preparing for the opening up of China in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger needed the logistical support of Pakistan. Nixon-Kissinger duo, therefore, was in no mood to listen to the voice of reason and human rights. India was not unaware of these realities yet was keeping its powder dry for the inevitable showdown with Pakistan. To achieve this goal two things were necessary, one, enlisting the support of the Soviets in case of the eventuality of a India-Pakistan war which might see the United States supporting Pakistan, and two, making the military use of the refugees to whatever extent possible. To achieve the latter it decided to train a section of the refugees to join the war against Pakistan on behalf of the Mukti Bahini, the Bengali rebel army that was in the forefront of waging a war against the oppressive military junta of West Pakistan, and which had the full logistical support from the Indian armed forces. There was a non-military security compulsion also. India believed that behind the flow of refugees was the calculated design on the part of Pakistan to push millions of East Pakistani Hindus to India so

as to neutralise the numerical advantage of East Pakistan vis-a-vis West Pakistan (Weiner 92-93: 123). That was a dangerous proposition for India. On the one hand it would dramatically deteriorate the fragile Hindu-Muslim relations in India which would have long term implications for the future of Indian state the hallmark of which was secularism, and on the other it would jeopardize regional security as the Partition of India on religious lines had already shown.

Besides the indirect connection between the refugee problem and the question of promoting India's politico-strategic interests vis-a-vis Pakistan there was a direct one as well. Among the people who had fled East Pakistan was the Awami League leadership which had set up a Bangladesh Government in Exile in Calcutta. The Government of India and the Bangladesh Government in Exile could coordinate their political strategies to mutual benefit. India had four principal objectives in mind within the overall strategic consideration. First, to see to it that Pakistan lost its eastern province and its power reduced; second, to see that the refugees returned to Bangladesh; third, the communists, particularly the pro-Chinese variety, did not gain in political strength through the liberation movement; and fourth, the new nation accepted India's pre-eminence in the region unlike Pakistan. Except for the last point, which was to be endorsed by implication than by explicit declaration, all the rest were clearly endorsed by the Awami League. The first objective does not require any documentation. Regarding the second and third there was clear evidence that the Bangladesh Government in Exile had endorsed them (Ghosh 1989: 57-64).

Infiltrations from Bangladesh: In recent times there is also an ethno-communal dimension to the security question in respect of Bangladeshi migrants. The fact that most of the villages on the India-Bangladesh border are Muslim majority villages have made them vulnerable to ISI machinations. The Islamic connection of these migrations is evident from the growth of madrasas. Audio cassettes propounding the cause of Worldwide Islamic Terrorism (WIT) are in circulation in West Bengal,

particularly in the border areas. One of the additions to the list included a highly provocative one of a speech by terrorist Azhar Masood who had to be released by India in exchange for the passengers of the hijacked IC 814. A 32-page booklet written by him espousing the cause of jehad was distributed in West Bengal. Two ISI operated international telecommunication centres or secret spy exchanges, close to the Calcutta airport, were closed down by the Indian authorities.

It must, however, be underlined that the security connection of the Bangladeshi immigrants has often remained unsubstantiated. To understand the linkage between the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India and the alleged internal security threat posed by them, four interrelated factors have to be grappled with: one, the overall Hindu-Muslim politics of India; two, the growth of international Islamist terrorism and the jihadist threat posed to India by elements in Pakistan and Bangladesh with the help of their conduits on Indian soil; three, the nexus between politicians, illegal migrants and trafficking in drugs and other black money rackets such as smuggling; and four, the control of the Delhi police by the central government unlike other states where the police is under the control of the state government. It is possible to assume that along with other migrants from Bangladesh some jihadists too are sneaking into India. But given the porous India-Bangladesh border any motivated jihadist would not wait for this sort of cover. India does not have a problem of Pakistani infiltration as it has of Bangladeshi infiltration still India's internal security is ever threatened by the Pakistan-based jihadists operating in India. So the connection between Bangladeshis in India and Islamist terrorism is at best a conceptual formulation with very little substantive evidence.

For political reasons, however, this connection is always highlighted. This is so because at the national level the contest for power is between the Congress and the BJP and the issue of secularism versus Hindu nationalism, the two ideological positions over which these parties contest, is ever vibrant. The fact that neither Congress is fully secular nor is BJP totally

communal is another matter (Ghosh 1989: 402). Because of this ideological divide the Bangladeshi Muslim migrants in India have a natural ally in the Congress and for the same reason a natural enemy in BJP. No wonder that during the rule of the BJP-led NDA government internal security threat emanating from illegal Bangladeshi migrants figured in a big way. BJP leader L.K. Advani as the Deputy Prime Minister thundered that the government would 'locate and throw out' all Bangladeshi illegal migrants from India. Under such a diktat the Delhi Police which is under the control of the central government had to act. It came out with information that it had intelligence reports suggesting that under police pressure Bangladeshis had left Delhi and moved to Jammu and Kashmir to help the jihadists operating there mostly as carriers and messengers (*The Hindu,* 15 September 2003). Probably there is enough evidence to argue that the rise of Islamic politics in Bangladesh, particularly during the BNP regimes, has an inevitable connection with the jihadists in Pakistan, and also with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, but to link it to Bangladeshi migrants requires substantive evidence.

Whether or not one finds any clear connection between security threats and the presence of Bangladeshis in India, the Delhi police seemingly does not take any chance as was seen during the Commonwealth Games held in October 2010. Many of them were asked to vacate certain sensitive areas or were under strict surveillance. A World Bank-funded NGO survey conducted those days, which was supposed to look into Delhi-based Bangladeshis as well, had to skip Delhi for the same reason and had to substitute it by Lucknow because in Lucknow 'the security threat perception from illegal migrants didn't appear to be a dominant public discourse. As a result the sample was found to be far less resistant to respond to the questionnaire (to reveal identity) as compared to the sample in Delhi' (TARU 2010).

Rohingya Refugees: It is instructive in this context to discuss about the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and their relevance for Bangladesh's Islamist politics as well as Bangladesh's relations with Myanmar from where these refugees have come.

It is alleged both by the secular forces in Bangladesh and the government of Myanmar that these refugee camps contribute to Islamist militancy in Bangladesh to the detriment of liberal and democratic politics in Bangladesh and that of the national security of Myanmar. The latter claims that the Rohingyas are Bangladeshis who have illegally settled on their land and as such they have been evicted. This irks the Bangladeshis, particularly in the camps' neighbourhood areas, who insist that they should be sent back even if force will have to be used. This may be also because of the fact that there is growing militancy amongst a section of the refugees under the leadership of Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), which has close links with such terrorist groups as Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (Huji). Because of this militancy variable neither the Bangladeshi government is sympathetic to the plight of the Rohingya refugees nor is the Myanmar government in any mood to take them back. In 2008 when the Bihari Muslims were allowed to become Bangladesh nationals many had thought that it might mean that the government was willing to consider similar policy for the Rohingyas but nothing of that sort happened for it would have been an unpopular move especially in view of their terrorist links (Murshid 2012: 105-8).

Afghan Refugees: Pakistan's experience *vis-a-vis* Afghan refugees in the post-Soviet invasion phase also highlights the connection between migration and security. Millions of Afghan Pushtuns had taken shelter in Pakistan, mostly in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). At one level their presence on Pakistan's soil was a God-send for the dictatorial regime of the country but later they became a liability. Through them Zia-ul-Haq had bargained with the United States for a new lease for his political life besides demanding huge amounts of arms and economic aid. But before long a pernicious nexus developed between the multi-million dollar illegal trade in narcotics and arms on the one hand and the massive corruption in the politico-military-bureaucratic establishment on the other. It not only affected Pakistan's political development, it also dragged Pakistan into the vortex of factional ethnic conflicts of

Afghanistan which it found difficult to extricate itself from. As the Afghan situation became complicated Pakistan's federal problems in North West Frontier Province multiplied for it was the home of same ethnic groups to which the major warring factions were engaged in the Afghan civil war. Still, the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 following a bloody civil war was pro-Pakistan which the latter had raised from amongst the refugees. The Pakistan army had trained them for the job to Pakistan's advantage. It had been the strategic requirement of Pakistan to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan through which it could fulfil its need of strategic depth given the rivalry with India. These developments cast their shadow on India-Pakistan-Iran relations causing complications for South Asian regional security.

While the Taliban victory was to Pakistan's advantage, insofar as India was concerned it not only affected India-Pakistan relations but also resulted in refugee problems for India. Not only did the Hindu and Sikh settlers in Afghanistan feel threatened and left for India even many disgruntled Afghans opposed to the Taliban regime took shelter in India. One of the members of the first group of 80 Hindu/Sikh refugees that arrived at the Rajasansi airport in Punjab on 17 October 1996 said: 'It is not just that we are required to go out in a burqua. The general atmosphere of fear and terror that stalks the land has made our lives miserable' (*Times of India*, 18 October 1996). Indian settlers in Afghanistan felt that the situation was becoming increasingly hostile and began to leave for India. Pakistan viewed its problems from a somewhat similar ethnic angle. The Washington based *Pakistan Affairs* reported a few years ago that Zia-ul-Haq had told Rajiv Gandhi in early 1987 that if India desired a declaration from Pakistan to the effect that the latter would not interfere in the internal affairs of India, the latter would also have to declare that it would not support the so-called 'Sindhu Desh and Pakhtoonistan' (1 March 1987: 1). In May 1987, the ruling Muslim League, in a party resolution reiterated the proposal. Later there were allegations that India was actively behind the militancy launched by the MQM (Altaf) that rocked Karachi. On 10 November 1998

Pakistan announced the sealing of its western borders with India to check cross-border movement of unscrupulous elements.

***Nepali Migrants*:** The security connection between Nepali migrations to Bhutan and north and northeastern parts of India may be analysed in three segments—first, the impact of these migrations on India's security outlook in the Himalayan region, second, their impact on Bhutan, and third, the impact of the above two phenomena on India-Bhutan and India-Nepal relations. All these are closely linked to India's relations with China. The migration of ethnic Nepalis from Nepal and the northern districts of India from nineteenth century onwards to Sikkim (till 1975 an independent kingdom) and Bhutan was a regular phenomenon. It tended to change the demographic balance between the migrants and the indigenous populations measurably, more so in the case of Sikkim where the Nepalis displaced the original Bhutia and Lepcha communities. Because of politico-strategic reasons India took advantage of the situation to become an interested party calling the shots.

Ever since the exit of Britain as the imperial power in the region an important element in India's China problem was the spectre of its potential influence in India's Himalayan neighbourhood that included three kingdoms—Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. Ethnically, the common denominator across these states was the Nepali ethnicity. China's forward policy in the region had started causing anxiety to India's strategic establishment from the early days of independence exactly the way it used to bother the British. The systematic occupation of Tibet by China from the early fifties till it was annexed in 1959, and its war against India in 1962, had made India concerned about the future of its small northern neighbours, which had traditionally served as buffers between the two Asian powers. This was amply evident in the discussions and exchange of notes between the Indian and Chinese governments in the fifties and sixties (details in Rao 1972: 162-76). Against this background India's policy for Sikkim was to make use of the Nepali 'fifth column' to get it incorporated into the Indian Union because the royal family there

was not playing its cards in consonance with the Indian interests. Eventually India manipulated Sikkim's merger with the Indian Union in 1975. In achieving this, India's principal conduit in Sikkim was the militant Sikkim Youth Congress led by Nar Bahadur Khatiawada, who was also the president of the Committee on Land Reforms of the Sikkim government. In early 1975 he submitted a report the communal implications of which were far-reaching. Its recommendations were meant to dispossess the influential Buddhist monasteries of their huge landholdings. Since these lands supported a sizable portion of the kingdom's original Bhutia-Lepcha population the report if implemented had the potential to deprive these communities of their economic and political power. It is instructive to recall here what the Calcutta-based *Statesman* had editorialised on 18 February 1975. It cautioned Kazi Lhendup Dorji, the Chief Minister of Sikkim, that he:

> must be aware that the acceptance of this report will, in time, lead to the disappearance of the indigenous community of which he is a leading representative. This has happened already in Darjeeling district where Bhutia-Lepchas were in majority before the 19th Century Nepalese influx and also, to some extent, in the southern regions of Bhutan. A similar process was arrested in Chota Nagpur, Nagaland, Mizoram and other parts of India by preventing the transfer of Adivasi and tribal holdings; and it is to be hoped that the Chief Executive of Sikkim will take adequate precautions to protect the indigenous minority community.

Soon, there was a unanimous resolution in the Sikkim assembly for its merger into the Indian Union, which was approved by a state-wide referendum.

It may be noted that by the beginning of 1970s the interethnic political rivalry had become chronic resulting in the dramatic decline in the Sikkim king's capacity to rule. Against this background Kazi Lhendup Dorji, Nar Bahadur Khatiwada, Ram Chandra Poudyal and Krishna Chandra Pradhan emerged as

leaders who mattered. It was alleged that behind these leaders were the Indian armed forces in readiness to intervene. Events moved very fast thereafter: 'ruler's refusal to compromise with the agitating politicians, invalidation of 1973 election, fresh election to the State Council in 1974, demand for associating Sikkim with India, *ruler's visit to Kathmandu against the advice of the government of India*, State Council's resolution to abolish the office of the Chogyal, referendum to decide Sikkim's future and its merger with India in May 1975' (Sinha 2006, emphasis added). It was decided through a Tripartite Agreement among the king, the representative of the government of India and leaders of the political parties in Sikkim to convert the existing State Council into State Assembly and to allow it to continue for a period of five years from its election in 1974. The Government of Sikkim Act, 1974, Clause 7, Section II stipulated: 'The Government of Sikkim may make rules for the purpose of providing that the Assembly adequately represents the various sections of the population, that is to say while fully protecting the legitimate rights and interests of Sikkimese of Lepcha or Bhutia origin and Sikkimese of Nepali origin and other Sikkimese, including Tsongs, Scheduled Castes, no single section of population is allowed to acquire a dominating position in the affairs of Sikkim mainly by its ethnic origin' (for details on Sikkim's ethnic politics, see Sinha 2006).

In the case of Bhutan the use of the Nepali card by India took an altogether different form. Here a bit of recalling the history of India-Bhutan relations since India's independence would be necessary. After the British left the subcontinent Bhutan was worried about its future. In all the three Himalayan states—Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, pro-Congress forces were actively pitted against the respective monarchs, namely, the Nepal State Congress Party (since 1946), the Sikkim State Congress Party (since 1947) and the Bhutan State Congress Party (since 1948). Though Bhutan did not immediately sign any 'standstill agreement' with India like Nepal and Sikkim, for all practical purposes it too adhered to a similar arrangement as was evident from the fact that the Bhutan Agent in India continued to function

in his previous capacity and the Indian Political Officer in Gangtok continued to be accredited to Bhutan as well. On 8 August 1949 both the states signed a treaty according to which Bhutan agreed to 'be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations'. It was further agreed that the 'treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent'. Soon, China's civil war was to end in the victory of the Communists in October 1949 and China was to occupy Tibet in 1950. It has been argued that India's terms might have been harder had the negotiations taken place sometime later as by that time India had faced serious challenge from China in India's North Eastern border with Tibet. Leo Rose explained the situation in the following words:

> In contrast, when negotiating new treaty relations with both Nepal and Sikkim in 1950 the Indians were acutely disturbed by the expressed determination of the new Communist regime in China to 'reunite' Tibet with the 'Chinese motherland'. India's heightened concern over the vulnerability of its Himalayan bulwark was reflected in the secret letters attached to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal, and in the retention of Sikkim as a 'protectorate' in the 1951 Treaty with that state (Rose 1974: 193-94).

Subsequent events showed India and Bhutan closely coordinating their national interests in which India's border war with China worked as a catalyst. India's China war on the one hand demonstrated how vulnerable Bhutan was to the Chinese forward moves while on the other it raised the question in Bhutanese minds as to what extent their alliance with India would be effective in safeguarding their independence given the virtual walkover for the Chinese troops in dealing with their Indian counterparts. Yet, in spite of these dialectics Bhutan decided in favour of aligning closely with India. It did not emulate the model which Nepal was in the process of developing: that is, to follow a policy of equidistance from both India and China. A significant indication of this reaffirmed trust in India was Bhutan's

acceptance of an 'Indian Adviser' to assist the Bhutanese Prime Minister, then Jigme Dorji. This was attributable to the basically different Bhutanese and Nepali perceptions of China's Tibet policy. While the Nepali political elite had little sympathy for the Tibetans the Bhutanese, in contrast, were perceptibly disturbed by the Chinese action which tended to destroy an ancient culture with which Bhutan had so much in common. Moreover, the Bhutanese considered as spurious China's justification that its actions in Tibet were based on historical claims. They feared that the same justification could someday make them meet the same fate (Rose 1974: 198).

India-Bhutan relations moved ahead smoothly with no serious tension. Against this background when in late 1980s and early 1990s the question of Nepali migrations to Bhutan and their possible repercussions on Bhutanese polity and security rocked the country's politics resulting in a state of insurgency in the Nepali-dominated southern districts of the Kingdom that made thousands of Nepalis flee to Nepal as refugees India's policy turned out to be one of benevolent neutrality—in effect, pro-Bhutanese. It may be underlined that Bhutan's borders did not touch those of Nepal. They touched those of India, that too those areas of India's north-eastern region which hosted large number of ethnic Nepalis. It would be logical to surmise (documentary proof is difficult to garner on such matters) that India saw to it that these Nepali refugees did not take shelter in India which would have complicated India-Bhutan relations. According to a recent report of the New Delhi-based Human Rights Law Network (HRLN):

> The Indian government has neither acknowledged presence, provided relief nor extended any assistance to Bhutanese refugees. They are mostly staying in the north-eastern states and in West Bengal. Reports indicate that the local people provide shelter to these refugees. They earn a living through self-employment in animal husbandry and find work in agriculture and the informal sector. The Indian government has not yet

formulated any policy statement regarding the Nepali Bhutanese (Zutshi *et al* 2011: 65).

India's policy has suited the Bhutanese interest well. For Bhutan, dealing with Nepal on the subject was relatively easy compared to dealing with India, which was a bigger power bordering Bhutan. Many rounds of failed talks between Bhutan and Nepal on the refugee issue have shown the far sight of Bhutan and Indian leaderships. So far, Bhutan has not taken back a single refugee. The issue is virtually a dead one now in spite of all kinds of UN and NGO interventions. The American offer of granting immigrant visas to many of these refugees has further watered down the problem to Bhutan's satisfaction. India could have played its Nepali card the way it did in Sikkim. But there were two significant differences in the situations. One, the Bhutan king threw his lot with that of India, and two, its policy was to see to it that it continued to identify its security interests with those of India. In both cases the presence of Nepalis was made use of though in different forms. In Bhutan, unlike in Sikkim, India did not support the Nepali cause; it rather threw its weight in favour of the Bhutan king who represented the Drukpa interests.

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Against the background of Maoist militancy in Nepal that started in the mid-1990s a new security dimension was added to Indo-Nepal relations as well. India was suspicious of the operations of the ISI, LTTE, and Kashmiri and Punjabi terrorists on Nepali soil and feared that at critical moments they could penetrate into India to foment trouble. During the assembly elections held in August 1996 and the parliamentary elections held in October 1996 in Jammu and Kashmir the Indian press was full of reports that Pakistan was planning to send thousands of trained militants to disrupt the polls. Indian intelligence reports maintained that about two thousand of such militants were about to cross the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir making the army to prepare itself to face the eventuality.

It was feared that the use of Nepal by terrorists might eventually complicate India-Nepal relations. It is the hallmark of

Nepal politics to entertain strong sentiments against India's interference in Nepal's politics in which the issue of alleged growth in the number of Indians there figures prominently. The more India's security interests interfered with the politics of Nepal the more vicious these sentiments became. As one Nepalese scholar put it: '[T]he intermittent quarrel over the "people of Indian origin" (which has also become a strong point in reference to the origin of Sadvawana Party in Nepal) could generate unwarranted ethnic turmoil in Nepal (which, in fact, has already encouraged several Jana-Jati groups to build pressure on the government)' (Bal Kumar 1994: 83).

The North-East Connection: On India's northeastern flank, insurgencies of all kinds, arising from the region's demographic complexities, have close connections with migrations from across the borders. The Chinese presence in the neighbourhood complicates the situation. India, at one point of time, had pressurised the Bangladesh government to stop the land settlements in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as they led to displacements of local tribals and their becoming refugees in India. India could take such a stand because restrictions on trade and river water flows could affect the Bangladesh economy severely which it could not afford (Weiner 92-93: 123). The Farakka and the Chakma accords contributed to the improvement in India-Bangladesh relations.

In Mizoram, in the Lunglei district in particular, the Chakma accord, however, prompted a strange reaction. Some of the Village Council Presidents this author spoke to at Tlabung (in mid-1990s) argued that the removal of the Chakma militant Shanti Bahini would lead to total lawlessness on the border. On account of the Shanti Bahini's presence, other insurgents did not dare to tread into the area, they argued. In the absence of the Shanti Bahini, other insurgent groups would have a field day in the area leading to law and order problems and smuggling. From these discussions it seemed to be common knowledge that the Shanti Bahini operated from Indian soil and that they were armed and trained by India's Border Security Force (BSF). The members of the

Shanti Bahini knew the local terrain better and therefore were more effective in patrolling the border on behalf of the BSF. It was a strange situation. On the one hand the Mizos in that part of Mizoram resented the existence of the Chakma Autonomous District Council in Tlabung but on the other hand, they were in favour of the Shanti Bahini, operating under the overall guidance of the BSF. With respect to the tri-junction between Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, it is clear that there is always a close connection between the cross-border movements of people and international security. When, as a result of the Burmese policy of settling non-Muslims in Arakan, many Muslims flocked to Bangladesh as refugees, the Bangladesh government threatened to arm them if the settlement policy was not stopped.

Similar linkages are noticeable in Indo-Myanmarese relations, too. In 1994, India and Myanmar entered into agreements aimed at solving border problems. As a result, the Mizoram government forcibly repatriated about 10,000 Chins to Myanmar. But when India welcomed student activists and pro-democracy members and kept them in refugee camps, the relations between the countries soured, with the result that the joint counter-insurgency operations were suspended. Arrested insurgents told the police that some military officers of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) were extending full support to certain underground organisations of Manipur. Besides, all the outfits in the region had begun to send new recruits to camps in Myanmar for guerrilla training.

It was also surmised that the LTTE was probalby using the sizable Tamil community in India's north-east, to establish contact with the local insurgents. There were about 17,000 Tamils living in and around Moreh in Manipur and also across Myanmar in the area vacated by the same people following the nationalisation of trade and commerce in the 1950s. These Tamils were proficient in Manipuri, Burmese, Nagamese, Hindi, Tamil and English. They had relatives and business contacts in Myanmar, India and other parts of Southeast Asia, which facilitated commerce. Together with Punjabis, Marwaris and Nepalese they controlled the

legitimate and illegitimate Burma trade, latter being by far the larger (Verghese 1996: 123). In 1991 when the Government of India launched its 'Operation Rhino' against the ULFA it came across documentary evidence of the links between the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) of Myanmar, the NSCN, and the LTTE. In one of their press interviews the NSCN admitted as much (Verghese 1996: 59, 406).

V
Impact of Migration on Culture

The most fascinating aspect of the migration saga is the movement of cultures. When migrants move to culturally unfamiliar lands the process leads to interesting fusions in music, dance, and all art forms like painting, cinema, drama and architecture. Of course food also gets influenced. Whether it is the United States, the Caribbean countries, or India, all have experienced such fusions. Prior to the arrival of the African slaves, Americans were unfamiliar with fried foods; now KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) is a global identity marker for America. Before the Portuguese came to India, Indians did not know of chilly, potato or tomato; now Indians cannot live without them. Indians who have settled in the West have added their curry, tandoori, butter chicken, and pilau to Western cuisine. Most Singaporean Indians are now either bi-lingual or multi-lingual, assimilating Malay and Hokkien words in their speech. We are familiar with tongues such as Hinglish or Chinglish. Religious places, too, show signs of this amalgamation as many Hindu temples in Mauritius and West Indies resemble Christian churches and there one is not necessarily expected to take off one's shoes, or, in contrast, in many South Indian churches one is expected to remove one's shoes before entry. In South Asia the impact of migrations on literature and cinema has been significant. In drama, painting and photography there were impacts but they were very nominal. So far as music is concerned there is no such evidence at all for reasons explained below.

Literature: In Bengali, Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu and English literature the impact of Hindu and Sikh refugee movements from

Pakistan or, in general, Partition, is palpable. Partition and the resultant woes became a big theme for Hindi and Urdu literature and they continue to be so. Another somewhat comparable story was that of Saadat Hasan Manto. To escape the wrath of Hindu rioters in Bombay this Amritsar-born Muslim had left for Pakistan where he was accused of obscenity in his short stories. He did not live long and died an alcoholic in 1955. On Bengali literature the impact of the refugee inflow was not immediate though the deteriorating Hindu-Muslim relations and the communal riots had formed the themes of many writings. But as the problem of the refugees started sinking into the collective psyche of West Bengal many authors addressed the issue in their literary creations. Though the list is not exhaustive, the following writings may fall in this genre: Abinash Saha's *Prangana* (1949), Narendranath Mitra's *Durobhasini* (1951), Bonophool's *Pancha Parba* (1954), Ramesh Chandra Sen's *Pub Theke Poschime* (1956), Amiya Bhushan Majumdar's *God Shrikhanda* (1957), Narayan Sanyal's *Bolmik* (1958), Shaktipada Rajguru's *Tabu Bihanga* (1960), and Saroj Kumar Roy Choudhury's *Neel Aagun* (1963). Amongst the poets to be militant about what all happened because of the partition displacements were Sunil Gangopadhyay and Tarapada Roy. According to Sunil Gangopadhyay the partition 'was a subject to be militant about, a subject to feel anger and distress, a subject to romanticize, a subject to cry for, a subject to make a statement' (Mandal 2011: 168-72).

The impact of Partition and migration on literature has over the years spread to English language as well and process seems unending. Anup Beniwal's study (2005) portrays this phenomenon well. He is right when he says that 'however hard we may try to wish it away, the very notion of India's freedom is inextricably enmeshed with the reality of Partition. The socio-political and psychological culture that this entangled inheritance has spawned, has impacted almost every domain of Indian life—public or private. Instead of exhausting itself with the passage to time, the atavistic in the phenomenon of Partition has continued to implode/explode Indian sensibility/reality in myriad ways' (Beniwal 2005: v). Here is a passage from his concluding remarks:

> The creative responses to Partition in Indian novel in English, when analyzed as a whole from the point of view of their emotional content, slot themselves along a two-fold classification: the pre-Rushdie cathartic expression and post-Rushdie parodic metafiction. Within this classificatory schema *Train to Pakistan, The Rape, Ashes and Petals, Sunlight on a Broken Column, Azadi* belong to the first category; *Midnight's Children, The Great Indian Novel* and *Looking Through Glass* belong to the second one. The former expresses itself in realistic-naturalistic terms, the latter in parodic-surrealistic terms. Whereas the trauma of the lived experience tends to make the former responses melodramatic, but didactic, this element is palpably missing in the latter responses. However, in both the responses, violence is viewed as unnatural. In pre-Rushdie Partition novels, the historical revisiting of Partition, being a conscious enterprise, is frozen in time. These authors do not seem to outgrown this time warp. But in post-Rushdie novels, the revisiting of Partition history is both incidental and its repercussions spread over time. Both the responses in their historical analyses of Partition, nevertheless, strike a pronounced anti-colonial stance. Yet Partition history *per se,* when seen from the perspective of its victims, in both the categories is conceived of as an impersonal force beyond human agency (Beniwal 2005: 184-85).

Besides, the thriving Indian diaspora has given rise to a new genre of English writing which is competing for the top slot with native English and American writers. Writers such as V.S. Naipaul, Salman Rushdie, Vikram Seth, Bharati Mukherjee, Amitav Ghosh, Jhumpa Lahiri, Anita Desai, Kiran Desai, Bapsi Sidhwa, Pico Iyer, Rohinton Mistry, and others, tend to draw their inspiration from the hybrid cultures that the South Asian communities in the West and elsewhere have generated.

Cinema: To find the connection between migration and cinema one must take note of the fact that the impact of the

phenomenon of migration on cinema is often indirect. Both in terms of the themes of the movies as well as the influence of the directors and producers of those movies the interconnected events of the Partition violence and displacement of large masses of people had their influences which were not necessarily confined to movies produced immediately after the events but also in movies produced much later. In this section we would try to find this connection first in the Bombay movies and then those produced in Calcutta. So far as the Tamil movies are concerned we would try to see how they were influenced first by the eviction of Indians from Burma in the early 1950s (which constituted mostly of Tamils) and later by the Sinhala-Tamil conflicts in Sri Lanka and the resultant arrival of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu in thousands starting with the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 in Colombo. (This segment of research is yet to be undertaken by the author.)

In pre-partition India film studios existed in Bombay (now Mumbai), Calcutta (now Kolkata) and Madras (now Chennai) to which Lahore was added later. Though Lahore was a late entrant, compared to Calcutta and Madras it had an advantage. Unlike Calcutta and Madras which generally catered to regional languages cinema, because of the general acceptance of Urdu in Punjab the Lahore film industry could cater to the Hindi-Urdu-Hindustani audience of the entire north-central region of India. It may be noted that after the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849 Urdu was introduced as the official language of the province (Kamran 2012: 174). As a result of all this a close connection was established between Bombay and Lahore film industries during the pre-partition days. Such eminent names in the Bombay film world were actor-singer K.L. Saigal, actors Prithviraj Kapur, Dilip Kumar (Yusuf Khan), Shyam, Khurshid, Suraiya, Shyama (Khurshid Akhtar) and Manorama (a Christian from Lahore). Among the music directors were Vinod (real name Eric Roberts), Shyam Sunder, Ghulam Haider, Jhandey Khan, Feroze Nizami and Khurshid Anwar. The lyricists in the same category were Qamar Jalalabadi and Tanveer Naqvi. Renowned singers like Mohammad Rafi, Noorjahan and Shamshad Begum had all moved from Lanore to Bombay in the forties. Even the famous producer

A.R. Kardar, who was one of the pioneers of the Lahore film industry, had shifted to Bombay in the early 1940s. No one had anticipated that Bombay and Lahore would soon belong to two different countries (Ahmed 2012: 60-61).

Following the partition which marked the culminating point in the process of deterioration in the inter-communal relationship many Hindu and Sikh artistes belonging to the Lahore film industry left for Bombay. That is why many prominent actors, producers, directors, and technicians who ruled the Bombay film industry for decades after Partition were either directly from Pakistan or were their descendants. The predominance of ethnic Punjabis in the industry is a consequence of this history (Ganti 2004: 22). With the rise of the Bombay film industry many Calcutta based Bengali producers and directors also started migrating to Bombay. Among the Punjabi actors one may mention the names of Pran, Om Prakash, Jeevan, Hiralal, Meena Shori, Balraj Sahni, Geeta Bali, Kamini Kaushal, Rajendra Kumar, Manmohan Krishan, Gulshan Rai, Chetan Anand, Dev Anand and Vijay Anand; film producers Ramanand Sagar, B.R. Chopra and I.S. Johar; and music directors Husnlal, Bhagatram, Hanslal Behl and O.P. Nayyar. The Lahore connection of Bombay continued much later when Lahore-born Kabir Bedi, Prem Chopra, Simi Garewal, Shekhar Kapur made themselves famous in Bombay (Ahmed 2012: 60-61). Bombay movies also gained in terms of production quality as after the partition many technicians from Lahore film industry migrated to the city.

Bombay's gain was Lahore's loss which had the noted Pancholi and Shorey production units. The Hindus and Sikhs were prominently placed in the city. The 40 per cent strong Hindu-Sikh community owned 80 per cent of the modern buildings of Lahore and all its cinema theatres and studios. Even outsiders like D.M. Pancholi, a Gujarati, and Himanshu Roy, a Bengali, had started their careers in Lahore as producer and director, respectively. The exodus of the Hindus and Sikhs coupled with the general stifling atmosphere generated by the Islam-centric politics of the country encouraged even Muslim artistes who were progressive minded

to leave Pakistan and settle in Nehruvian India that promoted secular temper. One such ideological refugee was Sahir Ludhianvi for whom it was actually a second migration. He and his family had fled from Ludhiana in India to Lahore to escape the wrath of the Hindu-Sikh terrorism. But soon he realized that Islamism would come in the way of his left-oriented poetry. He migrated to India either in 1948 or 1949. Some of his lyrics in Bombay films are legendary. But Lahore was not totally a loser. There were some prominent returnees also. For example music director Ghulam Haider, singer Noorjehan and a few others resettled in Lahore. For some time Lahore regained its activity but it did not last long (Ahmed 2012: 64-65).

Financially both Bengali and Bombay industries suffered severely. Bengali films lost their East Bengal market which provided about 40 percent of their revenue and subsequently the overall Pakistani ban on Indian films affected both Bombay and Calcutta film industries. In 1952 Pakistan imposed taxes on imported Indian films and then in 1962 it banned all imports of Indian films (Ganti 2004: 22). There was no impact of Partition on Madras film industry. It rather gained to some extent by taking advantage of the difficulties of the Bombay industry. Already it had a market in the rest of South India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia to which was now added portions of Hindi film market. The production houses that made this possible were those of S.S. Vasan, A.V. Meiyappan (of the AVM fame), and L.V. Prasad from the Telugu film industry (Vasudevan 2010: 207-9).

In terms of productions, while Bombay alone gained from the arrival of new artistes and technicians from Lahore both Bombay and Calcutta gained in terms of some outstanding productions which were inspired, directly or indirectly, by the displacements that accompanied the Partition. The question of impact of partition migrations, or more broadly, the Partition trauma, on Indian cinema, however, is a complex subject and has much to do with the memory discourse. Interestingly neither the partition nor the trauma associated with it got directly reflected in the cinema produced immediately after the events. Bhaskar Sarkar in his

study *Mourning the Nation* (2009) has tried to find the impact in many movies which were not otherwise connected with the Partition trauma. Though in fewer than a dozen Hindu-Urdu movies out of a total of about 1800 movies produced between 1947 and 1962 the events of Partition figured directly, for example in *Lahore* (M.L. Anand, 1949), *Nastik* (I.S. Johar, 1954), *Chhalia* (Manmohan Desai, 1960), or *Dharamputra* (Yash Chopra, 1961), there were several other movies where the trauma found an indirect presence in terms of physical injury resulting in bodily scars and wounds, reunion of separated families, the loss of near and dear ones due to accidents or natural disasters, and the dishonoured woman, the illegitimate child and suspicions of paternity. One may mention in this category such movies as Bibhuti Mitra's Shabnam (1948), Raj Kapoor's *Aag* (1948), and Yash Raj Chopra's *Dhool ka Phool* (1959) and *Waqt* (1965). About *Aag*, Raj Kapoor's first film, Sarkar writes that it:

> cannot ignore the deep wound inflicted by the national amputation and the accompanying violence; the tone of the film, which casts a shadow over its youthful idealism, intimates the shock more eloquently than the narrative's single direct reference to Partition. *Aag* cues us to the cryptic ways in which Indian popular cinema engaged with a portentous historical horizon inescapably constituted by the trauma of Partition. An array of indirect, tacit figurations come into play: conscious displacements; subconscious, even unintended allusions; indexical citations; accidental traces; evocations of broad, analogous sentiments (Sarkar 2009: 92).

This indirect connection that Sarkar has talked about is to be found if one compares it with similar connection between wars or holocausts on the one hand and art and literature on the other in the West. Sarkar borrows from Dominick La Capra's reference to collective trauma when people's art rendition 'departs from ordinary reality to produce surrealistic situations or radically playful openings that seem to be sublimely irrelevant to ordinary

reality but may uncannily provide … insight into that reality'. People suffering from trauma cannot remember the source of the trauma yet they remember it through other means. In this connection he quotes from Joshua Hirsch's insightful book on Holocaust films:

> As trauma is less a particular experiential content than a form of experience, so posttraumatic cinema is defined less by a particular image content—a documentary image of atrocity, a fictional image of atrocity, or the absence of an image of atrocity—than by *the attempt to discover a form for presenting* that content that mimics some aspects of posttraumatic consciousness itself, *the attempt to formally reproduce* for the spectator an experience of suddenly seeing the unthinkable (Sarkar 2009: 23, emphasis is Sarkar's).

Thus, 'Hirsch is essentially arguing for a mode of representation that is more adequate to the charge of conveying a traumatic experience; in a sense, his is a hyperrealist quest for appropriate forms, given the task at hand' (Sarkar 2009: 23).

Psychoanalysis recognizes trauma through this non-remembering the source. Any description connected to the original event may get transformed into other events. The traumatized persons tend to feel secure only when they are able to bring back the past events into the realm of their transforming capacity. Indian cinema, therefore, may not have dealt with Partition directly but it has done so in transformed narratives, which often has taken the form of melodrama (Biswas 2008: 210-11, Virdi 2010: 1-2, Vasudevan: 2010: 152-55). In this context the Raj Kapoor persona on the screen is of importance.

> The Raj Kapoor character immediately alerts the film public to a certain populist, even agitprop view of the street personality as the vehicle of meditations on issues of social injustice and community bigotry. The figure is at a crucial level produced through a desire to

> distance the public from investments in a social field shot through with the claims of lineage. This was particularly important not only for an imagination of a more egalitarian society, but one also unencumbered by the anxiety arising from a scrutiny of blood ties which could compromise the 'purity' of ethnic religious communities in the wake of the Partition (Vasudevan 2010: 71).

Against the background of Nehruvian secularism and the continued existence of Hindu-Muslim psychological trauma over the pains of broken families in north India the necessity was ever felt by producers to somehow highlight the co-existence of the communities. Amongst the leading characters in successful movies at the box office there has to be a Muslim character, if a Christian is added to it, it is even better. Manmohan Desai, who produced several blockbusters, had once said in an interview that if a movie was rejected by India's Muslims it was a commercial failure. It goes to the credit of Bombay film industry that it has not allowed itself to be touched by the fire of Hindu-Muslim communalism and for this the credit should go to both the Hindu and Muslim film fraternities that belonged to Bombay and Lahore film industries. One of the best examples of this secular ethos was a song sequence in the 1954 flick, Amar (meaning the immortal), an otherwise box office flop. The song, *Insaaf ka mandir hai ye, bhagwan ka gharhai,* was an all-Muslim affair against a Hindu backdrop. The temple scene of the song was directed by Mehboob Khan, enacted by Dilip Kumar and Madhubala (both Muslims), the lyric was by Shakeel Badayuni, sung by Mohammad Rafi on the tune of Naushad Ali.[5] Several years later *Garam Hawa* (1973) was released. Based on Ishmat Chugtai's story and adapted for the screen by Kaifi Azmi the movie was directed by M.S. Sathyu. It dealt with the tensions

[5] On lighter vein, a humorous similarity is the Bollywood flick, *Quick Gun Murugun* (2009). It was a movie with a Telugu comedian, Rajendra Prasad, as its hero, who portrays a Tamil character, is directed by a Bengali director, Shashank Ghosh, the makeup man is a Marathi, and the ethos and stiffness of the hero is that of a Britisher.

within a Muslim family torn between two forces, one arguing for leaving India for Pakistan and the other for remaining in India whatever be the difficulties. In the late 1980s against the background of the Babri Masjid controversy a six-part TV serial called *Tamas* was telecast. Its story was by Bhisham Sahni, a Sikh refugee from Rawalpindi in West Pakistan, and it was directed by Govind Nihalani, a Sindhi refugee from Karachi. It was a very powerful statement against communalism and showed how communal riots were manufactured by vested interests.

So far as the impact of migration on Bengali cinema was concerned the most notable name to be mentioned is that of Ritwik Ghatak who in his films narrated how the Partition of Bengal struck at the roots of Bengali culture. He sought to express the nostalgia that many Bengalis felt for their pre-Partition life. Reproducing the last part of the screenplay of his movie *Meghe Dhaka Tara* (The Star Veiled by Clouds, 1960) Bagchi and Dasgupta (2003: 219) wrote:

> If you are asked to choose a single film which captures the trauma and tragedy of the Bengal Partition with unmatched power and sensitivity, you choose, without a question, Ritwik Ghatak's *Meghe Dhaka Tara* (The Star Veiled by Clouds, 1960). This classic is built on a simple story line: how the eldest daughter of an uprooted family, in a stifling, desperate environment, turns into the breadwinner and ultimately sacrifices her life. In fact, Nita, the protagonist in the film, has become a deathless symbol of Partition itself and the uprooted woman's tragic struggle against it. Here we present a translation of the last part of the screenplay where Nita after fulfilling her mission succumbs to tuberculosis. Her piercing cry 'I wanted to live' sums up the essence of all displacements, exodus and partitions.

According to Erin O'Donnel: 'In his [Ghatak's] films, he tries to convey how Partition struck at the roots of Bengali culture.

He seeks to express the nostalgia and yearning that many Bengalis have for their pre-Partition way of life' (quoted by Chattopadhyay 2007: 266). In response to a question as to what inspired his films Ghatak said: 'Being a Bengali from East Bengal, I have seen the untold miseries inflicted on my people in the name of independence—which is a fake and a sham. I have reacted violently towards this and I have tried to portray different aspects of this in my films' (Madal 2011: 178). Some of his outstanding films belonging to this category, besides *Meghe Dhaka Tara,* were *Nagarik* (Citizen, 1951), *Bari Theke Paliye* (The Runaway, 1958), *Meghe Dhaka Tara* (The Star Veiled by Clouds, 1960), Komal Gandhar (meaning a soft note on a sharp scale, 1961) and *Subarnarekha* ('The Golden Line', 1962). Another notable film in this genre was Nemai Ghosh's *Chhinnamool* ('The Uprooted', 1950). *Chhinnamool* tried to portray as realistically as possible the havoc that the Partition resulted in which was to be seen on the Calcutta streets and all over the city. To do so much of the movie was shot on location at Sealdah railway station swarming with refugees under temporary sheds. This sort of emotively charged documentation of the refugee exodus is rare however extensive is the catalogue of relevant Indian cinema. Compared to *Chhinnamool*, Ghatak's *Nagarik* which was released a year later 'had extensive faults due to Ghatak's initial lack of command over filmic language and his overtly Marxist pedagogy' (Chattopadhyay 2007: 266).

The question, however, remains why Ghatak, who was in a way obsessed with the trauma of Partition and was in a position to directly connect his experience to his creations, took recourse to melodrama like the Bombay films which we have discussed above. This was seen in both his *Meghe Dhaka Tara* and *Subarnarekha*, particularly the latter. In this movie, through the characters of Ishwar and Sita, the director combines two tragedies, one of family dislocation and the other of millions of displaced people groping in the dark as refugees on Calcutta streets. It was not easy to narrate this complex interconnection for it would inevitably remain incomplete. It was, therefore, necessary for him to find the solution in some melodramatic sequences like Ishwar

visiting a prostitute only to find that the prostitute was none other than his lost sister, Sita (Biswas 2008: 213-14, Chattopadyay 2007: 266, Vasudevan 2010: 30). Vasudevan writes: 'The event [Partition] marked his work deeply, generating a highly innovative inquiry into the ramifications of this violent rupture. Using mythic and epic resonances in his delineation of characters and settings, his work documented how displacement had blighted attempts to put a world together again, whether on the basis of the household, the radical collective, or the ground of a realist and rationalist ontology' (2010: 306).

There were other popular melodramatic movies too in this genre, such as *Agneepariksha* (1954), *Harano Sur* (1957), *Bipasha* (1962), and many others, most of which were acted by the legendary duo Uttam Kumar and Suchitra Sen. The duo 'lent its name to the era [1950s and 1960s] and can be used as a sign for a large number of films that did not actually feature the stars together'. Several of these movies fell in the category of the 'Comedy of Remarriage' talked about by Stanley Cavell in the context of Hollywood films—by meeting just once is not the complete story, the couple must re-meet to complete the story. In many of the Uttam-Suchitra movies of this generation the hero and heroine were without parents or at least their presence was negligible. Compared to the present-day TV serials where families are shown so prominently this parental absence is easily noticeable (Biswas 2000: 122, Biswas 2008: 215-16).

Pakistani Cinema: Prior to its decline after Partition the Lahore film industry was rated highly in terms of production. It was one of the world's top ten film industries. While the first Bollywood movie, *Harishchandra*, was released in 1913, the first movie from Lahore to be released was *Daughter of Today* in 1924, produced by G. K. Mehta. Against the background of the Islamic drive after the creation of Pakistan coupled with the exodus of Hindu and Sikh artistes the Lahore film industry suffered a lot. Film making as such was looked down upon as un-Islamic. The Minister of Industries Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar announced: 'In principle Muslims should not get involved in filmmaking. Being

the work of lust and lure, it should be left to the infidels.' But the left-oriented artists, patronised by people like Faiz, continued to have their presence in the industry to the chagrin of the vigilant authorities who got into action to identify this so-called Red threat. In 1954, W. Z. Ahmed's *Roohi*, a socialist kitsch, was banned. For decades, films on poverty-related themes were censored. During General Ayub Khan's rule two shrewd bureaucrats, Qudratullah Shahab and Altaf Gauhar, were mandated to see to it that Pakistani films projected the ideology of Pakistan. These two bureaucrats vitalised the Department of Film and Publications at the Ministry of Information the first major attempt of which was *Nai Kiran*, a feature length documentary. It exposed the greedy politics of the country probably to make a pro-military political statement. Shahab who wrote the story was paid Rs. 20,000 in 1959 (remember that Sadat Hasan Manto was paid barely Rs. 200 for a story). Fearing that prominent artistes would avoid associating themselves with such undertakings the state empowered the producers of *Nai Kiran* to book any artiste for their film. Those who refused to comply were coerced by the police. For instance, Noor Jehan had originally refused to act in the film but when harassed she had to relent (Sulehria 2013).

Drama: Compared to cinema the impact of Partition on drama was less visible, even indirectly. Barring Mumbai, where the Sindhi refugees had generally settled, in other places where most of the West Punjab refugees were rehabilitated, notably Delhi and its vicinities, there was not much of a tradition of drama any way. Let us, therefore, see what kind of influence the East Bengal refugees had on the Bengali theatre which had a long tradition of staging drama in various formats. Given the fact that millions of Bengali refugees took shelter in Calcutta itself, which hugely dislocated the civic life of the city, one would imagine that the refugee phenomenon would be the subject matter of a large number of plays. But it was not so. It has been said that whether it was in painting or other forms of art 'nowhere was this paralytic lack of response more in evidence than in the theatre' (Raha 2001: 153). Since just a few years ago (in 1943) there was the great

Bengal famine and since there was a leftist response to that event in the form of popular plays the presence of refugees got mixed up with that event and the phenomenon was viewed in terms of class conflict and the oppression of the poor and dispossessed in the hands of the privileged sections of the society. In this context the role of the Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) is to be particularly recognized.

Bengal had a tradition of political plays. In the early decades of the twentieth century patriotic plays of Girish Ghosh, Jyotirindranath Tagore, Dwijendra Lal Roy and K.P. Vidyabinode started the tradition. In the form of *jatra* (a folk Bengali theatre form where the audience sat on the three sides of the stage which itself was without sets or props) Mukunda Das preached nationalism. In the 1930s Manmatha Ray made use of mythological legends as allegories to make political statements on contemporary events (Raha 2001: 162). Against this background it is rather surprising that the theatre community of Bengal did not adequately respond to the massive post-Partition displacement of people and the huge refugee influx in Calcutta in particular. There can be three possible explanations.

One, the refugee issue got mixed up within the overall leftist thrust of IPTA which we have referred to above. Two, IPTA, which was in the forefront of political theatre, did not find the post independence situation conducive to promote its leftist ideology for the Indian state had identified it as one of its enemies as reflected in the suppression of the Telengana movement in the south. The CPI to which the IPTA belonged, which was able to popularize itself after the Soviet entry into the Second World War in support of the Allied Powers, found an altogether new situation 'where the common imperialist enemy had left the scene and the recently empowered bourgeois leadership [had] engaged itself in crushing the various mass upsurges and the influence of the Communists'. IPTA found itself unprepared to deal with the situation. 'The vanguard position which organizations like IPTA had achieved over a broad congregation of intellectuals and artists in the earlier period was being lost in this critical situation, and

the problems of growth which it had been facing even in 1945-6 became paralyzing after 1947. At least from early 1948, official and unofficial attacks were also concentrated against IPTA programmes and activists. The theatre movement still went on sporadically, but the character of purposive intercommunication which the organization had given to it was severely hampered' (Bhattacharya 2009: 172-73). And three, IPTA had become so ideologically committed that it became suffocating for all those who supported its cause. They were willing to support the IPTA but not at the cost of professional theatrical standards. For example, Sombhu Mitra, who had pioneered the successful IPTA production *Nabanna* (1944) drifted away from the organization and started his own troupe called Bohurupee without of course compromising on his leftist ideology as was reflected in its first production, a remake of *Nabanna* in 1948 (Raha 2001: 166).

Painting and Photography: Like other art forms, in the field of painting and photography also the refugee phenomenon (which included the famine refugees in Calcutta) did not leave any visible mark in Bengal barring the sketches and paintings of Zainul Abedin (1914-1976), Chittaprosad (1915-1978) and Ganesh Haloi and the photographs of Sunil Janah (1918-2012). 'But the scanty number of such exceptions underlined the atrophy of sensibility' (Raha 2001: 153). In the sketches of Haloi, who was born in Mymensingh in East Bengal and migrated to Calcutta in 1950 as a refugee, one gets the traces of his psyche formed through his childhood experience as a refugee. 'Everything begins in pain', said Haloi. He also said: 'I try to fit the irregular movements of life into the artificial boundaries of paintings.' Haloi's works concentrated mostly on abstract renderings of landscapes in which the nostalgia for a lost world pervaded. So far as photography is concerned the 1998 feature story on Janah in the *Frontline* magazine was conspicuous by the absence of any reference to Janah's paintings on the Bengal refugees though he very much belonged to that time and photographed on other contemporary events (Ramachandran 1998). The explanation can be the same as given above in the context of Bengali drama.

Music: The most fascinating impact of migrations is perhaps on music provided the migrants settle in unfamiliar lands and get detached from their mother country. The best example are the African-American music in America, most notably jazz, and the Bhojpuri music in the Caribbean (Ghosh 2012). Bhojpuri folk music has been characterised as cultural supermarkets where one feasts on a range of social and cultural identities (Johnson 2005: 19). Its influence on Caribbean pop music has been brilliantly presented in Surabhi Sharma's documentary, *Jahaji Music*. The idea of the film came from Tejaswini Niranjana's work (2006). After having heard Goan musician Remo Fernandes, Niranjana observed that his music contained strains of the Trinidadian Calypso. Intrigued, she contacted Fernandes who responded with enthusiasm. Sharma notes:

> This was the journey Tejaswini asked me to document: Remo's encounter with the music and musicians of Jamaica and Trinidad. But this journey had to resonate, I felt, with other journeys—of African slaves and Indian indentured labourers being shipped to Jamaica and Trinidad to work on the colonial sugar plantations in the mid nineteenth century. The world was on the move.

In South Asia, however, since it was not the case of unfamiliarity with the host society music had little scope of hybridization.

VI
Conclusion

The enormity of the problem of migrants, refugees and the internally displaced persons defies all theories of governance because it inevitably gets politicised making the solution complex. The only redeeming feature is that because of social and familial networking the state alone is not the service provider. For example, the Sri Lanka Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, the Afghan

[6] http://www.upperstall.com/films/2007/jahaji-music.

refugees in the NWFP of Pakistan, or the Bangladeshi Hindu refugees in West Bengal often depend in the initial stages of their arrival on migrants who had come earlier. Many Bangladeshi Hindus have confessed to this author that because of the deteriorating communal situation in their country they often try to have one of their children located in India so as to fall back upon in days of crisis. Since the borders in general are porous there is always a sense of having dual belongingness, which actually underlines the artificiality of borders in the Indian subcontinent (Lahiri-Dutt 2004: 490).

Besides state interventions based on legal regimes, what is required more is civil society's contributions both ideationally as well as in terms of activism. Mercifully, people to people contacts in the region are growing in spite of higher walls that are being built by the states to prevent academic seminars and conferences. The path has hurdles, but they will have to be overcome. Interestingly when there was no globalization these movements of people were more accepted but not now. Unfortunately, even India, which is the largest component of South Asia, does not seem to be interested to invest its energy to placate its neighbours beyond routine efforts (Ghosh 2013).

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